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THE FCC'S NEW THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Hannibal Travis*
[FCC licensing permits a broadcaster to] monopolize a
radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens....
[It] confers [a] right on licensees to prevent others from
[communicating in violation of] an unconditional monopoly
of a scarce resource which the Government has denied
others the right to use.'
1W]e believe that taking action to preserve the open
character of the Internet "promotes rather than restricts
expressive freedom" because it provides consumers with
greater choice in the applications they may use to
communicate and the content they may access.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The inauguration of Barack Obama as President prompted new
debate about how federal agencies would implement his plan "to
restore prosperity," "promote the cause of peace," and "reclaim the
American dream."3  How would the Federal Communications
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of
Law. Copyright Hannibal Travis 2010. The author thanks Professors Marvin
Ammori, Thomas E. Baker, Jason Mazzone, Joelle Anne Moreno, Kali Murray,
and Howard M. Wasserman for their helpful comments and suggestions. He
thanks Brad Hutcheson, Karen Mooneram, and Karena Montes Berrios for their
excellent research assistance, and Mike Foy, Gene Kim, and Lara Muller of the
Santa Clara Law Review for their careful and detailed editing. This paper was
presented at the Florida Legal Scholarship Forum in November 2009, and a
portion was presented at the University of North Carolina's "Cyberspeech"
symposium.
1. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 389, 391
(1969).
2. In re Formal Compl. of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028,
13053 n.203 (2008), vacated by Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 600
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
3. Transcript: 'This is your victory,' Says Obama, CNNPOLITICS.COM (Nov.
4, 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/04/obama.transcript/ (last
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Commission (FCC) carry out its statutory mandate of promoting
efficient and world-wide communication by wire and radio without
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or religion?4 Would
it, as then-Senator Obama proposed as a presidential candidate,
guarantee a neutral Internet to all and move against radio
broadcasters that promote racial discrimination?5 And would this,
as some feared, impose "intellectual protectionism in the form of
regulations that suppress ideological rivals"?6 Or would President
Obama's FCC, as others feared, continue to sell out the public
airwaves and Internet infrastructure of the United States to large
corporations with political connections?'
This Article attempts to theorize mass media and Internet
regulation as a solution to the problem of discriminatory, biased,
and deceptive coverage of the nation's most important political
debates. As Congress considered legislation to regulate mass media
visited Nov. 20, 2010).
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (mandate to ensure nondiscriminatory access
to regulated wire and radio networks); U.S. CONST. amend. V (right to due
process in administrations of federal laws that deny liberty).
5. See, e.g., Obama Pledges Net Neutrality Laws if Elected President, CNET
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2007, 2:29 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9806707-
7.html ("Affixing his signature to federal Net neutrality rules would
be high on the list during his first year in the Oval Office, the junior senator
from Illinois said during an interactive forum Monday afternoon
with the popular contender put on by MTV and MySpace at Coe College
in Iowa."); Joe Torres, FCC to Investigate Link Between Hate Speech
and Hate Crimes, HISPANIC MARKETING 101 (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/viewarticle.htmlarticleid=53fb0e563
bb2e9cb799c8b69600al57a (stating that in September 2008, Obama told the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus that "'[tihis election is about the 12 million
people living in the shadows, the communities taking immigration enforcement
into their own hands . . . they're counting on us to stop the hateful rhetoric
filling our airwaves, rise above the fear and demagoguery, and finally enact
comprehensive immigration reform'").
6. George Will, Broadcast 'Fairness' Fouls Out, JEWISH WORLD REVIEW
(Dec. 7, 2008), http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/will120708.php3.
7. See Chris Hedges, Worry: Everything's Gonna Be Not All Right, PACIFIC
FREE PRESS (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.pacificfreepress.com/news/1/3673-worry-
everythings-gonna-be-not-all-right.html (arguing that corporate media censored
or ridiculed those who warned of America's economic decline and loss of its
fundamental civil liberties, and that President Obama could do nothing to stop
the press from continuing to propagate "info-entertainment and fatuous
pundits"); Michael Grebb, Broadband Fight Heads to Congress, WIRED (June 28,
2005),
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,68021,00.html?tw=wn-lpolihead
(reporting claims by public-interest groups Free Press and Public Knowledge
that Supreme Court rulings had set the stage for cable and telephone companies
to control the content of Internet and prevent nondiscriminatory access by the
public).
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and the Internet to ensure neutrality or nondiscrimination with
respect to the type of content or application available for user
access,8 many scholars have explored in great detail the theoretical
justifications for broadcast and Internet neutrality regulation by
the FCC. Yet the theorization by the FCC itself of the First
Amendment's limits on such broadcast, cable, and Internet
neutrality regulation has, surprisingly, escaped the attention of
most scholars of telecommunications and Internet law. Several
scholars have attempted to theorize broadcast neutrality, and
several others Internet neutrality. However, few have considered
the two areas of telecommunications regulation together by using
common theoretical constructs, or emphasized the FCC's own vision
of free speech.9
8. In 2008, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, held hearings and issued a report on the
Internet Freedom Preservation Act, which would prohibit certain forms of
discriminatory blocking of Internet content or applications. See H.R. REP. No.
110-941 (2009). Although Congress is not seriously considering a pure
broadcast media neutrality bill at this time, President Barack Obama's platform
called for increased "diversity in the ownership of broadcast media, . . . the
development of new media outlets for expression of diverse viewpoints,
and clariflications ofl the public interest obligations of broadcasters who
occupy the nation's spectrum." The Obama-Biden Plan, CHANGE.GOV,
http://change.gov/agenda/technology-agendal (last visited Nov. 20, 2010);
see also John Eggerton, McCain's Media-Lite, BROADCASTING &
CABLE (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/115287-
McCain sMedia Lite.php. The Media Ownership Reform Act of 2008, which
would have achieved some of these objectives and had several prominent
sponsors, including then-Senators Joseph Biden, Barack Obama, and Hillary
Clinton, was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on September 15, 2008.
See Bill Summary and Status, 110th Congress (2007-2008), S. 2332,
Cosponsors, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d110:SNO2332:@@@P (last updated Sept. 15, 2008).
9. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 7-20, 106-16, 219-71, 404-
39 (2006) (discussing both broadcast and internet neutrality from the
standpoint of democratic deliberation and economic efficiency); DONALD J.
JUNG, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE BROADCAST
INDUSTRY, AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 1981-87 (1996) (discussing the
chronological history of the development of the Fairness Doctrine); Jack M.
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing
broadcast ownership regulation and telecommunications nondiscrimination
principles, drawing on several capitalist and republican theories of the First
Amendment); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967) (discussing broadcast neutrality from the
standpoint of First Amendment and other democratic values); Oren Bracha &
Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1171-1206
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My analysis begins in Part II with the rise and fall of FCC
regulation of the mass media and the Internet through four distinct
eras in the FCC's conception of its own authority and the
constraints imposed upon it by the First Amendment. In the first
era, the "statist regulatory period," the FCC doled out
telecommunications licenses to entities favored by the government
and vigorously regulated broadcast content. In the second era, the
"democracy-promotion period," the FCC regulated the content of
speech in an attempt to engender a more robust democratic culture
in the aftermath of World War II. In the third era, the
"deregulatory period" or "dark ages of broadcast media," the FCC
tolerated blatant discrimination against minority political or ethnic
viewpoints, as well as long-term campaigns to reduce competition in
media content by merging corporate owners. In the fourth and most
recent era, which began in 2005 with renewed citizen activism and
congressional attention to bias within the mass media and Internet,
the FCC announced new nondiscrimination principles focused on
the Internet, but with clear implications for broadcast media.
The FCC initially handed a stunning victory to advocates of
media reform in 2008 when it endorsed a different theory of the
First Amendment. 10 As Part III describes, its new theory moves
(2008) (discussing search engine manipulation from the standpoint of economic
efficiency, individual autonomy, and democratic values); Thomas F. Cotter,
Some Observations on the Law and Economics of Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 67 (2006) (examining the regulation of information "intermediaries"
from an economic approach); Robert W. Crandall, The Remedy for the
"Bottleneck Monopoly" in Telecom: Isolate It, Share It, or Ignore It?, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3 (2005) (criticizing broadcast regulation from an economic efficiency
perspective); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 925 (2001) (discussing the effect of the regulation of broadband Internet on
content); Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial
Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263 (2008)
(applying net neutrality to search engines and arguing that dominant search
engines should be regulated to encourage nondiscriminatory access to
information); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1101 (1993) (criticizing FCC's repeal of broadcast neutrality regulation); Tim
Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006) (arguing that
telecommunications law should be structured under an anti-discrimination
regime); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality
Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004) (critiquing net neutrality regulation
from economic efficiency perspective).
10. See In re Formal Compl. of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd.
13028 (2008).
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away from the dark ages of selective deregulation of corporate
media by prioritizing media consumers' rights to access diverse and
antagonistic sources of information and opinion, rather than the
right of large corporations to acquire and control ever larger
combinations of media infrastructure." Although the decision was
vacated on appeal,12 its theories may reappear in other actions
within the FCC's jurisdiction; they may herald a new era of
attention to citizens' First Amendment interests in accessing and
benefiting from regulated telecommunications facilities such as
broadcast airwaves or cable networks. Part IV attempts to theorize
this new vision of the First Amendment using four strands of
constitutional and legal theory, i.e. formalist attention to text and
precedent; purposivist and originalist emphasis on the principles
and contexts underlying constitutional text; economic approaches to
efficient or cost-avoiding interpretations of legal language; and
civic-republican and egalitarian advocacy of citizen-empowering
constitutional narratives. 3  Except, perhaps, for the first strand,
which applies ambiguously to FCC regulation of network
infrastructure, the theories support the FCC's new emphasis on free
speech.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF MEDIA REGULATION: THE FCC RETHINKS
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Statist Regulatory Period
In the earliest era of FCC regulation of the broadcast media,
the commission adopted what could be described as a statist,
ministry-of-information model.' It imposed an uncompromising
11. See infra Part III.
12. See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Professor Lili Levi of the University of Miami designates this period as
the "melting pot" period in reference to her view that the Federal Radio
Commission was seeking to turn radio, which promised to give every American
"school of thought" a voice, into a "homogenizing and unifying creator of shared
values." Lili Levi, The Four Eras of FCC Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN.
L. REv. 813, 829-30 (2008). I prefer to call it a "statist" rather than a "melting
pot" period because I am unconvinced that racial or ethnic minorities had a
meaningful degree of control over radio content or ownership, as a "melting pot"
metaphor would suggest. Professor Levi similarly concedes that the FRC
promoted assimilation into nationalist narratives, and made "allocation and
assignment decisions that aligned the agency's interest with increasingly
powerful and moneyed commercial broadcasters." Id. at 832-33.
2011]1 421
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censorship of broadcast programming which complied with
Christian mores and American nationalist military objectives. 5 By
1936, two-thirds of religious stations lost their broadcasting
licenses, and eighty percent of educational stations had lost or sold
their licenses. 16 The Communications Act of 1934 even gave the
power to the President to close radio stations based on a "threat of
war." 7
During this first regulatory era, the Federal Radio Commission
and its successor organization, the FCC, heavily favored commercial
for-profit broadcasters over nonprofit and public-interested
broadcasters,18 so that the labor movement obtained zero out of
ninety clear radio channels.'9 Many educational and religious
broadcasters lost their licenses as "not in the public interest" under
the Radio Act of 1927 due to the transition from loose oversight by
the Department of Commerce under the Radio Act of 1912, to the
bureaucratization of radio policy in a process led by broadcaster
lobbies within the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC") and FCC.20
The FCC was also actively involved in supplying content and
monitoring broadcasters for material harmful to national security,
such as pro-fascist programs.2'
In the second era of its existence, from about 1945 to 1969, the
FCC approached its responsibilities with a mindset based on
democracy-promotion, participatory progressivism, and republican
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."); Thomas Irwin Emerson,
The Control of Obscenity in Radio and Television, in POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A COLLECTION OF LEGAL AND RELATED
MATERIALS 941 (1958); GERD HORTEN, RADIO GOES TO WAR: THE CULTURAL
POLITICS OF PROPAGANDA DURING WORLD WAR II 82 (2003); LORRAINE M. LEES,
YUGOSLAV-AMERICANS AND NATIONAL SECURITY DURING WORLD WAR II 149
(2007); Elizabeth Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
1379 (2008).
16. See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA 352 (Basic Books 2005).
17. See Communications Act of 1934 § 706(c), 47 U.S.C. § 606(c)
(2006) ("Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a
threat of war, or a state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency, .
. . the President . . . may cause the closing of any station for radio
communication.. .. ").
18. See STARR, supra note 16, at 352.
19. See One of Ninety!, 9 LIFE AND LABOR BULLETIN (May 1931), available
at http://books.google.com/books?id=5urmAAAAMAAJ&pg=PT371.
20. Adam Candeub, Shall Those Who Live by FCC Indecency Complaints
Die by FCC Indecency Complaints?, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 307 (2009-2010).
21. See HORTEN, supra note 15, at 63-83.
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self-government.22 Participatory progressivism had a political
tradition in the United States that dated back at least as far as the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which imposed nondiscrimination
obligations on railroads.23  It also imposed a nondiscrimination
obligation in communications that appeared in section 315(a) of the
Communications Act of 1934, which stated until 1996 that:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station, and the Commission shall make
rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any
such candidate.2 4
In the democracy-promotion era of the early 1960s and 1970s, the
FCC interpreted this section of the Communications Act of 1934 as
codifying the fairness doctrine.25
B. The Democracy-Promotion Period
The fairness doctrine stemmed from concerns expressed to the
FCC that broadcasters were using their FCC licenses to editorialize
on matters of public concern, which was inconsistent with the public
interest because it threatens an "overemphasis on the side of any
22. See, e.g., Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); MICHAEL D.
Scorr, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW DESK REFERENCE 262 (2d ed. 2004) (citing
Cullman Broad. Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963) (stating that broadcasters
have an obligation to contribute to political discourse by providing adequate
coverage to public issues, in a manner that is fair by giving a hearing to all
sides)); Roscoe L. Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in
Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447 (1968);
John Paul Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 719 (1964); Glen 0. Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52
MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967).
23. See An Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887); see
also McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944).
24. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (amended and repealed by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
25. See JAMES C. GOODALE & ROB FRIEDEN, ALL ABOUT CABLE 2-77 &
n.11.2 (1981).
2011] 423
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particular controversy which the licensee chooses to espouse."26 As
the FCC summarized the doctrine in 1964: "The keystone of the
fairness doctrine and of the public interest is the right of the public
to be informed-to have presented to it the 'conflicting views of
issues of public importance.' 27 A broadcast license is a privilege
that carries with it a public trust: "Every licensee who is fortunate
in obtaining a license is mandated to operate in the public interest
and has assumed the obligation of presenting important public
questions fairly and without bias."28 The fairness doctrine
represented not only a duty to provide an opportunity for persons
holding views opposed to those of broadcasting licensees to access
the airwaves, but also-perhaps even more importantly-the duty
of a broadcast licensee to "devote a reasonable percentage of this
broadcast time to the coverage of public issues . . . ."2 When critics
of the fairness doctrine complain that it may suppress broadcast
coverage of controversial issues, they frequently ignore this latter
obligation because it is "impossible to believe that the [obligation to
cover public issues for a set percentage of time] could hamper
broadcast news and commentary in any way."30
Statutes reflecting the fairness doctrine include the
Communications Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of 1996.31
The former created the FCC for the precise purpose of making
available, "so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
26. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1252
(1949). Professor Levi refers to this period as reflecting a "Community
Representation Approach" because the FCC instructed licensees to conduct
surveys and focus groups to identify "community problems and needs to serve
with responsive programming." Levi, supra note 14, at 834-36, 835 n.82, 836
n.85. In light of Professor Levi's concession that the FCC continued to "use the
media as educative tools that would promote unity in a diverse community," and
the emphasis on coverage of public issues and equal opportunities for both sides
of public debates, I prefer to identify the period as one in which the FCC was
interested in democratic dialogue rather than the equitable representation of
diverse communities. Id. at 840.
27. FCC Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964).
28. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 383
(1969).
29. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-
58 (1949).
30. Federal Communications Commission, Fairness Report: In re the
Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 7 (1974).
31. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges."3 2 The FCC's mandate included "centralizing authority"
and exercising "additional authority with respect to interstate and
foreign commerce in wire and radio communication. 33 The 1934
Act defined broadcasters as "common carriers"34 and made it
unlawful for common carriers to discriminate unduly or
unreasonably against any particular person or class.35  Common
carriers were intended to be liable in damages to any person so
discriminated against.36 The 1996 Telecommunications Act
provides, with exceptions for news programming, that: "If any
licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the
use of such broadcasting station. . . ."37 It also restates the
obligation imposed by the 1934 Act, as amended in 1959, for
broadcasters to show "newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, ... in the
public interest and [with] reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
The fairness doctrine was codified in 1959 in an amendment to
the 1934 Act.39  As endorsed by Congress, the doctrine required
FCC licensees to "provide a reasonable opportunity for the
32. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (emphasis
added).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 3(h) (defining "common carrier" as "any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio
or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy").
35. Id. § 201(a) (recognizing the "duty" of "every common carrier engaged in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such
communication service upon reasonable request therefor [sic]"); id. § 202(a)
(making it "unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or
unreasonable discrimination in charges, . . . or services . . . , or to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person. . . .").
36. Id. §§ 206-07.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
38. Id.; see also Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994, 999 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating that this
provision was intended in 1959 to give "Congressional approval" to "the
Fairness Doctrine" in which the FCC "emphasized the 'right of the public to be
informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast
licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular
views on any matter. . .. '"(citing 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964)).
39. 73 Stat. 557 (1959).
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discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.' 0 In
practice, the fairness doctrine was an effort to monitor public
complaints and resulted only rarely in regulation or remedy of
unfair exploitation of federal broadcast license monopolies.4 In
applying this doctrine, the FCC deferred to the good judgment of
the licensee, based on the particular facts of his situation, with the
agency's deference extending to "the type of programming and the
amount and nature of time to be afforded." 2 As the FCC declared
in 1949:
It should be recognized that there can be no one all
embracing formula which licensees can hope to apply to
insure the fair and balanced presentation of all public
issues. Different issues will inevitably require different
techniques of presentation and production. The licensee
will in each instance be called upon to exercise his best
judgment and good sense in determining what subjects
should be considered, the particular format of the
programs to be devoted to each subject, the different
shades of opinion to be presented, and the spokesman for
each point of view.4 3
Properly understood, the fairness doctrine was an effort to
prevent broadcast station owners from misappropriating from the
federal government an "unfettered power" to disseminate "only
their own views on public issues," thereby infringing on the First
Amendment rights of others.44
From 1954 to 1968, the Warren Court made enormous strides
in implementing freedom and democracy in the United States by
resurrecting the First Amendment from near oblivion, condemning
de jure racial segregation, and calling for "one person, one vote"
elections.45 Although it is often noted that the statistical correlation
40. Id.
41. Responsibility Under the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 576, 576-77 (1963).
42. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
43. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensee, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251
(1949).
44. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 398 (1983) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395
U.S. 367, 392 (1969)).
45. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN
WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 138
(2004) (describing early twentieth century judicial and executive branch
hostility to First Amendment freedoms of speech and the press); CHRISTOPHER
L. TOMLINS, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
277-302 (2005). For descriptions of the draconian federal censorship regime
426 [Vol:51
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between political party affiliation and voting record on the Supreme
Court is not absolute, the Court deals in qualitative, and not
quantitative, changes in the law. Near the forefront of changes was
the transition from Associated Press v. United StateS46 and Red Lion
v. F.C.C.4 7 to Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.48  The
cleavage between the participatory ethos of the 1960s, embodied in
the text of Red Lion, and the alienating disempowering tendency of
the 1970s and 1980s, articulated in Tornillo, paralleled the trend
towards U.S. democratization and economic equalization from 1945
to 1975, and towards elitism, ghettoization, and inequality from
1975 to 1992. *
that prevailed prior to the Warren Court's important First Amendment
precedents, including Sullivan and Red Lion, see STONE, supra, at 144-85, 220-
459.
46. Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
47. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
48. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
49. Starting in 1975, levels of income inequality in the United States began
to increase markedly. See, e.g., SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTTSCHALK,
UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 7 (1994); John Ydstie, Fed.
Chief Issues Warning on Income Gap, NPR (Feb. 7, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=7235086. The value of
the minimum wage, adjusted for inflation, fell by twenty percent from the 1970s
to 1986. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 110 (1989). As a result of falling or stagnating wage rates, to which
mechanization and globalization contributed, formerly vibrant urban
neighborhoods became ghettos, where persistent poverty and isolation from
commerce, education, and employment became common. See, e.g., PAUL A.
JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY
121 (1998); Editorial, By Isolating the Poor the Ghettos Today Are Worse
Than Ever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar 12, 1989, at C06. Nearly ten
million Americans were unemployed by 1992, an increase of three million
from 1989 and of over six million from 1970. See Herbert Barchoff, Yet
Recession Persists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/12/opinion/1-yet-recession-persists-
189493.html; Associated Press, 3.7-million Out Of Work, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1970, at 4. There were up to three million homeless Americans
in 1992, including 60,000 in Chicago alone. See Eileen Ogintz, Program Meets
Needs of Disabled, Homeless, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 23, 1992, at Business-1.
Meanwhile, the list of billionaires maintained by Forbes Magazine grew from
fewer than thirty names in 1986 to 223 names in 1992, some with over $10
billion. See Associated Press, Billionaire list Expands; Average Wealth
Doesn't, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 1992, at 26 (citing figure of 232
billionaires worldwide); United Press International, Billionaires in US Listed,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 1982, at 3 (citing figure of only
twelve billionaires in the United States in 1981-1982), available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=8msWAAAAIBAJ&sjid=JhEAAAAIBAJ
&pg=6449,6196737&dq=billionaires+in+us+listed&hl=en; Forbes Ranks Richest
People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1987, at D2 (citing figures of fewer than thirty
billionaires in 1986, and forty-nine in 1987). By 2008, there were nearly 500
2011] 427
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine against a
First Amendment challenge in Red Lion in 1969.50 The case
involved a request by an author to access the radio airwaves to
respond to an attack against him by a member of the Christian
Crusade and supporter of presidential candidate Barry Goldwater.
The Court declared that the fairness doctrine played an essential
role in preventing the FCC from distorting public debate by
granting communications monopolies to broadcast licensees. 52
Congress ordered the FCC not to exercise its authority in a way
that would compromise "the right of free speech by means of radio
communication," which was vital to ensure that "the people as a
whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the . .
. purposes of the First Amendment."53 The Court endorsed the
FCC's citizen-oriented interpretation of the First Amendment:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee.54
C. The Period of Selective Deregulation
The movement to repeal the fairness doctrine began under
President Richard M. Nixon, and culminated in 1987 under
President Ronald Reagan. 5 Under Nixon, the FCC turned down
billionaires and eleven million Americans unemployed, almost twice as
many jobless as in 1979. Compare Larry McShane, Unemployment Jumps
to 7.2% in December; Worst Year for Layoffs since 1945, NEW YORK DAILY
NEWS (Jan. 10, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/01/09/2009-01-
09_unemploymentjumpsto_72_indecemberwor-2.html (11.1 million in
2008), and L.A. Lorek, Jobless Take Another Hit to the Wallet, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 31, 2002, at 1A (8.5 million in 2002), with Unemployment
Up Slightly in December, SUMTER DAILY ITEM, Jan. 10, 1980, at 21, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=J4QiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=OqkFAAAAIBAJ&
pg=1341,1405248&dq=unemployment+up+slightly+in+december&hl=en (6
million in 1979). See also Andy Geller, Bloomberg Cracks Forbes Rich List Top
10, NEW YORK POST, Sept. 18, 2008, at 25 (billionaires count).
50. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367.
51. Id. at 371-73.
52. Id. at 400-01.
53. Id. at 382 n.12.
54. Id. at 389-90.
55. Professor Levi calls this the "Market Period" in which policy turned
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"deregulatory." Levi, supra note 14, at 841. While agreeing with that
characterization of the Reagan administration's rhetoric, I emphasize the
selectivity of the deregulation for reasons that should become clear below, but
above all to avoid giving the impression that broadcasting became a free market
where barriers to entry are low, government intervenes rarely, and program
quality is at competitive levels. In a related vein, Professor Levi notes that
"Conservatives [such as Reagan and Fowler] in favor of economic deregulation
often . . . favored social regulation to promote family values." Id. at 846.
Professor Levi also identifies a fourth period of broadcast regulation during the
1990s and 2000s which she calls a "Targeted Return to Public Interest
Regulation." Insofar as she argues that this period "continued, and even
expanded, deregulation in the media structure context" while limiting new
regulations to "content regulation targeted the protection of children" rather
than democracy-promotion, I include this period in my era of "selective
deregulation." Id. at 844. The 1980s were also dominated by concerns about
regulating expressive content rather than distortion of debate. See In re Appl.
of Zapis Commc'ns Corp. for Renewal of the License of Station WZAK,
Cleveland, Ohio, 7 FCC Red. 3888 1 4 (1992) ("Broadcast of indecent material is
actionable if the broadcast occurs at a time when there is a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience. No terms are per se indecent, and words or
phrases that may be patently offensive in one context may not rise to the level
of actionable indecency in another context." (footnote omitted)); In re Appl. of
Jacor Broad. of Tampa Bay, Inc. for Renewal of the License of Station WFLA,
Tampa, Fla., 7 FCC Red. 1826 91 12 (1992) ("Indeed, the Commission has a
statutory obligation to take regulatory action when it determines that a
broadcast contains indecent material." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006))); In re
Appl. of Whale Commc'ns of Col., Inc. for Renewal of the License of FM Station
KKMG, Pueblo, Colo., 6 FCC Rcd. 7548 1i 9 (1991) (suggesting that the FCC
could regulate the "repetitive, deliberate, and patently offensive" use of
expletives); Letter to Goodrich Broad., Inc., Licensee, Radio Station WVIC-FM,
6 FCC Red. 2178, 2178 (1991) (condemning a "broadcast [which] made explicit
and repeated reference to a sexual organ in the context of soliciting mock
headlines for an allegedly true incident-apparently reported in a tabloid
newspaper-involving a man's testicle becoming trapped in the drain of a hot
tub."); In re Liability of Guy Gannett Pub. Co. Licensee of Radio Station WZTA-
FM, Miami, Fla. for a Forfeiture, 5 FCC Red. 7688, 7689 (1990) (concluding that
licensee "compliance with the federal proscription on indecent broadcasts,
cannot be determined by the popularity of particular programming among
adults in a specific community; nor can such local popularity alter the risk from
exposure to indecent programming incurred by children who may be in the
audience"); Letter to Mr. Michael J. Faherty Executive Vice President-Radio
(Notice of Apparent Liability Issued by FCC Mass Media Bureau), 6 FCC Rcd.
3704 (1989) (issuing forfeiture or fine of $10,000 for "titillating and pandering"
content on radio); In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., Licensee of Station WBAI
(FM), New York, New York Pet. for Decl. Ruling Regarding Future Broadcast, 2
FCC Red. 3957 (1987) (declining petition seeking permission to broadcast
indecent portions of James Joyce's novel Ulysses); New Indecency Enforcement
Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast, 2 FCC Red. 2726, 2727 (1987) (ruling
that "broadcasts [that] consisted solely of sexual innuendo and double entendre,
did not use the seven [dirty] words from the Pacifica case" were still indecent
"in a number of instances" because they "dwelt on sexual and excretory matters
in a pandering and titillating fashion"); In re Primary Jurisdiction Referral of
Claims Against Government Defendant Arising from the Inclusion In the NAB
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petitions seeking to balance broadcast media coverage of public
affairs, claiming that the First Amendment rights of broadcasters
trumped the First Amendment rights of the public to objective news
and public affairs coverage.56  Under Reagan, the FCC began the
process by issuing reports celebrating corporate editorializing and
media mergers.5 Mark Fowler, Reagan's FCC Chairman,
complained that the fairness doctrine had a "chilling effect" on
corporate broadcasters, without mentioning the "chilling effect" of
corporations on the journalists, public officials, academic
researchers, book authors, and human rights activists who were
denied access to the public airwaves to cover public issues or
express views opposed by corporate broadcasters.5 8 Fowler ensured
"a laissez-faire attitude at the commission toward fairness issues
that, critics sa[id], undercut[] broadcasters' fears of government
retribution implicit in the regulation."59  He remarked: "The
perception of broadcasters as community trustees should be
replaced by a view of broadcasters as marketplace participants."60
The FCC never issued an opinion enforcing the fairness doctrine
under Chairman Fowler.61 After leaving the FCC, Chairman
Television Code of the "Family Viewing Policy," 95 F.C.C. 2d 700 (1983)
(encouraging National Association of Broadcasters engaging in coordinated
action to "regulate the amount of sex and violence depicted during the early
evening hours" because "[violuntary industry action is often preferable to
governmental solutions"); In re Revocation of License of David Hildebrand,
Licensee of Station N6BHU in the Amateur Radio Service, 92 F.C.C. 2d 75
(1982) (revoking amateur radio station license on authority of federal regulation
stating that no licensed operator shall transmit obscene, indecent, or profane
speech) (citing 47 C.F.R. 97.119), rev'd, 92 F.C.C. 2d 1245 (1983) (rejecting
revocation on authority of Pacifica case).
56. See David K. Shipler, F.C.C. Again Refuses to Judge A Petition on News
Objectivity; First Amendment Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1973, at 71.
57. See, e.g., In re Review of the Commc'n's Regulations Governing
Television Broad., 10 FCC Rcd. 3524 (1995) (celebrating editorializing by
corporate-owned broadcast stations); In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the
Commc'n's Rules, the Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, 4 FCC Rcd. 1741
(1989) (celebrating political endorsements by corporate-owned broadcast
stations); In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240,
and 73.636] of the Commc'n's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM
and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C. 2d 17 (1985) (celebrating
editorializing by broadcast stations and the creation of conglomerates of
commonly-owned broadcast media outlets).
58. David Crook & Bill Steigerwald, Does TV Bar Shows of Right and Left?,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1985, at 6-1.
59. Id.
60. Steve Rendall, The Fairness Doctrine: How We Lost It, and Why We Need
It Back, EXTRA! (Jan.IFeb. 2005), http//www.fair.org/index.php?page=2053.
61. See Peter J. Boyer, Syracuse Group Appeals Fairness Doctrine Ruling,
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Fowler served on the board of directors of a corporate broadcasting
chain.62
The third era of FCC activity in media neutrality regulation
could be characterized as a "dark age" of deregulation and
conglomerate control. The FCC formally repealed the fairness
doctrine in 1987, finding it inconsistent with the First Amendment
rights of a corporate broadcaster.6 3 As one opinion issued early in
President Reagan's second term stated:
In FCC v. League of Women Voters the Court has
recently reaffirmed that the constitutional permissibility
of the fairness doctrine is predicated upon a factual
presumption that the doctrine has the effect of enhancing
the coverage of controversial issues available to the
viewing and listening public. Indeed, the Court stated
that it would be obligated to reevaluate the
constitutionality of the doctrine if the Commission
demonstrated the falsity of this assumption....
... By restricting the amount and type of controversial
programming aired, a broadcaster minimizes the
potentially substantial burdens . . . of the doctrine while
remaining in compliance with the strict letter of its
regulatory obligations. Therefore, . . . in net effect the
fairness doctrine often discourages the presentation of
controversial issue programming.
The evidence of record in this proceeding, however,
reflects that broadcasters are convinced that these costs
[of responding to fairness doctrine complaints can in fact
be a significant inhibiting factor in the presentation of
controversial issues.6
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1987, at C16.
62. Board of Directors, BEASLEY BROADCASTING GROUP, INC.,
http://www.bbgi.com/board_of_directors.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
63. In re Compl. of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5054-55
(1987) rev'd on statutory grounds, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also C.
Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing
Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 955, 971 n.59 (2007) (symposium on The First
Amendment: Constitutional Theories of Media Reform).
64. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'n's Rules and
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145, 152, 162, 167 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
20111 431
432 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:51
This opinion suggested a new weighting of inconvenience to
broadcasters of complying with the Communications Act as being of
greater importance than free debate on controversial issues.
The FCC predicted that the free market, by the mechanism of
competition among broadcasters, would ensure the balanced
presentation of controversial issues better than the fairness
doctrine could. Cable television and print media would also
compete with radio and television broadcasters to cover issues of
public concern." Congress attempted to force the FCC to
implement the fairness doctrine by law, but President Reagan
vetoed the law.67
Contrary to the FCC's predictions, the deregulation of
broadcasting did not lead to more vigorous and balanced
presentations of controversial issues. In other words, the results of
the FCC's more than twenty-year experiment in unfettered
corporate editorializing and control over news content were not
beneficial to public debate. The percentage of the American public
65. See id. at 207-08 ("Given the significant development of both radio and
television, we believe it is no longer necessary to utilize a mechanism of
government imposed 'fairness' in order to insure appropriate coverage of
controversial issues of public importance. As the above data amply
demonstrate, there are a sufficient number of over-the-air television and radio
voices to insure the presentation of diverse opinions on issues of public
importance."); id. at 201 ("While [the FCC broadcast licensing] system may
influence entry into the information services marketplace, a licensing scheme,
in and of itself, does not provide a proper distinction for the purpose of assessing
the impact of broadcasting as a diverse information voice."); id. at 203 ("At the
present time, there are approximately 11 national radio networks and 90
regional radio networks."); id. at 204 ("As the above data demonstrate, there
has been a 44.3 percent increase in the overall number of television stations
since the Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion Broadcasting."); id. at 205 ("[In]
1964 . . . only 59 percent of television households were capable of receiving 5 or
more stations. Today, only 4 percent of the television households receive fewer
than five signals."); id. at 206 ("[TIhe overall [television] network audience
share declined from 90 percent to 80 percent in 1983.").
66. See id. at 199 n.200 ("The record in this proceeding supports the
conclusion that the information market relevant to diversity includes not only
TV and radio outlets, but cable, other video media and numerous print media as
well. In the Notice, we took account of the fact that these other media compete
with broadcast outlets for the time that citizens devote to acquiring the
information they desire. That is, cable, newspapers, magazines and periodicals
are substitutes in the provision of such information."); id. ("That the various
media are in fact information substitutes in the marketplace of ideas is further
reflected in our local cable and television, newspaper and broadcast, radio and
television cross-ownership rules.").
67. See Molly Ivins, Media Concentration is a Totalitarian
Tool, THE BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 31, 2003,
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0131-09.htm.
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that believed that the news media tended to favor one side of
political debates surged from about fifty percent in 1985 to about
seventy percent in 2005.6$ Five media conglomerates gained control
of most television broadcast facilities and imposed a stultifying
homogenization on editorial content and endorsements of political
candidates for public office.69  While one empirical study on the
effects of corporate-ownership and advertiser sponsorship of
newspapers had mixed results,o most empirical studies found a
stunning disparity of viewpoints on economic and foreign policy
issues between persons allowed access to the media and the general
public.7 1 Most of the same sources, especially government officials,
68. Public More Critical of Press, But Goodwill Persists: Online Newspaper
Readership Countering Print Losses, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE
& THE PRESS (Jun. 26, 2005), http://www.people-press.org/report/248/public-
more-critical-of-press-but-goodwill-persists.
69. See, e.g., Robert McChesney, Making Media Democratic,
BOSTON REVIEW, Summer 1998, available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR23.3/mechesney.html ("Fewer than ten transnational
media conglomerates dominate much of our media; fewer than two dozen
account for the overwhelming majority of our newspapers, magazines, films,
television, radio, and books. ... [This portends] the degeneration of journalism,
political coverage, and children's programming under commercial pressure.");
see also BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 2-12, 139-40, 197-202
(2004); DANNY SCHECHTER, THE MORE YOU WATCH, THE LESS YOU KNOW:
NEWS WARS/(SUB)MERGED HOPE/MEDIA ADVENTURES (Seven Stories Press
1997); C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA.
L. REV. 839 (2002); C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 317, 380-405 (1999); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience
What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 (1997); Russell Schoch, A Few Words
with Media Critic Ben Bagdikian, AMERICAN REVIEW (Sept. 1995),
http://web.archive.org/web/20051230130424/www.americanreview.us/monopoly.
htm.
70. See Daniel E. Ho and Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media
Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781, 782-86 (2009).
71. See STEPHEN J. FARNSWORTH & S. ROBERT LICHTER, THE MEDIATED
PRESIDENCY: TELEVISION NEWS AND PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNANCE 73-75 (2006);
Anders Hansen & Olga Linn, Journalistic Practices and Television Coverage of
the Environment: An International Comparison, in MASS COMMUNICATION
RESEARCH: ON PROBLEMS AND POLICIES: THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 121-
29 (Cees J. Hamelink, Olga Linn6, James Dermot Halloran eds., 1994); DAVID
BRUCE MACDONALD, THINKING HISTORY, FIGHTING EVIL: NEOCONSERVATIVES
AND THE PERILS OF ANALOGY 129 (2009); NORMAN SOLOMON, WAR MADE EASY:
HOW PRESIDENTS AND PUNDITS KEEP SPINNING US TO DEATH 124 (2005); Karen
Watts Perkins, Management and Labor, in MEDIA BIAS: FINDING IT, FIXING IT
222 (William David Sloan & Jenn Burleson Mackay eds. 2007); Peter Hart,
Frontline Disguises Single-Payer Advocates as Public-Option Promoters, FAIR
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.fair.org/blog/2010/04/20/frontline-disguises-single-
payer-advocates-as-public-option-promoters/ [hereinafter Hart, Frontline]; Peter
Hart, WP Healthcare Shocker: Public Opinion Unchanged, FAIR (Oct 20, 2009),
http://www.fair.org/blog/2009/10/20/wp-healtheare-shocker-public-opinion-
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formed the basis of the incomplete, biased, and repetitive broadcast
radio and television coverage of public affairs.72
unchanged/ [hereinafter Hart, WP Healthcare Shocker]; The Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, WORLDVIEWS
(2002), http://worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport.pdf [hereinafter Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion]; The Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, Americans on Promoting Democracy,
PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES (Sept. 29, 2005),
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/AmRole World/DemocratizationSep05/Dem
ocratizationSep09-rpt-revised.pdf [hereinafter Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations, Promoting Democracy].
72. See, e.g., Kathleen B. Jones, On Authority: Or, Why Women Are Not
Entitled to Speak, in FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT 119-32 (Irene Diamond and Lee
Quinby eds., Northeastern University Press 1988) (describing historical
exclusion of women from public sphere on basis that political authority is
assumed to exclude compassion, solidarity, or pain from its domain, and that
women are assumed to fall subject to these affects more often); Eric Lotke
et. al., The Progressive Majority: Why a Conservative America Is a Myth 1-3,
22-24, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (June 2007), available at
http://cloudfront.mediamatters.org/static/pdf/progressive-majority.pdf
(documenting broadcast news media's mistaken belief that majority of American
public is politically, culturally, and socially conservative); Chon Noriega &
Francisco Javier Iribarren, Hate Speech on Commercial Talk Radio:
Preliminary Report on a Pilot Study, 22 UCLA CHICANO RESEARCH CENTER
LATINO POLICY & ISSUES BRIEF 1 (Feb. 2009) (describing extensive defamation
and dehumanization of Latinos on talk radio); S. Craig Watkins and Rana A.
Emerson, Feminist Media Criticism and Feminist Media Practices,
571 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 151 (2000) (describing how
media industry production practices exclude women, especially
African-American women); If It's Sunday, It's Conservative: An Analysis of the
Sunday Talk Show Guests on ABC, CBS, and NBC, 1997-2005, at 1,
MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://mediamatters.org/static/pdflMMFA SundayShow Report.pdf (describing
how broadcast political talk shows distort debate by allowing the same dozen
or two dozen government officials and reporters to dominate discourse
and exclude opposing points of view favoring international diplomacy or
economic reform); The Structural Imbalance of Political Talk Radio, THE
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS AND FREE PRESS 1, 7 (2007), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/06/pdf/talk-radio.pdf (noting that
although a majority of listeners to talk radio are liberal or moderate,
as of 2007, out "of the 257 news/talk stations owned by the top five
commercial station owners, 91 percent of the total weekday talk radio
programming was conservative, and only 9 percent was progressive");
Carole Ashkinaze, A Matter of Opinion: Female Pundits Are Still Missing
from the Media, MS. MAGAZINE, Summer 2005, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/summer2005/opinion.asp (describing how in 2005,
ABC's political talk show had only twenty-two percent women as panelists or
guests, and women made up only seventeen percent of opinion writers at
The New York Times, and ten percent at The Washington Post); Jeff
Cohen, Television's Political Spectrum, EXTRA! (July/Aug. 1990),
http://www.fair.org/extra/best-of-extraltv-spectrum.html (describing bias on
network television); Steve Rendall and Tara Broughel, Amplifying
Officials, Squelching Dissent: FAIR Study Finds Democracy Poorly
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In the 1990s, a few corporations formed enormous chains of
radio and television stations, imposing an artificial uniformity of
viewpoint across the political and cultural spectrum.73  In 1996,
Served by War Coverage, EXTRA!, May/June 2003, available at
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1145 (describing study showing that on
"evening newscasts of six television networks and news channels," seventy-one
percent of U.S. guests were pro-war and ten percent antiwar); Jon Whiten, If
News From Iraq Is Bad, It's Coming From U.S. Officials, EXTRA!, Feb. 2004,
available at http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1167 (describing study showing
that among "on-camera sources appearing in stories about Iraq on the nightly
network newscasts-ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News and NBC
Nightly News-in the month of October 2003," U.S. government officials
and appointees were seventy-three percent of total sources); Public TV Tilts
Toward Conservatives, EXTRA! (June 1992), http://www.fair.org/extralbest-of-
extra/public-tv-conservatives.html (describing political bias on public television
in early 1990s); Ivins, supra note 67 (describing political bias on talk radio);
Edward Monks, The End of Fairness: Right-wing Commentators have a Virtual
Monopoly When It Comes to Talk Radio Programming, THE REGISTER-GUARD
(Eugene, OR) (June 30, 2002), http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-
msg.tc?msgid=009WOC (similar); Jennifer L. Pozner, Missing Since 9-11:
Women's Voices, NEWSDAY (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.newsday.com/eye-on-the-
media-missing-since-9-11-women-s-voices-1.749907 ("According to a study
released last week by the White House Project, . . . women were just 11 percent
of guests and 7 percent of repeat interviewees on five Sunday morning
talk shows on ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN and FOX between January 2000,
and June 2001."); Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News
Media 2006: An Annual Report on American Journalism (2006),
http://stateofthemedia.org/2006/ ("When audiences did encounter the same story
in different places, often they heard from a surprisingly small number
of sources . . . . More coverage, in other words, does not always mean greater
diversity of voices."); Kay Semion, Who We Are and What We Do: An
Internet-researched Update, MASTHEAD, at 12-13 (Autumn 2006),
http://www.allbusiness.com/information/publishing-industries/3966983-1.html
(describing pattern of racial and ethnic exclusion in newspaper editing and
opinion writing); Who's On the News?: Study Shows Network News Sources
Skew White, Male & Elite, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER (May 21, 2002),
http://www.commondreams.org/news2002/0521-03.htm ("A study of ABC World
News Tonight, CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News in the year 2001
shows that 92 percent of all U.S. sources interviewed were white, 85 percent
were male and, where party affiliation was identifiable, 75 percent were
Republican."); Slanted Sources in NewsHour and Nightline Kosovo Coverage,
FAIR (May 1999), http://www.fair.org/reports/kosovo-sources.html (describing
exclusion of antiwar voices from coverage of 1999 war against Yugoslavia).
73. See The Structural Imbalance of Political Talk Radio, supra note 72, at
8 ("The Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed the national limit on the
number of radio stations that one company could own. This resulted in the
wave of consolidation that carried Clear Channel from 40 stations to over 1,200,
and many other conglomerates to several hundred stations apiece."); see also
Mark Crispin Miller, What's Wrong with This Picture?, THE NATION, Jan. 7,
2002, at 18, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/whats-wrong-picture-
0; Free Press, The Ownership Chart: Big Six (2010), available at
http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart/main.
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President Bill Clinton removed most limits on broadcast station
ownership by signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.74 The
federal courts, staffed with deregulatory "law and economics" judges
who were often linked to the University of Chicago or the Federalist
Society, struck down the few vestiges of broadcast ownership
regulation that remained as "arbitrary" interferences with the
property rights of the corporate owners of the broadcast airwaves.
Thirty percent of Americans got their news from the radio by
2003. Empirical studies of radio commentary revealed that
corporate-owned radio stations programmed far right-wing content,
almost exclusively, even when broadcasting in very liberal and
Democratic communities.77 Corporate chains acquired six to seven
radio stations in each city, and imposed rules limiting criticism, for
example, of President Bush or the Iraq war.78 In terms of access to
radio stations, far right-wing, frequently racist,79 talk show hosts,
74. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56;
Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Media
Ownership Rules, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671; Damien Cave, Inside Clear
Channel: How the Company's Domination Has Made the Airwaves Blander and
Tickets Pricier, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/6432174/inside-clear-channel.
75. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 280
F.3d 1027, 1033-55 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modified on reh'g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 284 F.3d 148,
155-65 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
240 F.3d 1126, 1137-39 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 982 F.2d 1043, 1048-55 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Cass
Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251
(2001).
76. See Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., We Must Take America Back, 22 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 201, 204 (2007) ("According to a 2003 Gallup poll, thirty percent of
Americans say their primary source of news is talk radio. . . .").
77. See id.; Monks, supra note 72 (describing near-total exclusion of
Democrats and political moderates from talk radio, even in Democratic cities);
Ivins, supra note 67 (similar).
78. See Kennedy, supra note 76, at 204 ("Ten percent [of Americans] say
their source of news is the Sinclair Network, the most right wing of all and the
largest television network in America, run by a former pornographer, who once
required all seventy-five of his local affiliates to take a pledge that they will not
report critically about this President or the war in Iraq or a number of other
issues.").
79. For example, Michael Savage refers to Mexican-Americans marching for
immigrants' and Latinos' rights as "vermin," and called illegal immigrants an
"invading organism." Media Matters, Savage Warned U.S. Politicians Not to
"Take to the Streets" to Support Illegal Immigrant "Vermin," MEDIA MATTERS
(Apr. 11, 2006), http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200604110005; Andrea Nill,
Michael Savage: 'Illegal Aliens' Are An 'Invading Organism' (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2009/08/25/michael-savage-immigration/.
Rush Limbaugh similarly refers to illegal aliens as an "invasive species" and an
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such as Rush Limbaugh (2008 audience: 14-20 million), Glenn Beck
(6.5 million), or Michael Savage (8 million), far outstripped in
audience access the leading Democratic host, Ed Schulz (3
million).8 0 This might be explained by market demand, except for
the fact that corporate radio chains create such demand by
disproportionately advertising and promoting right-wing talk
shows.81  About forty percent of political moderates and of the
American population as a whole consider talk radio stations to be
programming politically unbalanced content; so do seventy-two
percent of liberals, but fewer than fifteen percent of conservatives. 8 2
Radio station owners spent hundreds of thousands of dollars each
promoting Limbaugh.83 When Clear Channel acquired the
Limbaugh show syndication rights in 1998, its founder and CEO
expressed his intention to use his company's ownership of
thousands of billboards to promote his "clusters of radio stations . . .
and programs to send everywhere.' 84  By 2001 Clear Channel
owned 700,000 outdoor billboards worldwide, and promoted
Limbaugh on many of them.8 5
"invading army." Rush Warns of "Invading Army of Illegal Aliens Who Are
Using our Services and Taking our Jobs," MEDIA MATTERS (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://mediamattersorg/mmtv/201004260021. Moreover, Limbaugh refers
derisively to Native Americans as "Injuns" and claims that minorities like
Latinos and Native Americans "never do anything for which they have to
apologize." Limbaugh Calls Native Americans "Injuns" -Again, MEDIA
MATTERS (Aug. 18, 2005), http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200508180006;
O'Reilly Ignores Limbaugh's History of Racially Charged Remarks in Claiming
McNabb Comments Are "Only Thing We Can Find," MEDIA MATTERS (Oct. 16,
2009), http://mediamatters.org/research/200910160044.
80. See MEDIA RESEARCH CENTER, UNMASKING THE MYTHS BEHIND THE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 12 (2008) (listing talk radio hosts by audience reach per
week, based on 2008 figures).
81. See The Voices of Division: Red and Blue Radio, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb.
5, 2006, at El (noting common experience of seeing Limbaugh billboards while
driving); America's Laziest Fascist, SALON.COM (May 20, 2004),
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/05/20/savage/index.html
(describing San Francisco billboards for Hannity).
82. See Talk Show Listeners Talk Back on Balance, Talent and
Commercial Interruptions, BUSINESS WIRE (July 9, 2003),
http://www.allbusiness.com/company-activities-management/management-
benchmarking/5803486-1.html.
83. See Eric Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, SALON.COM (Apr. 30, 2001),
http://dir.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/04/30/clear-channel/print.html.
84. See Allen Myerson, The Media Business; Clear Channel to Buy Jacor for
$2.8 Billion in Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1998, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/09/business/the-media-business-clear-channel-
to-buy-jacor-for-2.8-billion-in-stock.html.
85. See Boehlert, supra note 83; Robert L. Moore, Conservatives on Left,
Liberals on Right, THE LEDGER (Lakeland, FL), June 11, 2002, at 38, available
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Television fared little better. As a result of media mergers, five
conglomerates of corporations came to control about seventy-five
percent of prime-time television viewing, about the same percentage
as before the rise of cable television in the 1970s and 1980s.86 The
absolute number of television station owners plummeted by forty
percent between 1995 and 2003, and the "number of commercial
radio station owners" fell by about a third during that time.87
The decline in competitors was followed by a decline in
competition to provide high-quality public affairs programming with
enough airtime to voice opposing views or minority opinions. The
average amount of time allotted to presidential candidates to make
a point (or average "sound bite") fell from forty-two seconds in 1968
to nine seconds in 1992, after the fairness doctrine's repeal. The
number of political news stories fell twenty percent from 1968 to
1988, while the length of the average story declined another twenty
percent. The broadcast networks provided half as many minutes of
average nightly news coverage of presidential politics in 1996 as in
1992.89 Local news programs devoted an average of thirty-six
seconds to elections coverage in 2006, compared to ten minutes for
advertising, seven minutes for sports, and 2.5 minutes for crimes.90
Two-thirds of the elections coverage that was provided did not focus
on substantive issues of public policy. 9'
Empirical studies of television coverage of major wars and
economic matters have found the coverage to be extremely skewed
against antiwar or pro-economic reform viewpoints.92 Bias in war
at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=JqEsAAAAIBAJ&sjid=wvODAAAAIB
AJ&pg=4364,320532&dq=conservatives+on+left+liberals+on+right&hl=en
(noting that "billboards all over central Florida" promoted Limbaugh show).
86. See S. REP. No. 108-141, at 2-3 (2003).
87. Id.
88. See Media Were Candidates' Unwitting Accomplice, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-
TRIBUNE, Nov, 16, 1988, at 3A; Normal Solomon, The Conventional News
Wisdom of Network Television, MEDIA BEAT, Aug. 2, 2004,
http://www.fair.org/media-beat/040802.html.
89. See WILLIAM L. BENOIT, CAMPAIGN 2000: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN DISCOURSE 5 (2003).
90. See John Eggerton, Election Coverage Panned in
NewsLab Study, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/106115-
ElectionCoverage Panned inNewsLabStudy.php.
91. See id.
92. See Brenda Dervin, Whose Effects Are They, Anyway? Or, How Can You
Locate Effects in All This Fog, in MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: ON
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES: THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 380 (Cees J.
Hamelink, Olga Linn4, James Dermot Halloran eds., 1994); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 71, at 73-75; MACDONALD, supra note 71, at 129; SOLOMON, supra
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coverage typically involves giving mass media access to current or
former military officials and civilian enthusiasts for war and
military solutions to international problems, while denying access
to antiwar voices.93 Similar problems exist in the economic field.
After the fairness doctrine was repealed, a study of the ABC News
program Nightline revealed that there were seven business
representatives utilized as sources for every labor union
representative that was allowed access to the television airwaves.94
Despite near-universal support for Social Security, most sources
that were permitted on television in the 1990s described the system
as "broke," and constantly promoted privatization of the system as
the answer.95 Over ninety percent of Americans, in relatively equal
numbers whether Democratic or Republican in party affiliation,
favored making labor and environmental standards part of free
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). However, coverage of their differences with
politicians such as President Bush who opposed such standards was
so inadequate or misleading that eighty-four percent of Bush
supporters in 2004 falsely believed that the President wanted to
have such standards in trade agreements.9 6
Environmental coverage is perhaps the easiest to quantify as
note 71, at 124; Watts Perkins, supra note 71, at 222; Hart, Frontline, supra
note 71; Hart, WP Healthcare Shocker, supra note 71; The Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion, supra note 71; The Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, Promoting Democracy, supra note 71.
93. See DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE PERSIAN GULF TV WAR 80 (1992)
(describing how antiwar politicians and scholars, as well as non-American
voices, were almost completely excluded from television debate on 1991 Gulf
War); JOHN MACARTHUR, SECOND FRONT: CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN
THE GULF WAR 109, 180, 220-33, 254 (1992) (describing how a handful of former
government officials dominated television debate on 1991 Gulf War, and how
actual combat footage was not aired); see also supra note 72 (citing Pozner and
others).
94. See Jeff Cohen, Mainstream News Coverage of Economics, FAIR (Mar. 1,
2000), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=254.
95. See id.; Doug Henwood, TV on Social Security: It's Broke, Fix It, EXTRA!
(May/June 1999), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1458; ABC Muddles the
Social Security Debate: Not "Everyone Agrees" with Distorted Claims, FAIR
(Jan. 14, 2005), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2038. Social Security
actually was not broke when these claims were made, and has never been broke
because it has consistently been projected to be solvent until 2037. See ALLEN
SCHICK & FELIX LOSTRACCO, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY,
PROCESS 276 (2000); Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees, Trustees
Report Summary (Aug. 5, 2010), www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html.
96. See Steven Kull et al., Public Perceptions of the Foreign Policy Positions
of the Presidential Candidates, in PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY
ATTITUDES AND KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS 2 (Sept. 29, 2004).
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biased. Most television news gives credence to the argument that
there has not been any global warming or that it is all natural, yet
these contentions have been rejected decisively by scientists.9 7 By
1997, most Americans believed that global warming had had no
effects, and by 2008 nearly forty percent of Americans, and nearly
sixty percent of Republicans, believed this claim.98
On television, political content is subject to a de facto boycott,
particularly when it relates to foreign affairs. All of the corporate
broadcast networks air thirty-minute nightly news programs with
virtually identical content, including a uniform twelve minutes of
advertising and promotion of corporate images.99 Foreign news
coverage on network television plummeted from forty-five of
network airtime under the fairness doctrine, to 13.5 percent in
1995.100 Television exposed fewer than half of Americans to
NAFTA, one of the important changes in American economic policy
since World War I1.101 A study published by the Columbia
Journalism Review in 1997, a decade after the fairness doctrine's
repeal, concluded that foreign news was in danger of being
completely cleansed from the television airwaves. 102  Professor
Anthony Varona observes that "local public affairs and political
programming on free broadcast television are generally scarce and
altogether nonexistent on many stations."1os Television network
97. See Maxwell T. Boykoff, Lost in Translation? United States Television
News Coverage of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 1995-2004, 86 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 1 (2008).
98. See Riley E. Dunlap, Climate-Change Views: Republican-Democratic
Gaps Expand, GALLUP (May 29, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
107569/ClimateChange-Views-RepublicanDemocratic-Gaps-Expand.aspx.
99. See Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media
2006, http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2006 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
100. See MATTHEW BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES To WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 296 (Princeton Univ. Press
2003) ("[A] study by the Joan Shorenstein Center found that the percentage of
network airtime devoted to foreign news fell from 45 percent in the 1970s to
13.5 percent in 1995.").
101. See Patricia O'Brien, A Consumer's Guide to Media Truth, in MEDIA AND
PUBLIC LIFE 108 (Everette E. Dennis & Robert W. Snyder eds., Transaction
Publishers 1997).
102. See James F. Hoge, Jr., Foreign News: Who Gives a Damn?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 48, 49-51; see also Neil Hickey,
Unshackling Big Media, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 2001, at 30, 31,
available at http://archives.cjr.org/year/01/4/fcchickey.asp; Rachel Smolkin, A
Source of Encouragement, AM. JOURNALIsM REV. (Aug./Sept. 2005),
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3909.
103. Anthony Varona, Towards a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009).
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news coverage declined by nearly half between 1987 and 2003, and
much remaining coverage was "low effort horse race journalism." 04
Only a small minority of television time in 2008 was election-
related, and three-fourths of that election news was not directed to
the substance of public policy issues.105
In recent years, studies have shown that local news covered
local political issues only five percent of the time, devoting most of
their broadcasts to sports, fires, storms, murders, and other
sensationalistic phenomena.106  This pattern sometimes reinforces
destructive stereotypes of African-Americans and other
minorities. 107  Prime-time television programming has become
nearly devoid of public affairs; instead, it is saturated with violence
and mild titillation of the audience.108
Television coverage of foreign news has continued to
deteriorate in the past couple of years. A 2008 study found that
newspapers or online news sites devoted roughly twice to three
104. Anthony Corrado and Heitor Gouvea, Financing Presidential
Nominations under the BCRA, in THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES 2008, at 77-79 (William G. Mayer ed., 2008).
105. See CRAIG ALLEN SMITH, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION:
THE QUEST FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 121, 128 (2010).
106. See Eric Chiappinelli, The Corporatization of Communication, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 959, 971 (2007) ("A recent study by the Center for Media
and Public Affairs shows that election coverage in my city during 2004 was
significantly less than in the past, and that only about 5% of local news
coverage dealt with local races and ballot issues."); Jennifer Harper, Study
Finds 'Near Blackout' of Local Public Issues on TV, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2003, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lG1-109357225.html. A
confidential internal FCC study found that consolidation of broadcast
station ownership resulted in reduced local public affairs coverage. See John
Dunbar, Lawyer Says FCC Ordered Study Destroyed, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Sept. 15, 2006; see also Brennan Center for Justice, Fact Sheets
on Media Democracy, FREE EXPRESSION POLICY PROJECT,
http://www.fepproject.org/factsheets/mediademocracy.html (last updated Sept.
27, 2010) ("Six corporations own or have controlling interests in most of the
American mass media today," which have turned away from "public affairs and
local programming.").
107. See Marissa Lee, Study: Television News Often Perpetuates Racial
Stereotypes, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Aug. 20, 2008 ("Watching local and network
news reinforces negative stereotypes of African Americans, according to two
recent studies published this spring. . . .").
108. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 15-77
(Univ. of Illinois Press, 1999); NEWTON MINOW & CRAIG LAMAY, ABANDONED IN
THE WASTELAND 21-46, 129-53, 163-88, 210-37 (Macmillan 1995); TV
Bloodbath: Violence On Prime Time Broadcast TV, PARENTS TELEVISION
COUNCIL,
http://www.parentstv.org/ptc/publications/reports/stateindustryviolence/main.as
p (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
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times as much attention to foreign news as radio and television
news, despite the U.S.'s involvement in two wars, urgent warnings
of a global recession, some $1.5 trillion of U.S. foreign debt owed to
creditors in various foreign countries, and a U.S. trade deficit
nearing $300 billion a year.109 In 2008, the networks devoted only
six minutes to the war in Iraq out of 450 minutes scheduled for
weekday news shows.110 Only about two of those minutes were
actually reported from Iraq, and the war in Afghanistan received
even less coverage, about three minutes per week.' With Iraq as
the primary case in point, the minimal foreign news remaining after
the repeal of the fairness doctrine was carefully monitored by
corporations to censor most images that could result in the public
forming anti-war or "isolationist" opinions, such as dead bodies,
destroyed buildings, or children starving due to war.112 The media
attempts to ascribe their bias to market demand. But the vast
109. See Topline for the First Six Months of 2008,
PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM,
http://www.journalism.org/sites/journalism.org/files/Topline%20for%20first%20
6%20months%20of%202008.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
110. See Jim Lobe, Networks' Int'l News Coverage at Record
Low in 2008, INTER-PRESS SERVICE (Jan. 5, 2009),
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45300.
111. See id.
112. See MICHAEL MASSING, Now THEY TELL Us: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND
IRAQ 21 (New York Review Books, 2004) ("The fighting [during the invasion of
Iraq] was so intense that, according to Centcom, between two thousand and
three thousand Iraqi soldiers died. Yet, on TV, I didn't see a single one of them.
On MSNBC, the anchor announced that its live video feed was being put on
five-second delay so that images deemed too 'disturbing' could be weeded out.");
id. at 23 ("In the case of Iraq, the conflict Americans saw was highly sanitized,
with laser-guided weapons slamming into their intended targets with great
precision. We observed this from afar, usually in pictures taken from bombers
thousands of feet above their target, or in images of black smoke rising
hundreds of yards away."); id. ("Spared exposure to the victims of war,
Americans had little idea of its human costs."); Rory O'Connor, War Coverage's
Biggest Lie-Censoring the Horrors, MEDIACHANNEL.ORG (Jan. 27, 2004),
http://www.commondreams.org/viewsO4/0127-09.htm ("What you don't see is the
maiming of killing of civilians. Instead we show you the highly spectacular, as
in some grand video game. So you get the impression that war is a cost-free
way of settling differences. This is terribly dangerous and fundamentally
untrue."); id. ("Print journalist Robert Fisk amplifies. 'The bosses say that
we don't want to respect the dead-we kill them! What we want to do is
to stop people from seeing these images-because if they saw them they
would never, ever again support war. And we want a population that will-
when we want!-support wars.'"); Angela Woodall, Survey: U.S. Media
Censors Iraq Reporting, UPI PERSPECTIVES (Apr. 5, 2005),
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-9073616_ITM ("The
news media are self-censoring reports about Iraq because of concern for public
reaction to graphic images . . . .").
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majority of Americans have expressed a preference for neutral
rather than pro-administration coverage of the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq,"' while the media has decisively chosen to act as a
mouthpiece for politicians.114
D. Was There an Alternative to Selective Deregulation Suppressing
Democratic Dialogue?
The fairness doctrine might have played a role in equalizing
access to radio and television facilities and broadcast spectrum by
members of minority political, ethnic, racial, and religious groups.
For example, in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
National Committee,"l5 a group of citizens filed suit against a radio
station for failing to provide airtime access to persons opposed to
the Vietnam War, and for refusing to accept their antiwar issue
advertisement as a remedy to the imbalance in coverage.'16  The
Supreme Court noted that because several Senators had been
"sensitive to the problems involved in legislating "equal
opportunities" with respect to the discussion of public issues,"117 the
Congress had imposed an obligation upon broadcasters "to operate
in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."" 8
The Court denied the plaintiffs a remedy because the station had
not refused advertisements on a discriminatory basis."'9 It noted,
however, that when the renewal of the broadcaster's license is due,
"the broadcaster will be answerable if he fails to meet [the public's]
legitimate needs." 20
Likewise, in Office of Communications of United Church of
Christ v. FCC,'121 a coalition of African-American organizations in
Jackson, Mississippi challenged an FCC license on the grounds of
discrimination and exclusion of the local community, forty-five
percent of which was African-American, from the airwaves. The
113. Public More Critical of Press, But Goodwill Persists, supra note 68, at
12.
114. See ERIC BOEHLERT, LAPDOGS: HOW THE PRESS ROLLED OVER FOR BUSH
10-23, 212-20 (Free Press 2006).
115. Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Dem. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
116. See id. at 97-100.
117. Id. at 106.
118. Id. at 108 n.3 (quoting 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) (2006)).
119. See id. at 114 n.11.
120. Id. at 125.
121. Office of Commc'ns of United Church of Christ v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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D.C. Circuit found that the organization had standing to challenge
the license. In his opinion, then-Judge Burger characterized an
FCC license as an exclusive right of access to part of the public
domain, which is burdened by a virtual easement enforced by the
FCC for public access, an easement needed to air conflicting views.
122
E. Conclusion
Out of the depths of the censorial statism of the Radio Act of
1927, the fairness doctrine emerged from the 1940s through the
1960s as a check on the FCC's distortion of political debate
conducted on radio and television. Properly understood, it
represents a check on the power of government to restrict First
Amendment-protected expression by prohibiting broadcasting by
educational, political, or religious speakers not sponsored or
affiliated with a federal licensee. Therefore, the deregulatory spirit
of the 1980s and 1990s is very selective in nature and effect. It
deregulates the content of broadcast licensees, permitting them to
refuse access to the airwaves to the vast majority of political
speakers, and to suppress political coverage to a tiny minority of
airtime. At the same time, selective deregulation continues to
restrict access to the science of broadcasting by permitting federal
licensees to prevent members of the public from participating in
political debate.123 This exclusion extends to political candidates,
who find their sound bites confined to miniscule snippets of time in
which political reasoning is impossible (forcing them to accept
bribes to pay for advertisements). The fairness doctrine might have
enhanced the quantity and diversity of political expression, but
remains a path not taken.
III. THE RETURN OF DIVERSE MEDIA: THE FCC THEORIZES NET
NEUTRALITY AS FREE SPEECH
A. Advocacy for Net Neutrality Prior to 2008
As the FCC was deregulating the broadcast networks in a way
that ensured widespread corporate censorship, it was paradoxically
constructing a free and uninhibited Internet through carefully
targeted regulation of the cable, telephone, and broadband
122. See id. at 1006.
123. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 391
(1969).
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infrastructure providers. Unlike the broadcast airwaves, which lost
First Amendment protection by being subjected to FCC licensing
unrestrained by the fairness doctrine, the Internet had free speech
safeguards:
In a society which relies more and more on electronic
communications media as its primary conduit for
expression, full support for First Amendment values
requires extension of the common carrier principle to all of
these new media.
A communications common carrier, such as a
telephone company is required to provide its services on a
non-discriminatory basis. It has no liability for the
content of any transmission. A telephone company does
not concern itself with the content of a phone call. Neither
can it arbitrarily deny service to anyone. The common
carrier's duties have evolved over hundreds of years in the
common law and later statutory provisions. The rules
governing their conduct can be roughly distilled in a few
basic principles. Common carriers have a duty to:
* provide services in a non-discriminatory manner at a fair
price
* interconnect with other carriers
* provide adequate services
. . . Given Congress' plan to build the [Internet] with
services from privately-owned carriers, a legislatively-
imposed duty of common carriage is necessary to protect
free expression effectively. As Professor Eli Noam, a
former New York State Public Utility Commissioner,
explains:
[C]ommon carriage is the practical analog to [the]
First Amendment for electronic speech over privately-
owned networks, where the First Amendment does
not necessarily govern directly.124
124. Mitchell Kapor, The NREN as Test-Bed for the National Public Network,
IETF (Sept. 1991), http://www.apps.ietf.org/rfe/rfcl259.html; see also
Mitchell Kapor & Jerry Berman, A Superhighway Through the Wasteland?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at Op-Ed Page, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/19990117101711/www.eff.org/pub/GII-NII/nii.kapor
berman-eff nyt.article ("Like today's phone companies, the companies
controlling the superhighway must be required to carry other programmers'
content, just as phone companies must provide service to anyone who is willing
to pay for it. We must guarantee that anyone who, say, wants to start an
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The FCC's Computer Inquiries of the 1970s and 1980s
subjected telephone companies to must-carry and nondiscrimination
obligations in their capacity as conduits for computer-mediated
speech and communication.12 5  The FCC distinguished between
telephone networks, which had to offer interoperability and
interconnectivity to Internet companies and applications,12 6 and the
alternative news network or a forum for political discussion is given an outlet to
do so."); Mitchell Kapor, Where Is the Digital Highway Really Heading?, WIRED
1.3 (1993), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.03/kapor.on.nii-pr.html ("In
its fundamental architecture and, increasingly, in its policies, the Internet is an
ideal example of an open network. It is an interactive medium based on two-
way communications, where people can fluidly shift from position of listener to
that of speaker, from role of consumer to that of provider."); id. ("[Bly virtue of
being common carriers, telcos are required to be open in access, use, and
content.").
125. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, at 12, Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Svcs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), (Nos. 04-277 and 04-281) ("Because the FCC
and state governments regulated telephone providers as common carriers, the
phone companies could not leverage their control over dialup lines into one over
Internet service or ISPs. As a result, thousands of ISPs, empowered to connect
to their subscribers over regulated phone lines, sprang up to fulfill the public
demand for various flavors of Internet access." (citation omitted)); Robert
Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMMC'NS L.J. 167 (2003), available at
http://law.indiana.edulfclj/pubs/v55/no2/cannon.pdf; Francis Bar et al.,
Defending the Internet Revolution in the Broadband Era: When Doing Nothing
Is Doing Harm 1 (E-conomy Working Paper No. 12, Aug. 1999) (arguing that
growth of ISPs was made possible by FCC policies that "prevented telephone
companies from dictating the architecture of data networks," and "forced open
access to networks whose monopoly owners tried to keep closed"); Kapor, Where
Is the Digital Highway Really Heading?, supra note 124 ("[Bly virtue of being
common carriers, telcos are required to be open in access, use, and content.");
United States General Accounting Office, Technological and Regulatory Factors
Affecting Consumer Choice of Internet Providers, USIAA, at 24 (2000),
http://www.usiia.org/news/gao.pdf ("[Tihe common carrier status of telephone
companies, which requires that they provide nondiscriminatory service at just
and reasonable rates, worked to give ISPs easy access to consumers through the
telephone network."); id. at 22 ("Consumers' choice of companies providing
transport to the Internet over the telephone network has been facilitated . . . by
the common carrier regulation of these companies.").
126. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 973-1002; see also id. at 1000 ("[W]hen local
telephone companies began to offer Internet access through DSL technology in
addition to telephone service, the Commission applied its Computer II facilities-
based classification to them and required them to make the telephone lines used
to transmit DSL service available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory,
common-carrier terms." (citing In re Amend. of Sections 64.702 of the Comm'n's
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 474-75,
229, 231 (1980); In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecomm. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24030-31 (1998))); In re Deployment
of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecomm. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd.
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Internet firms themselves, which largely did not have to
interconnect with anyone. The reasoning was that unlike the
telephone companies, the Internet firms themselves did not enjoy
exclusive access to any telecommunications infrastructure and
required no federal or state licenses to operate. 27
These policy decisions ensured the rapid development and
diversification of the Internet as a means of communication.
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has argued that due to the
efforts of the FCC and Congress to mandate more telephone
industry openness, there were soon 6,000 Internet service providers
(ISPs). 128 The number of Internet users in the United States rose
24012. The FCC refused to rule in 1999 on whether cable modem service
represented a regulated telecommunications service or largely deregulated
"information service." Brief of the Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n as Amicus Curiae,
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-35609).
The FCC changed course on cable in 2002, soliciting public comment on whether
"a cable operator is offering a 'telecommunications service' or private carrier
service, on a stand-alone basis, to ISPs or subscribers," which "offering might
provide the [FCC] with grounds, respectively, for common carriage regulation or
exercise of its ancillary authority." In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4846-47
(2002). The FCC "tentatively conclude [d] that enforcement of Title II provisions
and common carrier regulation is not necessary for the protection of consumers
or to ensure that rates are just and reasonable and not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory." Id. at 4848.
127. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 973-1002. The FCC made a similar distinction
in the 1970s between data services that travel over communications networks
and communication services that utilize data and computers, the former
requiring fewer regulations because they were not dominated by local
monopolies. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications
Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 173 (2003) ("The
pure data processing market was viewed as an innovative, competitive market
with low barriers to entry and little chance of monopolization . . . . The pure
communications market, on the other hand, was provisioned by an incumbent
monopoly. This monopoly almost always was AT&T but there were a few other
players such as GTE and a large handful of small, mainly rural, incumbent
carriers. In any given market, these players exercised control through their
regulated monopoly."); see also In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented
by the Interdependence of Computer & Commc'ns Services and Facilities, 28
F.C.C. 2d 267, 270-71 (1971), affd in part sub nom, GTE Service Corp. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), decision on remand, 40 F.C.C.
2d 293 (1973) (Computer I) (FCC limited telephone monopolies' entry into data
processing services so that they would not "favor their own data processing
activities by discriminatory services, cross-subsidization, improper pricing of
common carrier services, and related anticompetitive practices and activities.").
128. See REED HUNDT, YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION: A STORY OF
INFORMATION AGE POLITICS 193 (Yale Univ. Press, 2000); Reinhardt Krause,
Former FCC Chief Hundt on Telecom Outlook, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY,
Apr. 4, 2000; Karen Charman, Recasting the Web: Information Commons to
Cash Cow, FAIR (2007), http://www.fair.org/extra/0207/open-access.html.
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from very few in 1989, to sixty-three million in 1999, to more than
200 million in 2009.129 Although it is difficult to segregate bloggers
by nationality, the number of blogs skyrocketed from fewer than a
million in 2000, to thirty million in 2005, to more than 100 million
or even 500 million today.130
The Internet's designers envisioned an information ecosystem
more content- and application-neutral than proprietary networks or
communications systems such as AT&T's telephone network or the
broadcast network NBC. The design principle that crystallizes this
commitment to neutrality is commonly referred to as the end-to-end
principle. It basically says that innovation and filtering should
occur at the ends or the edges of the Internet, rather than in the
connections or central hub (i.e., the AT&T or NBC networks).
Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn first suggested the principle, and
explained how an "internetwork protocol" could facilitate the
sharing of information and computer resources between different
networks operating on distinct protocols.131  Professor Jerome
Saltzer of the computer science department at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology more fully articulated the principle, and
became a key player in the development of the Internet.132 The
129. See Leslie Walker, Interview, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July
29, 1999, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/business/talk/transcripts/walker/walker072999.htm.
130. See Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband; Access to Digital
Media as a First Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1530 (2007);
Douglas Quenqua, Burned out or Disappointed, Writers Give Up Their Posts,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 19, 2009 (stating that as of mid-2009,
there were 133 million blogs tracked by Technorati). The figure of 500 million
blogs is a global estimate popularized by Andrew Keen, a critic of participatory
media like the Internet. See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR:
How BLOGS, MYSPACE, YOUTUBE, AND THE REST OF TODAY'S USER-GENERATED
MEDIA ARE DESTROYING OUR ECONOMY, OUR CULTURE, AND OUR
VALUES 3 (2007); David Smith, Enough! The Briton Who Is Challenging the
Web's Endless Cacophony, THE OBSERVER, Apr. 29, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/apr/29/news.newmedia.
131. Vinton Cerf & Robert Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network
Intercommunication, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS 637, 637
(1974). This paper influenced the development of the Transmission Control
Protocol and the Internet Protocol by Jon Postel, who cited work of Cerf and
Kahn. See Jon Postel, Transmission Control Protocol, IETF (Sept. 1981),
http://www.apps.ietf.org/rfcrfc793.html; Jon Postel, Internet Protocol, IETF
(Sept. 1981), http://www.apps.ietf.org/rfe/rfc791.html.
132. See J.H. Saltzer et al., End to End Arguments in System
Design, ACM TRANS. ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS (2003),
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf; Mark A.
Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930
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Internet was meant to operate as a "dumb network"133 with "dumb
pipes,' 34 moving data along without, in the words of a federal
statute, "selection of the material by the service provider," or the
"select[ion of] the recipients of the material except as an automatic
response to the request of another person."35
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Internet proved itself capable of
fulfilling the high hopes that Mitch Kapor, Tim Berners-Lee, and
Jon Postel had for it. As a result of having more diverse and cross-
referenced inputs, the Internet is frequently more reliable than the
print or broadcast media. '36  Web-based "extremist enclaves" like
Common Dreams or Democracy Now! warned profusely that Iraq
was being falsely blamed for the conspiracy to attack the United
States on 9/11, which in fact had roots in Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia.13  They noted further, and correctly, that Iraq's weapons
subject to U.N. resolutions had been destroyed starting in 1991 by
many U.N. inspectors, and there was little evidence of ongoing
production.'38  Wikipedia contributors also attempted to warn in
2002 and 2003 that the Iraq war would be a foreign policy and
humanitarian disaster.139
(2001).
133. The words are those of David Isenberg, a dissident voice within mid-
1990s AT&T. David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network, JOURNAL OF THE
HYPERLINKED ORGANIZATION, http://www.hyperorg.com/misc/stupidnet.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
134. Hewlett-Packard, AT&T Team up on Software (Hewlett-Packard Co.),
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Dec. 18, 1995), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1Gl-
17854521.html.
135. 17 U.S.C. §512(a) (2006).
136. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Views Archive, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER (Feb. 2003),
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/february2003.htm; February 2003
Archive, DEMOCRACY NOw!, http://www.democracynow.org/shows/2003/2 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2010).
138. See, e.g., Views Archive, supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., Governmental Positions on the Iraq War Prior to
the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 21, 2003),
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Governmental-positions-on-theIraq.
War.priortothe_2003_invasion ofJIraq&oldid=854580 ("Richard Butler,
who led the UN inspection teams in Iraq until 1998, accused the United
States of promoting 'shocking double standards' in considering unilateral
military action against Iraq. He said, 'The spectacle of the United
States, armed with its weapons of mass destruction, acting without Security
Council authority to invade a country in the heartland of Arabia
and, if necessary, use its weapons of mass destruction to win that battle,
is something that will so deeply violate any notion of fairness in this world
that I strongly suspect it could set loose forces that we would deeply live to
regret.'"); Iraq Disarmament Crisis, WIKIPEDIA (Mar. 12, 2003),
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The financial crisis of 2008 was also predicted more often by
Internet users than by many writers for newspapers or television.
Wikipedia contributors warned in 2003 about billions of dollars'
worth of financial derivatives going unregulated and threatening
financial disaster.140  Other Internet-based extremists warned as
early as 1995 of an Internet bubble,' 4 ' and as early as 2003 of a
housing bubble. 42
The decentralized, open, innovation-rich Internet seemed in
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Iraq-disarmament-crisis&oldid=7435
90 ("Other opponents of the American invasion plan say that the US's reasons
are selective and ultimately insufficient, pointing out that states that the US
regards as friendly to it share some of these attributes. For example, Saudi
Arabia is not a democracy and is closely connected to the terrorists who
executed the attack on the WTC and the Pentagon. Also, Kuwait did not
become a democracy with universal suffrage after the UN-Iraq War. Many
states have weapons of mass destruction, the US more than any other. . . ."); id.
("Many opponents of the plan also claim that some or all of the above claims are
vastly misrepresented by the Bush administration, especially in the connection
between Iraq and terrorist groups. Fundamentalist Muslim groups generally do
not support Iraq, as it is a secular nation that does not enforce what they
perceive as Muslim law dictated by the Koran-in a tape reputedly released by
Osama bin Laden in February 2003[,] Saddam Hussein is referred to as an
'ignorant infidel' and placed only second on the list of evils, after an invasion by
the United States-of course collaboration between them would likely result
in just such a tape, and it is impossible to verify that such tapes do not
come from the CIA, as is widely believed about all such evidence in the Arab
world."); Opposition to the Iraq War, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 11, 2003),
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Opposition-to-theIraq_War&oldid=9
84953 ("Many critics of the American War on Terror do not believe that
American actions will help to end terror, and will actually increase the ranks
and capabilities of terrorist groups. American presence in Middle-Eastern
countries like Saudi Arabia are one of the major sources of discontent that leads
Islamic fundamentalists to commit acts of violence; hence, additional American
presence in Iraq will likely increase the ranks of terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda, especially with the collateral damage of civilian deaths inevitable in any
invasion."); id. ("The [Vatican's] foreign minister, Archbishop Jean-Louis
Tauran, expressed concerns that a war in Iraq would inflame anti-Christian
feelings in the Islamic world. . . . The World Council of Churches, which
represents between 350 million and 450 million Christians from over 100
countries, published a statement in opposition to war with Iraq. The executive
committee said, 'War against Iraq would be immoral, unwise, and in breach of
the principles of the United Nations Charter.'").
140. See, e.g., Derivatives (finance), WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 30, 2004),
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Derivative_(finance)&oldid=8952061.
141. See Mark Gemein, The Best of All Possible Worlds, SALON.COM (Nov. 4,
1999),
http://www.salon.com/technology/books/1999/11/04/new-optimism/print.html.
142. See, e.g., Scott Patterson, A Conversation with John Burns (Apr. 2,
2003), http://www.smartmoney.com/investing/economy/a-conversation-with-
john-burns-14132/; Frank Shostak, Housing Bubble: Myth or Reality?, MISES
DAILY (Mar. 4, 2003), http://mises.org/story/1177.
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the late 1990s to be at risk of increasing corporate control and
management.14 3 A book published in 1999 suggested that AT&T
was unwilling to allow an unfettered Internet to develop into a
competitor to its voice or television services.'" AT&T had recently
acquired Tele-Communications, Inc., the cable provider for San
Francisco that would control that city's high-speed Internet access
lines.145 AT&T spent $100 billion buying up potential competitors
in the cable and broadband industry between 1997 and 2000
alone. 46 In late 1998, America Online ("AOL") and Time Warner
announced the largest merger in history. 14 7 Questioned in Congress
about its pending merger, AOL refused to commit to allow other
ISPs to reach consumers subscribing to the merged company's
services.148
By 2004, it had become clear that the effort to deregulate the
corporations that were acquiring ever-increasing control over the
Internet was in high gear. By acquiring their competitors in the
broadband industry, large corporations threatened to undermine
the "dumb pipe" model of the Internet, replacing it with a corporate-
filtered Internet. In 2002, the FCC approved Comcast's $51 billion
acquisition of AT&T's cable and broadband assets, forming an
Internet "giant" with unparalleled power over the network.14 9 The
143. See Hannibal Travis, The Future According to Google, 11 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 209, 222 (2009).
144. See KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 51, 62-64, 104, 232-33, 247 (1999); Lemley &
Lessig, supra note 132, at 934.
145. See Saul Hansell, The Battle for Internet Supremacy is Shifting to the
Companies that Sell the Connections to Users, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at
D4,available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/29/business/technology-battle-
for-internet-supremacy-shifting-companies-that-sell.html; Joanna Glasner &
Kristen Philipkoski, AT&T Wins in SF, WIRED NEWS (July 27, 1999),
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/07/20952; Frances Katz, AT&T
Bids for TCI-The Internet-Deal Makes Phone Giant Major Force in
Broadband, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 25, 1999,
http://www.ajc.com/; Denise Pappalardo, David Rohde & Sandra Gittlen, ATT Is
Going for the Cable Gusto, NETWORK WORLD FUSION (Apr. 23, 1999),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/1999/0423mediaone.html.
146. See Jane Martinson, AT&T Revamp Plan Wins Few Fans, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 26, 2000.
147. See Michael Wolf, You've Got Merger, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 14, 1998,
available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/columns/medialife/1642/;
Howard Wolinsky, He's Got Time! AOL's Deal Is Biggest Merger Ever, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, available at http://www.highbeam.com/docdlP2-
4527037.html.
148. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 132, at 928.
149. See Peter J. Hower, Comcast's $51 Billion Takeover ofAT&T Broadband
Gets Key FCC Approval, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov 14, 2002, available at
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company promptly raised the price of high-speed Internet access in
places like St. Paul, Minnesota by $11, to $58 per month (or $61 if a
modem was leased) unless customers subscribed to the basic cable
service that started at $11 per month. 5 0 That same year, the FCC
announced that it was releasing cable broadband services from the
"common carrier" obligations that guaranteed an interconnected,
interoperable Internet.' The FCC declared its intention to do the
same with digital subscriber line ("DSL") service. 152 It had
previously "distinguished between the common carrier offering of
basic transmission service, which provides a communications path
for the movement of information, and the offering of enhanced
services, which . . . [consist] primarily of data processing
services."153 In 2004, the Supreme Court declined to recognize an
obligation on the part of telecommunications network licensees to
provide nondiscriminatory access to their competitors for purposes
of interconnection.154 The decision was a blow to efforts to roll back
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-8929361_ITM;
Christopher Stern, FCC Clears Comcast's AT&T Deal; Acquisition Creates
Cable-Internet Giant, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2002, available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lP2-393374.html.
150. See Steve Alexander, AT&T Broadband Raises Net-only Price, STAR
TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS, MN), Jan. 16, 2003, available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-96530228.html.
151. See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) (concluding that cable
modem service is an "interstate information service" and not a cable service and
beginning to explore whether or not cable modem service should be regulated by
law); see also Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting
Beyond the Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 245 (2003)
(examining how the March 2002 FCC ruling that cable modem service is an
"information service" leaves cable operators largely unregulated and not subject
to open access requirements).
152. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
Over Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Red. 3019, 3033, 1 25 (2002) (concluding that
"in the case where an entity combines transmission over its own facilities with
its offering of wireline Internet access service, the classification of that input is
telecommunications, and not a telecommunications service."); see also Nirali
Patel, Comment: FCC Broadband Policy: More Power for the Bell Monopolies, 55
AD. L. REv. 393 (2003) (discussing the implications of the FCC's classification in
achieving regulatory parity in the industry); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S.
Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 885 (2003) (exploring the modern shift in regulating
network industries, high-speed broadband service providers).
153. In re Policy & Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
Marketplace, 16 FCC Red. 7418, 7419-20 (2001).
154. See Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
410-11 (2004) ("We have never recognized such a doctrine ... and we find no
need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.").
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the increasingly rigid policy of telephone companies to refuse to
offer broadband service without tying it to obsolete local telephone
service. 155
In 2005, all of these developments seemed to come to a head.
In January, sources revealed to the press that AT&T and SBC were
in talks to merge, a previously "unthinkable" step towards
recreating the "sprawling AT&T telephone monopoly" broken up in
the 1980s.156  The FCC reported that most U.S. households had
access to only one cable provider.157  Comcast was on its way to
being the local cable provider (one commentator says "monopoly") in
about four out of five of America's largest media markets.s In
April, Comcast and Time Warner announced their acquisition of
Adelphia Communications, which had 5.3 million subscribers, for
$17.6 billion in cash and stock.15 9  Also in April, a Comcast
subscriber sued Comcast for releasing her Internet usage data to
the Recording Industry Association of America, causing her to have
to pay a $4,500 settlement.16 0 In June, the Supreme Court upheld
the FCC's decision in 2002 to deregulate cable broadband.'6 ' In
155. See SBC-AT&T and Verizon-MCI Mergers Remaking the
Telecommunications Industry Part II: Hearing before Senate Judiciary
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Gene Kimmelman, Director,
Washington DC Office, Consumers Union), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1465&witid=4176 (citing
UNE Fact Report 2004, In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC
Red. 2533 (2004) (WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Docket No. 01-338).
156. Yuki Noguchi, AT&T-SBC Union Now Looks Possible, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 2005, at El.
157. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market
for Delivery of Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, 20 FCC Red. 2755,
2828, 136 (2005) (determining that few consumers have a second wireline
alternative and that few cable community units have effective competition).
158. See Daniel Roth, The Dark Lord of Broadband Tries to Fix
Comcast's Image, WIRED.COM (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/17-
02/mfbrianroberts?currentPage=all.
159. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner and Comcast Seal
Adelphia Purchase, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00EODF1431F931Al5757CO
A9639C8B63.
160. See Comcast Sued for Disclosing Customer Info, CNET NEWS (Apr. 15,
2005),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wOxd3Yz4ElgJ:www.ma
il-archive.com/isn@attrition.org/msg04135.html.
161. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S.
967, 973-75 (2005) (holding that the FCC lawfully interpreted the
Communications Act and Administrative Procedure Act and that cable
companies that sell broadband are exempt from mandatory common carrier
regulation).
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August, the FCC relieved AT&T and other telephone-based
broadband networks from many interconnection and
nondiscrimination obligations. 16 2
The FCC finally responded to a rising tide of consumer and
industry demands for reinstituting basic nondiscrimination
obligations on broadband providers. In August 2005, the FCC
announced a policy statement designed to preserve the Internet as
"a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity." 6 3  The FCC adopted four net neutrality
principles designed to guarantee that: (1) "consumers are entitled to
access lawful Internet content of their choice"; (2) "consumers are
entitled to run applications and services of their choice, subject to
the needs of law enforcement"; (3) "consumers are entitled to
connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network";
and (4) "consumers are entitled to competition among network
providers, application and service providers, and content
providers." 64  The FCC noted that the principles it adopted were
not rules, and that they were "subject to [the requirements ofJ
reasonable network management."6 s
Despite the FCC's new principles of net neutrality, activists
continued to urge legislation in the area. Telecom mergers filled
the news in late 2005. In October, the FCC approved Verizon's
acquisition of MCI, which gave one company control over much of
the Internet backbone system and thus the power potentially to
block traffic from competitors deemed a threat,'6 6 like public
broadband networks or innovative commercial alternatives like
FON or Google. 6 7 As the FCC was considering the Verizon/MCI
162. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14855, 14862 (2005).
163. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (establishing a
new system of minimal regulation to improve efficiency, promote access, and
create consistency in the broadband service industry, as well as affirming the
determination that wireline broadband Internet access is an "information
service").
164. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20
FCC Rcd. at 14987-90.
165. Id. at 14990.
166. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds
Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343,
366-77 (2008) (citing In re Verizon Commc'ns Inc. & MCI, Inc. Applications for
Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18433, 18496 (2005)).
167. Verizon controlled most telephone-based broadband networks,
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merger, The Wall Street Journal reported that corporate owners of
broadband infrastructure were purchasing software designed to
"block ... Internet applications such as phone calls, video and photo
downloads."168  BitTorrent, Skype, and YouTube were among the
likely targets of this "crackdown" on the Internet.'69 In November,
the FCC voted to approve the AT&T/SBC merger. 170 News reports
followed about plans by AT&T and Comcast to charge Internet
access fees and disallow access to popular applications and content,
contributing to heightened public concerns. 171 As one commentator
described all these developments in early 2006: "[E]ver-fewer
along with AT&T, by 2008. See Werbach, supra note 166, at 373. It condemned
entry by public providers such as cities or municipal utilities into the
broadband delivery business. See City-sponsored Wi-Fi's Wild Ride,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmllopinion/2002446112_peirce2l.html;
Municipal WiFi is the New Hope for Net Neutrality-Thinker, THE
REGISTER (U.K.), Aug. 16, 2006. It also condemned FCC auctions of
'open access" wireless spectrum that would permit the delivery of video, voice-
over-Internet telephone calls, and mobile handsets that do not pass
the approval process of Verizon and the other corporations with both wireline
and wireless businesses. See FCC Auction Could Mean More Flexible
Broadband Wireless Services, NETWORKWORLD (July 20, 2007),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/072007-fcc-auction.html. Verizon
called the auction "corporate welfare" for Google even though Google had to pay
for the spectrum. Id. Verizon also sought to outlaw the upstart broadband-
sharing service FON. See Hold the FON, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2006),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/02/08/google-ebay-verizon-
cx_df 0209wifiprint.html.
168. Peter Grant & Jesse Drucker, Phone, Cable Firms Rein in Consumers'
Internet Use, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2005, at Al.
169. Id.
170. See Arshad Mohammed, FCC Approves Verizon, SBC Mergers, WASH.
POST, Nov. 1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103100843.html.
171. See, e.g., Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated
Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 104 (2006-2007) (calling
statements made by an SBC executive indicating that it intended to charge its
competitors fees "frightening for many"); Hiawatha Bray, Telecoms Want Their
Products to Travel on a Faster Internet, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 2005, at Al
("AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. are lobbying Capitol Hill for the right to create
two-tiered Internet, where the telecom carriers' own Internet services would be
transmitted faster and more efficiently than those of their competitors.");
Arshad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2005, at D01 ("The head of a major telecommunications company stirred up a
hornets' nest this week by suggesting that he wants to charge companies like
Google and Yahoo a fee for bringing them into consumers' homes."); Online
Extra, At SBC, It's All About "Scale and Scope," BUSINESS WEEK (Nov. 7, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b395809 2 .htm (quoting
then-SBC CEO Edward Whitacre as saying that he would charge for use of
SBC's broadband pipes).
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broadband pipe providers, [empowered by] legislation designed to
give them practically dictatorial powers over what is and isn't
allowed on the Web, [could] kill a lot of the Internet entrepreneurial
fervor that's been bolstering a piece of America's . . . economy of
late."172
In 2006, concerns within the Internet industry and the public
about their likely effects, gave rise to continued net neutrality
activism. Google hired a key architect of the Internet's
interoperable, nonproprietary structure to lobby Congress for net
neutrality laws.173 Jeffrey Citron, Chairman and CEO of Vonage
Holdings Corporation, the largest Internet telephone company in
the United States, testified that Vonage could cut consumers' phone
bills in half and provide innovative new choices to Internet users,
but was increasingly being blocked by network providers who also
sold landline telephone service. 1 74 Representing 180 companies, the
COMPTEL trade association warned that the Internet requires
common carrier regulation of telephone and Internet backbone
companies in particular to thrive, and that the ongoing efforts of
broadband companies to limit the upstream bandwidth and
broadband modems available was restricting competition and
innovation.175 Other testimony before Congress in 2006 cautioned
that effective Department of Justice and FCC oversight was needed
to prevent AT&T's acquisition of BellSouth from locking up much of
the FCC-regulated wireless spectrum that could be used to develop
an alternative wireless broadband system.176 The chairman of the
antitrust subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee warned
172. Oliver Rist, Don't Neuter the Net, INFOWORLD (Mar. 9, 2006),
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/dont-neuter-net-106.
173. See Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., &
Transp., 109th Cong. 7-9 (2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President
and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc.), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&docid=f:30115.pdf.
174. See id. at 19-20 (statement of Jeffrey Citron, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Vonage Holdings Corp.).
175. See id. at 25-31 (statement of Earl Comstock, President and Chief
Executive Officer, CompTel).
176. See AT&T and BellSouth Merger: What Does It Mean For Consumers?
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol'y and
Consumer Rts. of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34-37
(2006) (testimony of James F. Geiger, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Cbeyond Comm.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate-hearings&docid=f:29938.pdf; id. at 38-48
(testimony of Jonathan L. Rubin, Senior Research Fellow, Am. Antitrust Inst.)
[hereinafter Rubin Testimony].
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that AT&T's consolidation of spectrum licenses could inhibit the
development of the "Wi-Max" alternative to cable and DSL service,
because BellSouth bought much of the Wi-Max spectrum in 1997
AT&T had acquired other bands of it along with SBC's assets. 77
Such efforts won important concessions from the broadband
infrastructure industry. The President of the United States
Telecom Association promised that his member companies would
not "block, impair, or degrade content" that was lawful and did not
harm the network.178 Similarly, the President of the National Cable
& Telecommunications Association argued that there were no
identified cases of discrimination against Internet content within
his industry. 79
Congress addressed the prospect of merged, deregulated series
of broadband super-networks by attempting to draft its own net
neutrality rules for network providers. The House Judiciary
Committee voted twenty to thirteen to pass the Internet Freedom
and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, which would make it a violation
of the Clayton Act, subject to private lawsuits for three times the
economic damage caused, for broadband providers to discriminate
against lawful content, impair other providers' ability to
interconnect, or offer enhanced quality of service to their own
information with the effect of prejudicing competitors' information
of a particular type.180 The committee noted that a diverse array of
advocates for regulatory action by the FCC and/or Congress
included Google, Intel, Microsoft, the Financial Services
Roundtable, the American Association of Retired Persons, Gun
Owners of America, Christian Coalition, National Religious
Broadcasters, and others.18 The Senate Commerce Committee
177. See AT&T and BellSouth Merger: What Does It Mean For
Consumers? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol'y and
Consumer Rts. of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006)
(statement of Hon. Mike Dewine, Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate hearings&docid=f:29938.pdf; see also Rubin
Testimony, supra note 176, at 47-48.
178. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 109th Cong. 1 (Feb. 7, 2006) (testimony of Walter B. McCormick, Jr.,
President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Telecom Ass'n), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/mccormick-020706.pdf.
179. Id. at 4 (testimony of Kyle McSlarrow, President & CEO, National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass'n).
180. H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. (2006).
181. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-541 (2006).
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passed the Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunity Reform
Act (ATORA) of 2006, which would have given the FCC the power to
fine and enjoin efforts by broadband providers to prohibit Internet
content because of the lawful views expressed therein, or to restrict
any non-harmful voice application, software, search engine, or legal
device of a subscriber's choosing; or to tie different services
together.182  This Act would have directed the FCC to report
annually to Congress on developments in Internet access markets,
including relationships between broadband service providers and
online companies like Google and eBay, and how these trends
"impact the free flow of information over the public Internet and the
consumer experience using the public Internet."18 3 If the FCC
discovered "significant problems," it would need to recommend steps
to help users better "access lawful content and run Internet
applications and services over the public Internet subject to the
bandwidth purchased and the needs of law enforcement
agencies."184
B. The FCC's Opinion in the Comcast Internet Content Blocking
Case
In 2004, a new Internet protocol became famous by making it
possible to download and view videos of the Indian Ocean tsunami
disaster from many different perspectives. 85  The protocol, called
BitTorrent, breaks large files into smaller pieces and incorporates
error-checking information so that it is possible to retrieve a single
file from numerous different computers, and even at several
different times.'8 6 It also attempts to force downloaders to upload
pieces for others as they download further pieces. 87  Lacking a
182. See S. 2686, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006); H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006);
H.R. Rep. No. 109-470 (2006).
183. S. 2686 § 901(a), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
pdf/06telcom.pdf.
184. See S. 2686.
185. See Jonathan Krim, High-Tech Tension Over Illegal Uses, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 2005, at E01.
186. See In re Formal Compl. of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13028, 13029-30 (2008); Kelvyn Taylor, Closer Look at P2P
Technology, PERSONAL COMPUTER WORLD (July 5, 2007),
http://www.businessgreen.com/personal-computer-world/features/2193584/
closer-look-bittorrent?page=2.
187. See Taylor, supra note 186. The developer of the protocol, Bram Cohen,
borrowed the "tit for tat" concept from game theory to prevent free-riding by
punishing non-uploaders (or "leechers") with slower or no downloads. See Kevin
Werbach, The Implications of Video Peer-to-Peer on Network Usage, in PEER-TO-
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search engine, BitTorrent requires trackers to connect users and
files, and several trackers were established for such purposes as
multimedia file sharing and open-source software development.188
BitTorrent began to be used in diverse contexts, including
distribution of independent film, video blogs, and high-quality
NASA images.'89
On November 1, 2007, the FCC received a complaint from two
leading consumer groups, joined by several groups focused on
freedom of expression, and faculty on the cyberlaw programs of
Harvard, Yale, and Stanford law schools. 190 That same month,
BitTorrent-based online video site Vuze, Inc. filed a petition to
establish a must-carry rule for broadband networks.191 The FCC
requested public comments, and received more than 6,500 of
them. 192
On August 1, 2008, the FCC concluded that it had jurisdiction
to enforce its net neutrality principles against cable and DSL
companies. 1 It found that Comcast's practice of interfering with
PEER VIDEO: THE ECONOMICS, POLICY, AND CULTURE OF TODAY'S NEW MASS
MEDIUM 103, 124 (Eli M. Noam & Lorenzo M. Pupillo, eds., 2008). Political
scientist Robert Azelrod developed the concept to describe the winning strategy
in a tournament he organized for computer programs to play "defection" games
based on the Prisoner's Dilemma in which two criminal suspects undergoing
interrogation are tempted to "defect" from a mutually beneficial strategy of
remaining silent in order to strike a deal with the police and incriminate the
other suspect, so that each suspect's pursuit of his perceived self-interest will
frustrate his own objectives and result in more jail time for both suspects. See
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 376-77 (2008).
188. See Free Press, 23 FCC Red. at 13029-30, 13030 n.7; LINUX TRACKER,
http://linuxtracker.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); Taylor, supra note 186;
VUZE, http://www.vuze.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); YOUTORRENT,
http://www.youtorrent.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
189. See Free Press, 23 FCC Red. at 13029-30; Production Diary, KONG IS
KING.NET, http://www.kongisking.net/kong2005/proddiary/ (last visited Nov. 20,
2010).
190. See Free Press, 23 FCC Red. at 13032; Complaint, Formal Complaint
of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Red. 13028
(2007) (WC Docket No. 07-52, FCC 08-183), available at
http://www.freepress.net/files/fp-pk-comcast-complaint.pdf.
191. See Free Press, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13030.
192. See id. at 13033.
193. The FCC relied extensively on the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2006), which Comcast characterized as mere prefatory language to
the immunization of Internet service providers from tort liability for their users'
speech, but which the FCC read as a mandate "to promote the continued
development of the Internet." Free Press, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13034-38. The Act
defines the FCC's jurisdiction over wire and wireless communications to include
"all instrumentalities, facilities, [and] apparatus" incidental to such
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peer-to-peer protocols such as BitTorrent was unreasonable and
discriminatory due to the effects on media and video game
companies that use the protocol, as well as multiple consumers.194
It declined to find the practice to be a type of "reasonable network
management," noting that it swept up homes consuming little
bandwidth, failed to address the bandwidth-intensive use of other
protocols, and was discriminatory against a protocol.
The FCC articulated a new theory of the First Amendment in
its Comcast order. Since the 1980s, the FCC had adopted what
could be called a Chicago School theory of the First Amendment in
abandoning the congressionally-mandated fairness doctrine. The
FCC argued that despite extensive licensing of television broadcast
networks by federal bureaucrats-and extraordinary barriers to
entry confronting new networks such as Fox, UPN, or the WB-the
First Amendment could best be promoted by competition among
cable, broadcast television, and radio.196 The broadcasters, formerly
a regulated public trust enjoying privileged access to the public
airwaves and corridors of political power, became participants in
the marketplace of ideas.
In Free Press, however, the FCC returned to a First
Amendment theory that characterized the fairness doctrine era of
the 1950s and 1960s. The FCC cited the Associated Press antitrust
case from 1945-a lodestar of advocates for limiting corporate
control over public debate-for the idea that saving the open
character of the Internet from restrictions on the content and
software available furthers First Amendment values, and helps
ensure a diverse and vigorous public debate. 9 7 The FCC evoked the
language of Mitch Kapor and other Internet pioneers:
communications. It also provides that the FCC may "make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be
necessary in the execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
194. See Free Press, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13051-52.
195. See id. at 13054-58.
196. See VICTORIA D. ALEXANDER, SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS: EXPLORING FINE
AND POPULAR FORMS 101 (Wiley 2003); SUSAN CHRISTOPHERSON & JENNIFER
CLARK, REMAKING REGIONAL ECONOMIES: POWER, LABOR, AND FIRM
STRATEGIES IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 91-92 (Routledge, 2007); Financial
Interest and Syndication Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION 875-76
(Horace Newcomb ed., CRC Press 2004); ALBERT GORE, THE ASSAULT ON
REASON 16 (Penguin 2007); JAMES A. PHILLS, INTEGRATING MISSION AND
STRATEGY FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 94 (Oxford Univ, Press 2005); JOHN
A. QUELCH & KATHERINE E. JOCZ, GREATER GOOD: How GOOD MARKETING
MAKES FOR BETTER DEMOCRACY 207 (2008).
197. See Free Press, 23 FCC Red. at 13040, 13053 n.203.
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Historically, "the innovation and explosive growth of the
Internet [has been] directly linked to its particular
architectural design." Thus, "variances from those
standard protocols and practices damages the Internet as
a whole," including the ability of entrepreneurs to enter
the market with new Internet services. Contravention of
these standard protocols and practices through
discriminatory conduct thus erects barriers to entry that
would not otherwise exist. Entrepreneurs are no longer
able to design new services and technologies around
known protocols and standards, but must spend
considerable time and resources in an effort to
accommodate Comcast's particular network management
practices-a task made all the more difficult by the
company's obfuscation regarding its actual practices. By
exercising authority over this complaint, we are able to
ensure that Comcast's actions do not inappropriately
hinder entry by "entrepreneurs and other small
businesses in the provision and ownership of
telecommunications services and information services." In
addition, by facilitating such entry, we also promote the
Act's policies favoring "a diversity of media voices" and
"technological advancement."198
Invoking the Associated Press case in particular, the FCC
stated that the First Amendment ensures "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources," rather than corporate interference with citizens'
communications and speech. 99
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FCC lacked the
jurisdiction to issue the Comcast order, although it did not address
200corhedta seelthe First Amendment issue. The court held that several
statutory delegations of authority to the FCC to monitor and
improve competition-including competition in providing "advanced
telecommunications capability," efficient public telecommunications
networks, and wire and radio communication-did not constitute
subject-matter jurisdiction for the FCC to regulate Comcast's
attempts to interfere with the proper operation of the Internet.2 0
The First Amendment conflict between owners of
198. Id. at 13040 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 13053 n.203.
200. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("We
begin-and end-with Comcast's jurisdictional challenge.").
201. See id. at 648, 651-52, 658-60.
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telecommunications equipment and Internet users will not be
resolved by the D.C. Circuit's opinion. The D.C. Circuit itself stated
that it was primarily relying on the FCC's own prior binding order
in 1998, which stated that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
not an independent grant of authority to the FCC to remove
barriers to reasonably-priced and advanced telecommunications
infrastructure. 2 0 2 The court indicated that the FCC could overrule
that prior order as long as it did not do so silently.203 The same
court has previously held that the Telecommunications Act of 1996
grants the FCC "significant, albeit not unfettered, authority and
discretion to settle on the best regulatory or deregulatory approach
to broadband .... " The Supreme Court, moreover, only rejected
a challenge to the FCC's deregulatory orders of the early 2000S 20 5 on
the grounds that "the Commission remains free to impose special
regulatory duties on [cable Internet providers] under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction."206  Three dissenting justices added that:
"Under its undefined and sparingly used 'ancillary' powers, the
Commission might conclude that it can order cable companies to
'unbundle' the telecommunications component of cable-modem
service."207 Comcast itself invited these conclusions by reassuring
202. See id. at 658 ("We begin with section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which provides that '[tihe Commission . . . shall encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing . . . price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers
to infrastructure investment.'" (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006))); id. ("As the
Commission points out, section 706 does contain a direct mandate-the
Commission 'shall encourage . . . .' In an earlier, still-binding order, however,
the Commission ruled that section 706 'does not constitute an independent
grant of authority.'" (quoting In re Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering
Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24047, [ 77 (1998))).
203. See id. at 659 ("Because the Commission has never questioned, let alone
overruled, that understanding of section 706, and because agencies 'may not ...
depart from a prior policy sub silentio,' the Commission remains bound by its
earlier conclusion that section 706 grants no regulatory authority." (quoting
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009))).
204. AD HOC Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572 F.3d 903, 906-07 (D.C.
Cir. 2009). See also Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659.
205. The order at issue was primarily in In re Inquiry Concerning High-
Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798,
4802-03 1 9 (2002), but the Court also addressed the order in In re Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17
FCC Red. 3019, 3030, 20 (2002).
206. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 996 (2005).
207. Id. at 1014 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., and Souter, J., dissenting).
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the Supreme Court that it should uphold the FCC's early 2000s
deregulatory orders because "the FCC retained Chevron discretion
in classifying cable modem service,"208 so that "'the Supreme Court
would be bound under Chevron to defer to the [agency] rule.'" 20
9
Subsequently, Comcast reassured a lower court that was hearing a
private case against the company that "[a]ny inquiry into whether
Comcast's [peer-to-peer] management is unlawful falls squarely
within the FCC's subject matter jurisdiction."210
The Internet industry, members of Congress, and academic
experts on telecommunications law do not view Comcast as
precluding the FCC from exercising the constitutional and statutory
authority to preserve the Internet against private corporations'
efforts to use state or federal licenses or powers to control Internet
content.211 The Chairman of the Democratic Policy Committee of
the United States Senate, Senator Byron Dorgan, commented on
the floor of Congress that:
The FCC, under former Chairman Powell, moved the
Internet from a telephone service to an information
service, and that is what the lawsuit was about. Comcast
brought a lawsuit and said under Title I of the
Communications Act, as an information service, the FCC
does not have the authority with respect to Internet
freedom as I call it, to impose net neutrality rules. The
208. "Chevron discretion" refers to a federal agency's power to adopt
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes, reasonable being defined in
contrast to arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute's text. See Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984);
American Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 2006); U.S.
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
209. Brief for Cable-Industry Petitioners at 34, National Cable and
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servcs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Nos. 04-277
& 04-281) (quoting Satellite Broad. & Communs. Ass'n v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344,
348 (11th Cir. 1994)). Comcast was technically not a party to this brief, but it is
a member company of the National Cable and Telecommunications Association,
which was a party. See Press Release, Nat'l Cable Telecomms. Ass'n, Comcast's
Brian Roberts Elected Chairman of NCTA Board: Other NCTA Board Members
Elected; Executive Committee Named (Apr. 11, 2005), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20060322001325/www.ncta.com/press/press.cfm?PRi
d=595&showArticles=ok.
210. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Judgment On the
Pleadings at 10, Hart v. Comcast of Alameda, Inc., No. 07-6350, 2008 WL
2610787, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008)).
211. For a description of how cable and telephone companies used state and
local licenses to secure control over telecommunications infrastructure over
which Internet content travels, see Travis, supra note 130, at 1569 nn.176-91
and accompanying text.
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circuit court said the FCC does not have that authority
under Title I. That gets very technical and very legal.
... I want regulators to regulate effectively to make sure
the market remains open and free and fair. That is the
job of a regulator. That is the job of the FCC.
We are going to have a big debate about this in the
Congress. But first and foremost, I hope the Federal
Communications Commission takes action under its own
authority because it has plenty of authority to respond to
this decision. It has authority under Title II of the
Communications Act, and it has other authorities it can
use. 2 12
The Open Internet Coalition has endorsed efforts by the FCC
to reach a common-sense clarification of its authority to promote
open and widely accessible high-speed Internet service.2 13 Its
members include Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, NetFlix, Sony
Electronics, Tivo, and Twitter.214 Prior to the D.C. Circuit's opinion,
a coalition of Internet industry leaders such as Jeff Bezos of
Amazon, Eric Schmidt of Google, Craig Newmark of Craigslist, and
Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook wrote to the FCC to express their
view that: "For most of the Internet's history, FCC rules have
ensured that consumers have been able to choose the content and
services they want over their Internet connections." 215 Academic
experts have reached similar conclusions.2 16
Prior to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Comcast, the FCC
announced its view that it has jurisdiction to enact a National
Broadband Plan, which would include rules guaranteeing to
Internet users their choice of lawful content, applications, and
devices to the extent consistent with reasonable network
management; the FCC invited comment from industry and the
212. 156 CONG. REC. S2275-03, S2287 (Apr. 14, 2010).
213. See OIC Supports FCC Notice of Inquiry and Third Way
Approach, OPEN INTERNET COALITION (June 16, 2010),
http://www.openinternetcoalition.com/index.cfm?objectid=7587D410-89EB-
11DF-A6BC000C296BA163.
214. See Who We Are, Open Internet Coalition,
http://www.openinternetcoalition.com/index.cfm?objectid=6C43DDCO-5C6A-
11DF-9E27000C296BA163 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
215. 155 CONG. REC. S10614-01, S10618-19 (Oct. 21, 2009).
216. See Austin Carr, FCC Pushes for Net Neutrality and Internet Regulation:
What Happens Next? [Update], FAST COMPANY (May 6, 2010),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1639209/fcc-pushes-for-net-neutrality-and-
internet-regulation-what-happens-next; Tim Wu, Is Net Neutrality Dead?,
SLATE (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2250700/.
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public.2 17  A prescient dissenting commissioner objected to the
proposed rules on the basis that the FCC lacked the jurisdiction
necessary to implement them.218 Neither this dissenting
commissioner nor the D.C. Circuit, however, has confronted the
legislative history and purposes that motivated Congress to enact
the various provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
National Recovery Act of 2009. Significantly, these statutes are
viewed as sources of the FCC's authority to protect and promote an
open, efficient Internet. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit ignored the
fact that Congress wrote the Telecommunications Act to mandate
that telecommunications carriers interconnect with one another in a
way that maximizes consumer choice, using an explicit reference to
broadband Internet with the words "high speed, switched,
broadband telecommunications capability."219  In this regard,
"Congress did not treat advanced services differently from other
telecommunications services," and "did not limit the regulation of
telecommunications services to those services that rely on the local
loop."2 20  More fully, Congress declared that the FCC "shall
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans" with
"measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that
remove barriers to infrastructure investment."221 It defined
advanced telecommunications capability to include "high-speed,
switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables
users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technology." 22 2 Thus prior to
Comcast, the D.C. Circuit itself rejected the notion that Congress
had intended Internet service to go unregulated by declaring it an
"information service" in the same category as electronic publishing
or e-mail that required few licenses to operate. 223
217. See In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices,
24 FCC Rcd. 13064, [1[ 87-92 (Oct. 22, 2009).
218. See id. 1 98 (statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
219. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2000).
220. Ass'n of Commc'ns Enters. v. FCC, 235 F.3d 662, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
221. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
222. Pub. L. 104-104, § 706(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996) (reproduced at note
under 47 U.S.C. § 157).
223. See Am. Council of Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Internet access was not an "information service" but a "telecommunications
service" subject to "an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate
a specific provision of the statute by regulation" as FCC's "reasonable policy
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The 1996 Act clearly makes telecommunications services
subject to nondiscrimination and interconnection requirements, and
defines a telecommunications service as the "offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . .. regardless of
the facilities used."2 24 It defines an "information service" as making
information available by such means as "electronic publishing," but
specifically excludes from this definition "any use of any such
capability for the . . . operation of a telecommunications system or
the management of a telecommunications service."225 Cable
companies are not engaged in "electronic publishing" in their
capacity as broadband providers, which is why they claim they are
entitled to a safe harbor against the defamation and copyright
liability that would ordinarily confront a publisher.2 26 Although
they make information available, when they go beyond providing a
capacity for acquiring or storing information to transmitting
information from user to user by wire or radio, they are providing a
telecommunications service.227 Information services like electronic
publishing do not transmit communications along diverse protocols
on behalf of other information producers or users, without
examination or selection of the contents thereof. Electronic
publishing typically involves editing, such as when "disseminating
news articles, offering literary material, and providing services
similar to the Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw databases."228 The
choice[s]" (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843-45
(1984))).
224. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).
225. Id. § 153(20).
226. See id. § 230; 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006); Comcast Dedicated
Internet IP Backbone Service Acceptable Use Policy,
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/l/2/CM/VanityURIdocuments/dedicated
internet/ComcastDedicatedInternet-Acceptable%2Use%2OPolicy-090113.pdf
(last revised Jan. 12, 2009) ("Comcast reserves the right to avail itself of the
safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. . . .").
227. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(46); Am. Council of Educ., 451 F.3d at 228-30;
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2000).
228. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 994
(2005) (noting that in 1980s, the FCC distinguished between
telecommunications services and "enhanced services," the latter of which
"included database services in which a customer used telecommunications to
access information, such as Dow Jones News and Lexis, as well as 'value added
networks,' which lease wires from common carriers and provide transmission as
well as protocol-processing service over those wires"). "Following this traditional
distinction, the Commission in the Universal Service Report classified ISPs that
leased rather than owned their transmission facilities as pure information-
service providers." Id.
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legislative history of the Telecommunications Act specifically
describes the Internet as a telecommunications service.229
The FCC's National Broadband Plan suggests that agency
oversight may help coordinate universal accessibility of the
Internet, a goal very nearly achieved already in some other
countries. Large gaps persist in the infrastructure of decentralized,
citizen-to-citizen high-speed Internet communication in this
country. Forty percent more households have broadband access in
the Netherlands or Scandinavia as in the United States, and nearly
twice as many households have it in South Korea. 230 More than a
third of Americans do not have broadband at home, as well as forty-
one percent of African Americans and nearly half of Hispanics.231
On sovereign Native American lands, broadband penetration may
be only five to ten percent, as little as a tenth of the national rate.232
Most Americans without access know that the Internet is valuable
for education and that children should learn how to use it.233
Nearly two-thirds of jobs require use of the Internet to perform at
expected levels. 23 4  Over half of teachers describe the Internet
access in their classrooms as too slow or unreliable to use
consistently. 235 A minority of American teachers can access their
229. See S. Rep. No. 104-23, at 18 (1995) (stating that "switching capabilities"
used by modern "information services" are "telecommunications service[s]"); S.
Rep. No. 1822, at 431 (1994) ("MCI and other long distance carriers have
invested billions of dollars in digital fiber optic transmission networks. These
networks are already being put to work to supply modem infrastructure
services, such as MCI's new SONET digital highway, which today is providing
the fastest and most powerful of the university, government and commercial
networks collectively known as the Internet."); CONG. REC. H2230 (Aug. 2,
1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("Finally, I have included language within the
manager's amendment to address a burgeoning problem in the fast advancing
telecommunications markets. Much to the dismay of concerned parents both
softcore and hardcore pornography is freely available on the Internet."); ROBERT
E. EMERITZ, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: LAW & LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, at SR-50 (1996) (similar); Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d
1120, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
230. See BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, NEXT GENERATION
CONNECTIVITY: A REVIEW OF BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY
FROM AROUND THE WORLD 32 (2009).
231. See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 167
(2010).
232. See id. at 24, 163.
233. See id. at 169.
234. See id. at 265. Perhaps for this reason, estimates are that half of new
jobs created over the next decade will require some degree or certificate after
high school. See id. at 225.
235. See id. at 20.
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students' academic records to tailor instruction to their needs.2 36
South Korea and Finland, with some of the highest broadband
access rates, also have some of the highest science and mathematics
test scores.23 7
Broadband performance in the United States is spotty,
averaging only about half the advertised speeds. 23 8  Mobile
broadband speeds may be closer to a third of what is advertised,
barely warranting the designation as high-speed Internet access.239
Just as with electricity, transportation and health care, universal
access has never been achieved by the market alone. 2 40
C. First Amendment Challenges to the FCC's New Internet
Neutrality Mandate
The FCC's order on the Free Press petition provoked a collision
between First Amendment interests. On the side of regulation
mandating net neutrality is the First Amendment interest of the
public in sending and receiving countercultural, oppositional and
underground speech and communications, and using new
applications and Internet protocols along the way. 24 1 On the side of
the status quo prior to the order is the asserted interest of Comcast
and its investors and employees in communicating messages they
favor through "their" equipment, and their asserted freedom not to
carry speech or applications that they dislike or with which they
disagree.24 2 The latter side combines two inconsistent positions:
that of an editor and publisher of a subset of all possible Internet
communications that has a First Amendment right to be free of
forced-carry obligations, and that of a conduit for data which
benefits from a series of common-law and statutory safe harbors
that immunize it from defamation and privacy-tort liability as the
"speaker" of the Internet.24 3
Comcast challenges the FCC's action as in excess of its
236. See id. at 234.
237. See FCC supra note 231, at 225.
238. See id. at 21.
239. See id. at 22.
240. See id. at 3 ("Treasury bonds and land grants underwrote the railroad,
the Rural Electrification Act brought electricity to farms and the federal
government funded 90% of the cost of the interstate highways") (footnotes
omitted).
241. See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13028, 13040, 13053 n.203 (2008).
242. See id. at 13053 n.203.
243. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
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jurisdiction, rather than as a violation of the cable network's First
Amendment rights.2 44 It emphasizes the absence of any law or
regulation prohibiting its conduct, pointing out that the FCC based
its decision on enforcing what its Chairman announced as an
unenforceable policy statement rather than a series of rules issued
in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
551 et seq.245 It further claims that there is no harm to consumer
choice of content and applications, because it only slows certain
protocols to prevent other consumers from experiencing a degraded
Internet connection.24 6 It also claims the right to filter out
infringing audio and video Net content on behalf of other media
conglomerates such as NBC Universal.
A related public relations campaign did, however, emphasize
Comcast's free speech rights. The "Hands Off the Internet"
movement argued that the government should stay out of
micromanaging Internet companies' relationships with their
customers: "the Internet has flourished because government has not
tried to regulate it."24 8 The movement's statement listed a series of
companies and organizations sponsoring the press release, but did
not list Comcast. Only an investigation of the movement's Members
page revealed to this author that one member was called
NetCompetition.org, which includes AT&T, Comcast, and Time
Warner Cable as members.249
244. See Opening Brief for Petitioner Comcast Corporation at 31, Comcast
Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Pet'n for review filed Sept. 4, 2008)
(arguing that FCC lacked "statutory or regulatory mandate that the agency
could elect to implement either by general rules or case-by-case
decisionmaking").
245. See id. at 17, 21-27, 36.
246. See id. at 24 ("Accordingly, Internet service providers ('ISPs') such as
Comcast universally manage their networks to ensure that high-volume usage
by a minority of customers does not harm others' Internet experiences.").
247. See id. at 54-55 ("Finally, the Order is arbitrary and capricious because
the agency failed to give meaningful consideration to the need for ISPs to
employ reasonable network management practices in order to prevent the
transmission of copyright-infringing audio and video content.").
248. Statement on FCC Resolution of Comcast-BitTorrent Issue,
HANDS OFF (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.handsoff.org/blog/page/3/.
See also Hands Off Coalition: House Vote a Victory for
'Bipartisan Common Sense,' THE FREE LIBRARY (June 9, 2006),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:akx6jPiDGgJ:www.thef
reelibrary.com/%27Hands%2BOft%27%2BCoalition%253A%2BHouse%2BVote%
2Ba%2BVictory%2Bfor%2B%27Bipartisan%2BCommon...-a0146803545.
249. See Member Organizations, HANDS OFF,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Hands-Off.theInternet#Member-
organizations (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); Members, NETCOMPETITION,
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D. Conclusion
The Internet depends upon the neutrality of network providers
to fulfill its vision of uninhibited debate characterized by an
unprecedented openness to members of the public. Corporate and
technological developments within the cable and telephone
industries threaten to rein in debate by limiting the applications,
content, and protocols that Internet users may access. The FCC
issued a strong opinion endorsing a theory of the First Amendment
that would preserve the Internet's openness by allowing the FCC to
protect Internet users from discriminatory or unreasonable cable
and telephone industry practices. Industry leaders, however,
describe this protection of the Internet's diversity as a violation of
their First Amendment right to edit the World Wide Web. The
result is a looming confrontation between the FCC and the First
Amendment.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALLY GROUNDING THE FCC'S NEW THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The FCC has articulated various theories to justify broadcast
and Internet neutrality. In Free Press, it adopted a purposive
theory of the First Amendment. In response to the claim that its
net neutrality adjudication conflicted with Comcast's First
Amendment right to freedom from legislation or regulations
abridging its freedom of speech, the FCC argued that net neutrality
regulations "promote the dynamic benefits of an open and accessible
Internet." It further argued that protecting speakers from
interference with their Internet applications and communications
does not dictate the content of Internet communications in violation
of "First Amendment values" or prevent Comcast or other
companies from communicating with their customers or other
persons or entities.250 It has also relied upon the identification by
Congress of a "substantial . . . First Amendment interest in
promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology
media."251 Finally, it cited Supreme Court case law for the idea that
http://netcompetition.org/index.php/go/about-us-members/ (last visited Nov. 20,
2010).
250. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13028, 13053 n.203 (2008).
251. Id. at 13041 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, § 2(a)(6), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (Oct. 5,
1992), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521).
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the First Amendment supports regulating corporate restrictions on
the ability of individual citizens to enjoy "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."252
In explaining its regulation of broadcast television to the courts
and the public, however, the FCC has wavered between formalistic
and economic approaches to the First Amendment. As noted above,
in the late 1980s, the FCC decided that developments in the
economics of radio and television made the fairness doctrine
unnecessary and underscored a formal conflict with the First
Amendment.253 In a manual distributed to the public describing the
obligation of broadcast licensees to operate in the public interest in
exchange for rights over the public airwaves, it says:
The FCC allocates (that is, designates a portion of the
broadcast spectrum to) new broadcast stations . . . . As
noted above, whenever we review an application-
whether to build a new station, modify or renew a license
or sell a station-we must determine if its grant would
serve the public interest .... [W]e expect station licensees
to be aware of the important problems and issues facing
their local communities and to foster public understanding
by presenting programming that relates to those local
issues. As discussed in this Manual, however,
broadcasters-not the FCC or any other government
agency-are responsible for selecting the material that
they air. By operation of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and because the Communications Act
expressly prohibits the Commission from censoring
broadcast matter, our role in overseeing program content is
very limited.2 54
The author of a report released by the FCC's Media Bureau
Staff in 2005 went even further. The report amounted to a legal
252. Id. at 13053 n.203.
253. See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145, 227-46 (1985); GEOFFREY STONE, LOUIS SEIDMAN,
CASS SUNSTEIN, MARK TUSHNET & PAMELA KARLAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
506 (Aspen, 2003) ("In 1987, the FCC repealed the fairness doctrine, asserting
that [it] was unconstitutional because it 'chilled' the first amendment rights of
broadcasters.").
254. The Public and Broadcasting: How to Get the Most
Service from Your Local Station, FCC (July 2008),
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/public-andbroadcasting.pdf (emphasis
added).
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brief against the agency's own regulation of broadcast licensees,
arguing that broadcast licenses should not have to operate in the
public interest, that any requirement that they do is basically
unenforceable, and that even if it was enforced, broadcasters could
switch to relatively unregulated media, taking consumers with
them.255
Somewhat surprisingly, the "First Amendment values"
approach to the First Amendment in Free Press has been absent
from most recent FCC forays into radio and television regulation.
With a strange and often arbitrary exception of "indecent"
material, 25 6 _i e. mostly adult content-the FCC regards "'the
maintenance of control over programming as a most fundamental
obligation of the [broadcast] licensee.'" 257 The FCC "today imposes
very few affirmative programming obligations on broadcasters ...
."258 Yet the purposive theory underlying the Free Press decision by
255. See John W. Berresford, The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating
Traditional Broadcasting: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, FCC
at ii, 5-26 (Mar. 2005), http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-
released/scarcity030005.pdf.
256. The FCC drew a distinction between "the most objectionable, most
offensive language," most of which was sexual in nature, and objectionable or
offensive messages such as representations of Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan, or of
schoolhouse massacres, or of the torture and murder of women and children for
entertainment value in "horror" or "slash" movies and television shows. See
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct 1800, 1808, 1812-13 (2009). The
FCC reasoned that a sexual reference such as "the F-Word" has a "power to
insult and offend [that] derives from its sexual meaning." Id. (citing In re
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002
and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299, 13323 (2006)). Yet racist or sexist
content also insults and offends, without FCC regulation. See Center for
American Progress & Free Press, supra note 72. The FCC has also basically
admitted that its own distinctions between sexual "expletives" and sexual
innuendo of the type common on television shows like Friends or movies like
American Pie are artificial and nonsensical. See In re Complaints Regarding
Various Television Broadcasts, 21 FCC Red. 13299, 13308 23 (2006); In re
Industry Guidance On Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Red. 7999,
8000-01, 3-5 (2001); see also Mike Hudson & Chad Graham, Censorship:
The Big Chill, THE ADVOCATE, May 11, 2004, at 53.
257. Brief for the FCC and United States at 46, CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d
167 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3575) (quoting In re Application of WCHS-AM-TV
Corp., 8 F.C.C. 2d 608 7 (1967)), vacated and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 2176
(2009).
258. LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 12
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004). See also DOUGLAS KELLNER, TELEVISION
AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 183-84 (1999) (describing how repeal of pillars
of fairness doctrine in 1984 and 1987 led to a fifty percent decline in public
affairs programming on commercial television); MARKUS PRIOR, POST-
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the FCC, according to many courts and scholars, would support an
even greater FCC role in ensuring content and viewpoint diversity
in the context of broadcast licenses than in the context of cable
modems. 2 59  As the FCC itself has stated, "broadcasting has
traditionally 'received the most limited First Amendment
protection.' "260 This is because the broadcast airwaves are a "scarce
and valuable national resource" that give rise to "unique
considerations" requiring a balancing of interests between children,
their parents, political candidates, business, and law
enforcement. 261
BROADCAST DEMOCRACY: How MEDIA CHOICE INCREASES INEQUALITY IN
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLARIZES ELECTIONS 65-66, 212-13 (2007)
(describing improvement of public affairs coverage on television in 1950s and
1960s due to fairness doctrine, and deterioration into sleaze and bloodshed in
1970s with non-enforcement of the fairness doctrine's public affairs
requirement).
259. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1994)
("The scarcity of broadcast frequencies thus required the establishment of some
regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic spectrum and assign
specific frequencies to particular broadcasters . . . . Although courts and
commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception, we have
declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast
jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here." (citations omitted)); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 n.2 (1978) ("[Tlhere is a scarcity of spectrum
space, the use of which the government must therefore license in the public
interest."); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978)
("In setting its licensing policies, the Commission has long acted on the theory
that diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by
promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by preventing
undue concentration of economic power."); id. at 795-96 (due to First
Amendment and public policy interest in diverse speech, holding that FCC had
"acted rationally in finding that diversification of ownership would enhance the
possibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399 (1969) (broadcast spectrum is a public trust "of
considerable and growing importance whose scarcity impelled its regulation by
an agency authorized by Congress"); CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & FREE
PRESS, THE STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE OF POLITICAL TALK RADIO 7-9 (2007)
(since Telecommunications Act of 1996, media conglomerates have acquired
hundreds of FCC radio broadcast licenses with few or no strings attached,
enabling them to override local ethnic and political diversity); William Van
Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29
S.C. L. REV. 539, 562 (1978) (arguing that allocating broadcast licenses to
corporations narrows the field of broadcasters according to ability to pay rather
than viewpoint diversity, and eliminates the voices of those unable to submit a
matching bid); Alex Markels, Low Power to the Peep, MOTHER JONES MAG.,
July/Aug. 1999, at 69 (recounting how FCC licenses for big businesses censor
free speech on radio).
260. Brief for the FCC and United States, supra note 257, at 59 (quoting
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866 (1997)).
261. Id. at 53 (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Calif., 468 U.S.
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In this Part, I attempt to analyze the case for broadcast and
Internet neutrality, drawing on four of the most commonly utilized
types of constitutional theories. Beginning with formalist
constitutional theory, I demonstrate the difficulties encountered by
those who might desire to appeal to the "neutral" text of the First
Amendment, independently of the intentions of its drafters and
ratifiers, or of the economic or political context of the present day.
Turning to purposive or originalist theories, I detail three potential
purposive theories of the First Amendment, and describe the
contradictory and unrealistically rigid implications of two of those
theories as applied to the constitutionality of broadcast and Internet
regulation. The two impossibly anachronistic theories would either
deny Congress any power to regulate speech or the press, or limit
that power to the contours of the common law of speech and the
press in 1789. The third variant of purposive theory, stressing the
purposes of the First Amendment to promote individual liberty
and/or the public's ability to access diverse sources of information
and debate, is the only useful variant in this context, and ultimately
supports the FCC's Free Press decision, as well as the Supreme
Court's decision in Red Lion. Next, I argue that trying to resolve
conflicts among First Amendment interests by economic analysis
introduces a promising degree of clarity and structure to the debate,
and, depending on one's assumptions, provides further support for
Red Lion and Free Press. Finally, I describe the differing
implications of substantive political theories, ultimately concluding
that none of them significantly undermines Red Lion or Free Press,
but rather that these theories tend to reinforce them.
A. Formalism
One way to analyze regulatory forced access to
telecommunications media is to reject it on the grounds that it
conflicts with the First Amendment's literal text.26 2 In the context
of the First Amendment, a few justices have attempted to introduce
greater certainty, and fewer opportunities for partisanship and ad
364, 376 (1984)).
262. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 ("[T]he implementation of a remedy such as an
enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some mechanism, either
governmental or consensual. If it is government coercion, this at once brings
about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment and
the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed over the years.").
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hoc decision making, by adhering closely to text.263 Litigants
seeking to overturn laws often appeal to the phrase, "Congress shall
make no law."264
Formalism is an attempt to deduce the outcomes of
controversial cases from "neutral" appeals to constitutional or
statutory text.265 The authority of text acts as a series of shackles
on the domineering, self-aggrandizing, or rapacious instincts of
263. Cf. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is
quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to unstitch the warp and woof of
First Amendment law in an effort to reshape its fabric to cover the patently
wrong result the Court reaches in this case dangerous as well as lamentable ...
. It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the
censorship of communications solely because of the words they contain."); see
also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 63
(1977); EVERETTE E. DENNIS, JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: "'NO LAW' MEANS NO LAw" 160 (1978); Johnny H. Killian,
George A. Costello et al., The Constitution of the United States of America:
Analysis and Interpretation, Cong. Research Serv. (2000),
http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment0l/l0.html#7
("During much of [the twentieth century], the opposition to the [First
Amendment] balancing test was led by Justices Black and Douglas, who
espoused what may be called an 'absolutist' position, denying the government
any power to abridge speech.").
264. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18
(1971) (Supreme Court rejected government's idea that "no law" means other
than "no law" in area of national security); Brief for Appellant at 1, Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL
61467, at *1 (invoking these words in seeking to overturn "a statute that
imposes sweeping restrictions on core political speech"); Brief for Appellant at
16, United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442 (2008) (No. 05-0159), 2007 WL
2988379, at *16 ("no law" means "no exceptions" and no "preferred classes" of
speakers or religious practitioners); cf Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 653
("Appellants maintain that the must-carry provisions trigger strict scrutiny
because they compel cable operators to transmit speech not of their choosing.
Relying principally on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 ..
. , appellants say this intrusion on the editorial control of cable operators
amounts to forced speech which, if not per se invalid, can be justified only if
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.").
265. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 510 (1988)
("Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their 'ruleness' precisely by doing
what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into
account."); Michael Robertson, The Impossibility of Textualism and the
Pervasiveness of Rewriting in Law, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 381, 382 (2009)
("Formalists . . . believe that they have good reasons to restrict the material
that should be considered in arriving at an understanding of a rule, or a poem,
or a piece of scripture. A tight circle is drawn around a limited body of material,
and the reader is told not to go outside this circle to consider wider contextual
matters, such as the biographical details and psychological makeup of the
author, or the author's intention in producing the text, or more broadly the
animating spirit of the text as opposed to its letter.").
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legal officials.266  Arguments from authority, in this case the
authority of constitutional text and prior cases, are as common in
law as they are discredited in science and philosophy.6 This is
partially the result of the inherent characteristics of law, which
purports to emphasize regularity, predictability, consistency,
equity, and universality.2 68 But it is partially the result of a certain
ideophobia among lawyers and judges, or their fear of overturning
long-standing habits of thought, especially based on partisan
political grounds.269
It is notoriously difficult to explain or justify First Amendment
case law using the text of the First Amendment. Several
ambiguous terms call for creative policymaking by judges. 270 The
266. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009)
(refusing to recognize due process "right to access DNA evidence for testing"
because it "would force us to act as policymakers, and our substantive-due-
process rulemaking authority would not only have to cover the right of access
but a myriad of other issues."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Alexander] Hamilton had in mind a traditional
judiciary, bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, p. 465, 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961))); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that legal tests "that provide [ a clear, enforceable limitation supported
by the text" prevents "judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking");
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's opinion because: "It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides
in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that
the democratic rules of engagement are observed."); cf. Thomas Jefferson,
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540, 543
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.1888) ("In questions of powers, then, let no more be
heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of
the Constitution.").
267. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 42 (2009).
268. See id. at 42-44; see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF
THE COMMON LAW 48 (1991).
269. Cf. MORRIS COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 110, 229, 286 (1982). This was the basis of utilitarian philosopher
Jeremy Bentham's objection to stare decisis, and contributed to the objections to
the doctrine expressed by American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. See
SCHAUER, supra note 267, at 42-43.
270. Cf. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 87 (2008) ("Founding-era constitutionalists
understood, correctly I think, that no legal instrument complex in its provisions
or in its goals can eliminate ambiguity . .. [Interpreting the Constitution is an
intellectually creative activity, not a mechanical process of unveiling outcomes
already fixed in the text."); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the
Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 553-54 (2009) (arguing that
drafters of U.S. Constitution "included rights guarantees that sound in the
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First Amendment protects the "freedom" of "speech" and "the press"
from being "abridg[ed]" by "Congress."27 1 Using the dictionaries
commonly employed by the Supreme Court when it engages in
textual or formalist analysis of the Constitution,2 72 the operation of
radio and television stations, or of cable networks, might not
constitute "speech" or "the press" at all.273 The problem is
analogous to the lack of enumerated powers for Congress to raise
and maintain an Air Force, or grant copyrights in recorded music or
Web sites.274
Although it is fairly simple to argue that television or the
Internet constitutes "speech" or even "the press" because they
275contain words and meanings, a more difficult challenge is posed
vague and abstract language of principles," creating "constitutional silences and
open spaces" that do not expressly cover "every eventuality").
271. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
272. These are Johnson's dictionaries of 1755 and of 1773, Sheridan's
dictionary of 1796, and Webster's dictionary of 1828. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 651-53, 690, 713 (2008).
273. The answer depends on whether one considers the Internet a
mechanism for printing "books" or "using language." See SAMUEL JOHNSON, 2 A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1756), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=DgcUAAAAQAAJ (definition of "press" is an
"instrument by which books are printed," and "speech" is "power of
expressing thoughts by vocal words," "talk[ing]," "language," "anything
spoken," or "the liberty to speak."); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=CxATAAAAYAAJ (similar definitions);
THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1797), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=z-YIAAAAQAAJ (defining
"press" as "instrument by which books are printed," and "speech" in terms
nearly identical to those used in Johnson's dictionary); NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 637, 776 (1826) (defining
"press" as a "machine for printing, a printing-press," or the "art or business of
printing and publishing," and "speech" in terms nearly identical to those used in
Johnson's dictionary).
274. Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, Why the Air Force Is
Not Unconstitutional, DISCOURSENET (Nov. 17, 2005),
http://www.discourse.net/archives/2005/11/why-the-air-force-is not-unconstitu
tional.html (describing problem with including U.S. Air Force in constitutional
terms "Army" and "Navy," despite fact that no aircraft existed in time of
Framers); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 139 F. 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1905) ("The meaning of the word 'writings' as employed in the Constitution, . . .
include[s] 'all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc. by which the
ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression.' . . . The words of
the statute have reference to the tangible object that appeals to the sense of
sight, and that which is susceptible of being reproduced by printing, copying,
publishing, etc."), affd, 147 F. 226 (2d Cir. 1906), affd, 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
275. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943).
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by the phrase "no law abridging the freedom of speech ... or of the
press." Most justices of the Supreme Court have rejected a literal or
formalistic reading of this phrase, which would construe it to mean
that any speech or publication must be permitted by law, and that
tolerance of speech must be maximized no matter the cost or
consequences for society.276 Besides ad hoc balancing, referred to by
the Court as "categorical" or "definitional" balancing, there are two
ways of implementing the original intentions or purposes behind
the First Amendment: permitting no law relating to speech other
than those that do not abridge the freedom of speech as it existed
under the common law in 1791, and limiting laws to those that do
not abridge the freedom of speech in a more abstract sense that
depends on the value of free speech.
In the telecommunications context, a literal reading of the
First Amendment would be difficult if not impossible to enforce.
The reason is that prohibiting all federal interference with "speech"
read broadly to include all audio and video communication of ideas
would throw the licensing of television and radio frequencies, and
authority over telephone and cable mergers, and other industry
practices, back to the states, or even into a completely unregulated
cacophony.277 Although the states could regulate broadcasters in
their respective jurisdictions, as they do cable and telephone
networks to this day, the transmissions interfere with each other
across state lines.
Likewise, an interpretation of the First Amendment that would
protect the full range of free speech enjoyed under the common law
at the time of the amendment's ratification in 1791 would create a
276. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003); Turner, 512 U.S. 622; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1 (1990); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); S.F. Arts
& Athletics; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
542 (1985); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984); Perry Edue. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831, 840 (1976); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
277. Cf Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-88 ("[Tihe reach of radio signals is
incomparably greater than the range of the human voice and the problem of
interference is a massive reality. The lack of know-how and equipment may
keep many from the air, but only a tiny fraction of those with resources and
intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible
communication is to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in the
present state of commercially acceptable technology.").
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significant degree of confusion and conflict by eliminating the
federal role in broadcasting, not to mention much of the Internet
owned or controlled by private entities.278  The pre-publication
licensing of speech violated the freedom of speech at common law.279
Given the practical advantages of broadcast spectrum
licensing, and its analogue cable television right-of-way regulation
by states and municipalities, an important question arises. The
question is whether auctioning off broadcast licenses and cable
rights-of-way based on willingness to pay-with little to no
oversight of the resulting content or public access with the sole
exceptions of prohibiting profanity, obscenity, or graphic sex-is
more formally respectful of the "freedom of speech" than a similar
auction with continuing oversight for balanced presentation of
public debates. A similar question confronts advocates of
maintaining a status quo that would censor profanity, obscenity, or
graphic sex from many Web pages and user-generated content
platforms, but provide no protections for Internet speech or
democratizing applications against discrimination or bans. In what
sense is the extensive censorship of sexual expression by the
FCC, 280 without the fairness doctrine or clear net neutrality
principles in place, more formally in line with the First
278. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 130, at 1574-83.
279. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1964) [hereinafter LEVY,
LEGACY]; Leonard Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800, 68 AM.
HIST. REV. 22, 25-37 (1962) [hereinafter Levy, Liberty].
280. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462-64; 47 U.S.C. §§ 503, 559-61; Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988); In re Clear Channel
Broadcasting Licensees, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 6773 (2004); Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearings on H.R. 3717 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108'b Cong. 87 (2004) (Statement of Kevin Martin, Commissioner,
FCC); FCC, Regulation of Obscenity, Indecency, and Profanity, FCC (Jan. 14,
2010, 10:25 AM), http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Welcome.html ("It is a violation of
federal law to air obscene programming at any time. It is also a violation of
federal law to broadcast indecent or profane programming during certain
hours."); Frequently Asked Questions-Enforcement Process, FCC (Jan. 14, 2010,
10:25 AM), http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html#TheLaw ("The FCC looks at
three primary factors when analyzing broadcast material: (1) whether the
description or depiction is explicit or graphic; (2) whether the material dwells on
or repeats at length descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory organs; and
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate or shock."); id.
("During 2004, the FCC imposed monetary sanctions for indecency violations up
to $1,183,000, for an aggregate annual total of $3,658,000. In addition, some
entities chose to settle claims against them and made voluntary payments to
the U.S. Treasury, totaling $7,928,080 in 2004.").
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Amendment? Defenders of such a regime must invoke the purposes
and common-law context of the First Amendment, which transcend
the jurisprudential framework provided by formalism.
Another proposed construction of the phrase "freedom of speech
. . . or of the press" would parrot the common-law framework
articulated by William Blackstone and adopted by numerous federal
and state courts in the nineteenth century.281 This construction
would relegate the First Amendment to a codification of the
legislative settlement of the British censorship debates of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the effect that prior
restraints or pre-publication licensing requirements for speech
abridge its freedom, while subsequent punishments for treason,
blasphemy, obscenity, libel, or other torts or crimes do not.2 82 The
Supreme Court has declined to adopt this purportedly plain
meaning of the phrase "freedom of speech," in the course of striking
down numerous forms of post-publication civil and criminal
penalties on speech.283 Most justices have authored or joined
opinions defending pragmatic regulation of speech according to
majority tastes, for example not to be disturbed by "loud" speech
outside homes or displays of sexuality on television.28 4
Neither is a formally clear answer to the constitutionality of
net neutrality regulation lurking in Supreme Court cases, or even
in the more numerous decisions of the lower courts. The Court
famously upheld the fairness doctrine in Red Lion, but that ruling's
precedential value has been undermined, it is said, by the passage
281. See, e.g., In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 839-41 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126)
("The definition of ['freedom of the press'] is, in my opinion, no where more
happily or justly expressed than by the great author of the commentaries on the
laws of England, . . . [whose] views of the subject could scarcely be unknown to
those who framed the amendments to the constitution . . . . His explanation is
as follows: 'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state. And this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.'" (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *151 (1765-
69))).
282. See, e.g., LEVY, LEGACY, supra note 279, at ix-xii; Levy, Liberty, supra
note 279, at 25-37.
283. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558-72 (1980); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
284. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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of time.285 During the four decades of social and legal change since
Red Lion, several cases have prioritized the liberty interests of
corporations and rich individuals who spend lots of money to distort
public debate in their favor, while downplaying the interests of the
public in protecting its freedom and democracy by making available
all ideas, facts, and viewpoints essential to the operation of
enlightened, participatory government.86 There seems to be no
limiting principle that would dictate whether the Court would have
to stick to Red Lion's doctrine, which articulates that the First
Amendment allows the FCC to restrain the power of those enjoying
special access to telecommunications resources as a result of federal
statutes and regulations, or rule that the First Amendment is
violated by most or all laws requiring balance, neutrality, or public
access. The Court might apply strict scrutiny to the fairness
doctrine or FCC net neutrality principles because both are justified
in reference to the content of the regulated communications; 287
however, the "compelling governmental interest" and "least
restrictive means" tests are highly subjective.28 8 But the Court
285. See, e.g., Angela J. Campbell, The Legacy of Red Lion, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
783 (2008).
286. See, e.g., Davis, 554 U.S. 724; Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Gregory P.
Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the
Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185, 199-203 (2007) (arguing that Miami Herald v.
Tornillo "established [that] broadcast access reforms constituted a limited,
medium-specific exception to the prevailing First Amendment concern for media
owners' expressive autonomy ... . After initially contemplating the free speech
value of access interests, the Court categorically denies any First Amendment
right of access to channels of communication while providing a strong right of
autonomy for owners of communicative infrastructure.").
287. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 877; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); In re Industry Guidance On Commission's Case
Law Interpreting 18 U. S. C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding
Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8000-01, 91 3-5 (2001) (in regulating
media, the FCC "must both identify a compelling interest for any regulation ...
and choose the least restrictive means to further that interest").
288. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1095, 1137 (2005) (describing First Amendment decisionmaking as an
"intuitive inquiry [that] can easily be influenced by factors that judges ought
not consider, such as the ideology of the speaker or the perceived merits of
the political movement to which he belongs"); see also Rob Frieden, Invoking
and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service Providers Leverage
Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft at 33-34) available at
482 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:51
might also, depending on its composition and the number of
recusals, 289 decline to employ strict scrutiny under Red Lion.
B. Principled Constitutional Theory
Another prominent family of theories of the First Amendment
attempts to divine the meaning of freedom of speech by reference to
the purposes and origins of the phrase. These theories are divided
as to whether they privilege the intentions of the drafters and
ratifiers of the First Amendment, the origins of its constituent
phrases in the late eighteenth century, the purposes it has served in
American history, and often as to what those purposes are or were.
Scholars have divided themselves into two broad camps when
they attempt to articulate the principles that motivated the First
Amendment's adoption. The libertarian or autonomy theorist tends
to emphasize that freedom of speech and the press restrains
government from engaging in intrusive management of individuals'
minds, thereby degrading the human spirit.2 90 The democratic or
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1425138 ("In Reno v. ACLU,
the Supreme Court considered the Internet . . . worthy of substantial protection
from government regulation even when government presents a compelling
reason for intervening, e.g., protecting children from the potential harm
resulting from access to obscene or indecent material. . . . These cases offer clear
precedent mandating close scrutiny of content-based regulations with
government bearing a substantial burden of demonstrating that content-
affecting regulations are narrowly drawn and do not unduly restrict lawful
access to content by adults."); cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and
Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1945, 1990 (2006) ("For example, an unbounded right of integrity that
would enable authors to prevent all perceived mutilations, unwarranted
criticisms, and objectionable contextual uses could be seen as content-based and
thus would raise serious First Amendment concerns. Nonetheless,
appropriately tailored moral rights protections that do not proscribe speech and
are enacted for a legitimate purpose other than discriminating on the basis of
the message conveyed are not content-based."); id at 1989 ("Strict scrutiny
requires that the government action be justified by a compelling state interest
and achieved through the least restrictive alternative.").
289. See Jeffrey Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles Cameron, and Harold Spaeth,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J.
POL. 812 (1995) (exploring correlates between ideological composition of
Supreme Court and outcomes of decided cases); Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku,
Regulating Supreme Court Recusals, SING. J. LEGAL STUD., July 2006, at 60, 67,
81 (exploring the intriguing possibility that a litigant could sway the outcome of
a Supreme Court case by filing a motion to recuse a sitting justice in a United
States District Court, and discussing several scenarios where recusals might
have occurred, but did not).
290. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1989); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 30 n.110 (2002).
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collective theorist would argue that these freedoms protect the
electoral process, and public debates about issues of concern to the
entire nation, from being distorted. 2 9 1 Either or both camps could
and often do rely on endorsements of absolute or near-absolute
protection for freedom of speech in the writings of the framers of the
First Amendment.292
The purposes underlying the First Amendment have dictated
the outcomes of several prominent cases, if judicial opinions are to
be taken at face value. 293 For several reasons, these principles, no
matter which line of thought is followed, tend to support media
neutrality laws. For one thing, broadcast and Internet neutrality
may be necessary, as described above, to prevent large
conglomerates from distorting public discourse according to their
ideologies or preferences. For another, they enhance the individual
liberty interest in speaking and writing freely by preventing the
government from acting in league with corporations to block
politically disfavored or culturally unpopular viewpoints from
enjoying access to the public. A third reason, which follows from
the first two, is that they may contribute to the completeness and
sophistication of public policy debates, which might otherwise be
systematically one-sided.
First, federal or state licensing of telecommunications
providers, as shown in Part III above, tends to distort public debate
in the absence of neutrality regulation, in direct conflict with the
central purpose of the First Amendment. In New York Times v.
291. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
292. See, e.g., DAVID LANGE & JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 198 (Stanford
Univ. Press, 2008) (James Madison wrote that judges will "resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution"); see also
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
(citing "the injunction to Court and Congress made by Madison when he
introduced the Bill of Rights. 'If [the Bill of Rights is] incorporated into the
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive;
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.'" (quoting 1
Annals of Cong. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789))); James Madison, Report on the
Alien and Sedition Act, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 608, 649 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999) (1800) (First Amendment "was intended as a positive and absolute
reservation of [press freedom]").
293. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947).
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Sullivan, the Supreme Court invoked James Madison, one of the
principal framers of the Bill of Rights, as declaring that the "right of
free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was ... a
fundamental principle of the American form of government."29 4 The
opinion quoted Madison as reasoning: "If we advert to the nature of
Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in
the people over the Government, and not in the Government over
the people." 295  Moreover, the Court noted that Thomas Jefferson,
whose correspondence with Madison helped shape the Bill of
Rights, "den[ied] the power of Congress 'to control the freedom of
the press.'"
296
Second, the fairness doctrine and net neutrality advance the
liberty interests of individual speakers by precluding the
government from enlisting private monopolies to deny unpopular or
minority viewpoints from accessing the airwaves, or the
underground wires. The statesmen of the early republic frequently
emphasized the importance of protecting a citizen's liberty of
speaking from state interference.2 9 7 Jefferson, for example, thought
that government should never claim authority over "the operations
of the mind."29 8 He wrote that "free correspondence between citizen
and citizen" is a "natural right" that government should not
abridge. 2 99  Madison defended the First Amendment in similar
terms, maintaining that a citizen should be entitled to make
"unrestrained animadversions" about official acts perpetrated in his
or her name. 00
294. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274-75 (1964).
295. Id. (quoting 4 Annals of Cong. 934 (1794)).
296. Id. at 276 (quoting 1804 Letter to Abigail Adams, quoted in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 522 n.4 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
297. See, e.g., Alan J. Koshner, The Founding Fathers and Political Speech:
The First Amendment, the Press and the Sedition Act of 1798, 6 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 395 (1987).
298. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 285 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1984) (1789). See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE
OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., 1982) (1789), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/amendl-religions40.html ("The
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to
others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods .
299. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel James Monroe, in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 422 (Library ed. 1903).
300. Madison, supra note 292, at 647-48. See also Tony Freyer, Hugo L.
Black and the Warren Court in Retrospect, in THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 97 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1995) (Justice
"Black accepted Locke's theory in part because he believed that Jefferson had
incorporated it into the Declaration of Independence .... The judge was bound
484 [Vol:51
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Third, neutrality regulation helps ensure that all good ideas
are heard, and that the national community understands all
important matters.o3 0  Madison recognized that the value of the
right to vote "depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits
and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal
freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits
and demerits of the candidates respectively."30 2 He realized that:
"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean
to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.' 03 Similarly, Jefferson thought it critical
that "every man should receive those [public news]papers & be
capable of reading them.' 0 4
by what Black believed was the fundamental intent of the framers of the Bill of
Rights. The First Amendment, Madison declared, placed freedom of expression
'beyond the reach' of Congress.").
301. See, e.g., John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in
3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 455-57 (Boston: Charles C. Little and James
Brown, 1850-1856) (early rulers of United States decided "that the art of
printing should be encouraged, and that it should be easy and cheap and safe
for any person to communicate his thoughts to the public"); Thomas Jefferson,
Letter to Isaac MacPherson, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1015 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1943) (1813) ("That ideas should freely spread from one to another
over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement
of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without
lessening their density at any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move,
and have our physical being, incapable of confinement, or exclusive
appropriation."); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Alexander Donald, in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 425 (Lipscomb and Bergh eds., 1903-04)
(1788), available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffcont.htm
(arguing that freedom of the press is beneficial to the individual because it helps
to "fortify the habit of testing everything by reason," and that a prohibition on
censorship is a "fetterf] against doing evil which no honest government should
decline"); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 723 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("A popular government without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their
own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."
(quoting James Madison, Letter to W.T. Barry, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (1822))).
302. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 546, 575 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
303. Madison, supra note 301, at 103.
304. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, in
LITERARY CLASSICS OF THE UNITED STATES (1984). The full thought is
somewhat more complex, and bears quoting for context:
The people are the only censors of their governors: and even their
errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of their institution.
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The counterargument to the view that access to complete and
diverse sources of knowledge and opinion was the motivating
purpose of the First Amendment is that the interest in individual
liberty from restraints must prevail, whether justified by
governmental animosity or neutrality. Owners of FCC licenses and
wireline telecommunications infrastructure built on public rights-
of-way argue that preventing monopolies from emerging in
broadcast or Internet access markets is a suppression of free speech,
or at least a burden upon it that is not justified by the public
interest.30 5 Such pipeline companies selectively pretend to be the
authors of the Internet content that the Supreme Court has
declared to be "a vast platform" for communications to and from
millions of readers.306  Under this argument, regulations erected
against corporate censorship violate the larger telecommunications
conglomerates' First Amendment interests under Tornillo, even
when the regulations seek to restrain the conglomerates' own
content-based censorship or efforts to prevent competitors'
growth.30 7
Such appeals by telecommunications corporations to an
autonomy-based conception of the First Amendment are
To punish these errors too severely would be to suppress the only
safeguard of the public liberty. The way to prevent these irregular
interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their
affairs thro' the channel of the public papers, & to contrive that those
papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our
governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether
we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers
& be capable of reading them. I am convinced that those societies (as
the Indians) which live without government enjoy in their general mass
an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the
European governments.
Id.
305. See Brief for Appellants, at 53-54, AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, No.
99-35609 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999), 1999 WL 33614052, at *53-54 (quoting
Turner Board. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)); Reply Comments of AT&T
Inc. at 37-39, Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, GN
Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Jan. 14 2010).
306. Brief for Appellants, supra note 305, at 57.
307. See id. at 57-58 (citing Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight
Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)); see also Reply Comments of
AT&T, supra note 305, at 39 ("'any effort by the Judiciary to decide which
means of communication are to be preferred for the particular kind of message
and speaker would raise questions as to the courts' own lawful authority'")
(quoting Citizens United v. FCC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 890 (2010)).
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unpersuasive. First, newspapers like the Miami Herald, at issue in
the Tornillo case's review of a right-of-reply law, do not require
licenses from the FCC to broadcast over the public airwaves, or
rights-of-way from cities, counties, and states that may not be
duplicated by many later-arriving "speakers." Therefore, the
rationale of Red Lion that the most effective media for speech
should not be divvied up in a completely unregulated fashion to
unaccountable private interests is applicable, rather than that of
Tornillo that the power of a new newspaper to reach the public is
limited only by journalistic integrity and economic success.308
Second, broadcasters and broadband Internet companies typically
proclaim themselves to be innocent conduits for the speech of other
writers, producers, directors, and performers, rather than the fully-
responsible and creatively-superintending editors and publishers of
such speech.309 By contrast, newspapers routinely incur liability for
308. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-91 (1969) (FCC
license empowers broadcasters to "monopolize a [broadcast] frequency to the
exclusion of his fellow citizens"), with Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-58 (newspapers
limited only by economic factors). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law in Support of Respondents at 8, Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) (Nos. 04-
277 & 04-281) ("Until 1992, the law permitted localities to award exclusive cable
franchises, and many did. Today's large cable companies owe their dominance
in the market to the earlier government-granted monopoly." (citation omitted));
David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry, 1894-
1910, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 543, 568-69 (Sept. 1994) ("'Local telephone exchanges
are 'bottlenecks' under classical antitrust theory. The control of these
franchises provides AT&T with the incentive and opportunity to protect,
maintain, and extend its monopoly in telecommunications services overall.'"
(citation omitted)); Patricia Worthy, Racial Minorities and the Quest to Narrow
the Digital Divide: Redefining the Concept of "Universal Service," 26 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 n.27 (2003) (historically, telephone companies like
AT&T received geographically-delimited "exclusive franchise[s]" in return for
promising "universal service").
309. Compare, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 ("A newspaper is more than a
passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising."), with Brief
of Amicus Curiae of United States Internet Service Provider Association in
support of Verizon Internet Services at 18, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., No. 03-MS-0040 (JDB) (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2003), 2003 WL
22341287, available at http://www.eff.org/cases/riaa-v-verizon-case-archive
("The DMCA provides immunity from liability based on the . . . ISP's ability to
remove or disable access to [copyright-infringing] material . . . . [The] ISP is
never liable by reason of transmitting, routing, or providing connection for
material . . . ." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a))), and Brief of Amicus Curiae of
Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Services, U.S. Internet Industry
Ass'n, and U.S. Telecom Telecom Ass'n at 24, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., No. 04-480 (2005), 2005 WL 508115, available at
http://w2.eff.org/IPIP2P/MGM-vGrokster/20050301-internetindustry.pdf
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the words and expressions of their writers. 3 10 Newspapers might
justifiably incur the benefits as well as the burdens of treatment as
speakers, editors, and publishers of their articles, while broadband
providers do not.311 Third, although broadband providers attempt
to analogize themselves to cable television systems that offer a
tailor-made set of channels to their subscribers,3 12 broadband
Internet companies have repeatedly reassured Congress that they
will not pick and choose among Internet users.3 13 It is therefore
wrong to privilege broadband service as an exercise in corporate
autonomy.
Even when invoked, the binding authority of underlying
principles is often weak. Thus, in Harper & Row Publishers v.
Nation Enterprises and Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court
disregarded numerous appeals in the merits and amici briefs to the
purposes that motivated the First Amendment's adoption,3 14 in
("The [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] contains an express disclaimer of any
intent to require [Internet service providers] to monitor (let alone police) any
user-to-user communications . . . .").
310. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (city
commissioner sued The New York Times and won the damages of $500,000 in
circuit court and supreme court of Alabama based upon advertisement written
and sponsored by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South).
311. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (provider of an interactive computer service
shall not be treated as publisher of its users' speech); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528
F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing extensive immunities of suit provided by
Congress to Internet service providers, who as a result are not speakers or
publishers of content generated by their users); Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)
(similar); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2003) (similar); Green v.
America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (similar); Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (similar).
312. See, e.g., Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 305, at 42 ("[T]he
Supreme Court has made clear that, 'by exercising editorial discretion over
which stations or programs to include in their repertoire,' Turner I, 512 U.S. at
636, cable operators, along with cable programmers, are engaged in the
business of 'communicatling] messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide
variety of formats.'" Id. That same principle applies to decisions by Internet
service providers about what content to offer".).
313. See Travis, supra note 130, at 1578 n.209 (collecting statements to
Congress on this point by representatives of cable and DSL industries); Kyle
McSlarrow, Remarks Before the Media Institute, NCTA (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.ncta.com/PublicationType/Speech/Net-Neutrality-First-Amendment-
Rhetoric-in-Search-of-the-Constitution.aspx ("[Allmost every net neutrality
proposal would seek to control how an ISP affects the delivery of Internet
content or applications as it reaches its customers . . . . All ISPs have stated
repeatedly that they will not block their customers from accessing any lawful
content or application on the Internet.").
314. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
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favor of analyzing the text and intentions of the Copyright Clause of
Article I, and several congressional copyright enactments of the
early United States.31 5 Under these cases, authors and librarians
suffer under byzantine regulations of their creative and editorial
discretion in quoting and publishing expressive works. 316 Similarly,
cases like San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic
Committee317 and Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy318 have made short shrift
of "insignificant" or weak First Amendment interests where the
efficient flow of commerce and trade was at stake.319 As Robert C.
(No. 01-618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edulopenlaw/eldredvashcroft/
supctiopening-brief.pdf, Reply Brief for Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003) (No. 01-618); Brief of Amici Curiae Tyler T. Ochoa, Mark Rose,
Edward C Walterscheid, The Organization of American Historians, and H-Law:
Humanities and Social Sciences Online in Support of Petitioners at 11-21,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1051765, at *11-
21; Brief for Jack N. Balkin, Yochai Benkler, Burt Neuborne, and Jed Rubenfeld
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. 01-618); Brief of Amici Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense
Fund and the Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618); Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. 01-618); Brief for Respondent, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632); Respondents' Brief in Opposition,
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-
1632); Brief for Pen American Center, Amicus Curiae, Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) (arguing
that "the balance struck between copyright protection and protection of free
expression (as set forth both in the fair use doctrine and the First Amendment)
should lead to a determination that The Nation had not violated the copyright
laws as a result of its reporting" on President Gerald Ford's memoirs, and that
"high officials of government may not claim property rights either in materials
generated by them while serving as public employees or over the information
they learned in that capacity.").
315. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539; Eldred, 537 U.S. 186; Travis, supra
note 130, at 1550-64.
316. See Yochai Benkler, The Public Domain: Through The Looking Glass:
Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use:
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The
Clinton Years, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337 (2000).
317. San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987).
318. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, No. 02-1782, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17117, at *4
(D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2002), aff'd, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004).
319. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 535-36, 536 n.15
(enforcing an organization's "limited property right in the word [Olympics]"
where parties were engaged in commerce and infringement on speech rights
was not "significant[]"); Coca-Cola, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17117, at *4, aff'd,
382 F.3d 774 (anti-abortion writer enjoined from using other entities'
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Post argues, the Supreme Court has often elevated institutional
efficiency and propriety in commercial, educational, and
governmental domains over both the human liberty interest and the
collective truth- or democracy-related interests in freedom of
speech.s20 With individual citizens and natural persons subject to
such extensive micromanagement of their speech and conduct in the
public sphere, it would be unjust if media corporations were to enjoy
greater protections in their attempts to "publish" a censored
Internet, particularly when the neutrality and openness of the
Internet is declared to be vital by its founders, industry leaders, and
legions of its users.
Thus, however instructive it may be in the abstract, principled
theory may be indeterminate in practice. It merely moves the field
of ambiguity and contradictions from the layer of literal text to that
of underlying purposes. These become even more confusing when,
as in Eldred, the intentions and origins underlying multiple
constitutional provisions and federal statutes are invoked. The
confusion can only be increased by considering the desires projected
by the public onto constitutional text and congressional practice
over more than two centuries.
trademarks in his Internet domain names due to likely commercial harm).
320. See Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47
STANFORD L. REv. 1249, 1259-60, 1268, 1271-78 (1994-1995) (citing Connick v.
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) on speech by employees; Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) and Renton v. Playtime Theater Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986) on orderly administration of public spaces for entertainment with
expressive component such as nightclubs with nude dancing; Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941) on orderly administration of times, places,
and tactics of protesters and picketers on public streets or other public spaces;
and Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) on orderly
administration of health clinics that attract protesters). For cases limiting the
First Amendment to preserve the efficient operation and protection from
damage of the U.S. military, state governments, public schools, other public
property, and public and private reputations, see, for example, Beard v. Banks,
548 U.S 521 (2006) (state prisons), Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
(state prosecutors' offices), Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550
(2005) (reputation of private agricultural producers and their products),
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (public official's reputation),
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (public school), Members
of City Council Taxpayers v. Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (public property),
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 469 U.S. 37 (1983) (public
schools), Greer v Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases), and United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (military recruiting campaigns including the
draft).
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C. Economic and Antitrust Theory
One way of explaining the apparent shift in the FCC's
interpretation of the First Amendment is to focus on differences in
the economic context of the firms it regulates. In the context of
broadcast media, the FCC argued successfully in the 1980s and
1990s that the time for broadcast neutrality regulations had come
and gone due to the increased competition. The agency's evidence
included the proliferation of radio and television frequencies
(including AM, FM, VHF, and UHF), cable channels, and satellite
television. By contrast, the FCC justified adopting enforceable net
neutrality regulations by citing potential decreases in competition
due to mergers and acquisitions in the broadband Internet access
market. Moreover, the FCC has distinguished broadcast and
Internet neutrality on the basis that unlike television channels,
which may disclose their biases openly, broadband consumers who
are unable either to use certain applications or access certain
content may not blame the broadband Internet company but the
application or Web site itself, causing competitive harm in the
marketplace. 3 2 1 It argued that harm to competition inflicted by
Internet discrimination is heightened by information asymmetries
between providers and consumers. 322 Providers may keep Internet
users in the dark about protocol blocking techniques or confidential
deals with other firms or even government officials.
Economic analysis may support broadcast and net neutrality
regulation for reasons analogous to those described above in
connection with principled constitutional analysis. First, neutrality
regulation prevents markets from being distorted, a particular risk
when companies enjoy monopoly power due to exclusive rights
bestowed by governments, network effects, and/or restrictive
contracts. Second, it guarantees to innovative individuals and
companies a minimum ability to access essential and/or
government-financed infrastructure such as television stations or
the high-speed Internet. Third, it serves as a means of filling gaps
in existing markets that may result from the failure of market
participants to satisfy consumer demand by improving quality,
expanding options, and cutting prices.
On the other hand, some scholars argue that broadcast or
321. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13028, 13058-59 $ 52 (2008).
322. See id.
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network neutrality is either economically unnecessary, harmful, or
even both. A line of case law and scholarship maintains that
federal regulation is suppressive of speech, considering increasing
private competition and the chilling effect of imposing a right of
access or a nondiscrimination principle. 323
Within economic analysis of law, the problem of discriminatory
suppression of potential competitors or upstart ways of competing is
analyzed as a refusal to deal, monopoly leveraging, exclusive
dealing, tying, a price squeeze, denial of access to essential
facilities, and other related doctrines. 3 24  The primary economic
justification for broadcast and net neutrality, as with many
antitrust doctrines, is preventing the monopolization of new
technologies by dominant firms that would inhibit the growth of
new marketplaces of ideas.325
323. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Liberating Red Lion from the Glass Menagerie of
Free Speech Jurisprudence, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293 (2002);
Adrian Cronauer, The Fairness Doctrine: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 47
FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1994-1995); Thomas W. Hazlett & George Bittlingmayer,
The Political Economy of Cable 'Open Access' (AEI-Brookings Joint
Center, Working Paper No. 01-06, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=286652; Adam Theirer, Why
the Fairness Doctrine Is Anything But Fair, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct.
29, 1993), http://www.heritage.org/ResearchlReports/1993/10/EM368-Why-The-
Fairness-Doctrine-Is-Anything-But-Fair.
324. See, e.g., William R. Drexel, Telecom Public Policy Schizophrenia:
Schumpeterian Destruction Versus Managed Competition, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5
(2004); Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization
Analysis, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 151 (2004); Carlo Luis Rodes, Giving Teeth to
Sherman Act Enforcement in the Intrabrand Context: Weaning Courts Off Their
Interbrand Addiction Post-Sylvania, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 957 (2009);
Donald I. Baker & Tony Woodgate, Compulsory Access as an Antitrust Remedy:
When, Why and How Is It Applied in EU and US Law?, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST 398-402 (Philip Marsden ed., 2006);
John H. Kilper, NOTE: A Bundle of Trouble: An Analysis of How the Lower
Courts Have Handled Bundled Discounts Since LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 72 MO. L.
REV. 1363 (2007).
325. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388, 390 (1969)
(concluding that FCC regulation of broadcaster bias is necessary "to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or of a private licensee"); In re Formal Complaint of Free
Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13024 1 13 ("[In 2005,
we] stated our understanding of our 'duty to preserve and promote the vibrant
and open character of the Internet as the telecommunications marketplace
enters the broadband age.' Thus, the Commission committed to incorporating
[net neutrality] principles . . . 'into its ongoing policymaking activities.'").
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Monopoly leveraging occurs when large market shares, or
other sources of power that exclude competitors or raise prices (such
as restrictive contracts or government-backed preferential rights to
valuable assets), empower a firm to harm competition, destroy or
degrade the profitability of competitors, and raise prices in the long
run.3 2 6 Thus, in the 1950s and the 1960s, the FCC concluded that
broadcasters have "enforceable public obligations" not to engage in
arbitrary self-dealing using exclusive communications licenses
issued by the federal government.2 One of the most observable
trends since the decline of the fairness doctrine is increasing
discrimination against independent television production firms, due
to the leveraging of broadcasting frequency monopolies into
increasing control over programming content.2 Economic theory
326. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515 (1984) ("The debate over the ability of firms to use
restrictive practices to leverage their monopoly power from one market to
another has continued throughout the history of the antitrust laws . . . ."); id.
("The [monopoly] leverage hypothesis underlies a substantial portion of the
antitrust attack on many other restrictive practices, ranging from vertical
mergers and reciprocal dealing arrangements to many tactics scrutinized under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.").
327. Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Commc'ns
Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court stated, more fully, that:
A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but he
is not in the same category in terms of public obligations imposed by
law. A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a
limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that
franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper
can be operated at the whim or caprice of its owners; a broadcast
station cannot. After nearly five decades of operation the broadcast
industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast
license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty.
Id. See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); C. Edwin Baker, Turner
Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 57, 62 (1994); Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and
the First Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 60 Mo. L.
REV. 799, 818-22 (1995); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and
Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J.
345 (2007); Daniel Spulber & Christopher Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom
and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822 (2007);
Anthony M. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1 (2009); Moran Yemini, Mandated Internet Neutrality and the First
Amendment: Lessons from Turner, and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2008).
328. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18 (1992), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf ("Other things being equal,
market concentration affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of
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tells us that the more providers there are of a service, the better its
quality and the lower its price will tend to be.3 2 9 Federal and state
antitrust laws reflect this principle of microeconomics by seeking to
maximize consumer choice and price competition.330
firms, could successfully exercise market power. The smaller the percentage of
total supply that a firm controls, the more severely it must restrict its own
output in order to produce a given price increase, and the less likely it is that an
output restriction will be profitable."); id. ("If collective action is necessary for
the exercise of market power, as the number of firms necessary to control a
given percentage of total supply decreases, the difficulties and costs of reaching
and enforcing an understanding with respect to the control of that supply might
be reduced."); id. at 2-3 ("Market power to a seller is the ability profitably to
maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time ....
[Wihere only a few firms account for most of the sales of a product, those firms
can exercise market power, perhaps even approximating the performance of a
monopolist, by either explicitly or implicitly coordinating their actions."); see
also S. Rep. No. 108-141, at 2-3 (2003); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY 35 (1993); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 291 (1986) ("[Blasic
competition theory can demonstrate that virtually all antitrust issues spring
from one of two fears: (a) that the challenged practice will enable firms engaging
in it to collude (or to collude more effectively) with competitors; or (b) that the
practice will permit the firm employing it to exclude actual or potential
competitors who, if not excluded, could restrain the firm from raising price
above the competitive level."); id. at 241 n.105 ("Much theoretical and empirical
research suggests that, in industries where entry is not easy, a decrease in the
number of significant competitors increases the likelihood of tacit or express
price coordination."); Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, supra note 83; Kennedy,
supra note 76, at 204; Moyers on America, The Net @ Risk, PBS (2007),
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/moyersonamerica/net/index.html.
329. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073-80 (D.D.C. 1997);
Tenet Healthcare Corp., 123 F.T.C. 1337 (1997); Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., 120 F.T.C. 743 (1995); Local Health Sys., 120 F.T.C. 732 (1995); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 203-33 (1st ed. 1976);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 229-38 (2d
ed. 2002); Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 933, 943 (June, 2008); Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Viability ofAntitrust Price Squeeze Claims, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 273 (2009); Mark A.
Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008); Spulber & Yoo, supra note 327;
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Network Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 151-53 (2003).
330. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that
Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Tom Campbell
& Nirit Sandman, A New Test for Predation: Targeting, 52 UCLA L. REV. 365
(2004); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 253 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and
Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 267 (2001); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-
Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1827 (1984);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986).
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Independently of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
FCC, antitrust law prohibits pacts between competitors in restraint
of trade, as well as "unilateral" anticompetitive acts imposed on
customers by a party enjoying market power due to exclusive
statutory rights, regulatory licenses, or network effects.331 The
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 provides civil and criminal remedies
for contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate
commerce, as well as for monopolization or attempts and
conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate commerce. 332 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 further specifies that: "All charges,
practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with
such communication service, shall be just and reasonable," so any
charge or practice that is unreasonable is illegal.
Empirical research into the effectiveness of
telecommunications regulation by the FCC has passed through two
phases over the past decade. In the first phase, scholars concluded
that the proportion of broadcast programming that is
"informational" in nature would tend to increase after the demise of
FCC neutrality regulation because corporate broadcasters would
not be deterred from controversial talk-radio formats. 334  Several
limitations of these early empirical studies made them an
incomplete answer to the question of whether federal regulation
could improve media competition and performance. Perhaps the
most obvious deficiency is that the study assumed that more "talk"
331. See, e.g., Robin Cooper Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades
of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2008); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra
note 329; Marina Lao Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization
Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151 (2004); David McGowan, Evolving Antitrust
Treatment of Dominant Firms: Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185 (2005). A
"network effect" is an increase in the marginal demand for a product
attributable to the existing demand for a product, so that a product's value
increases with the number or predominance of users, creating a tendency
towards monopoly by one firm serving all users with a product that is very
valuable due to its sheer ubiquity. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
479, 484 (1998); A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 148 (1999).
332. See 15 U.S.C. §H 1, 2 (2006).
333. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
334. See Thomas Hazlett & David Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a Chilling
Effect? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES
279 (1997); Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the Internet?
Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 35, 62-63 (1997-1998); see also ROUMEEN ISLAM, INFORMATION
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: FROM MEDIA MARKETS TO POLICY MAKING 173 (2008).
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equals more "public debate.'"335  Therefore, completely biased or
false "news" concerning, for example, Iraq's alleged weapons of
mass destruction, or the destiny of house prices to always increase,
would benefit the public under this methodology.3 3 6  This
assumption equates the ravings of a "shock jock" with an erudite
lecture or debate. The "shock jock" genre has, of course, grown
tremendously since the late 1980s in terms of the percentage of
radio stations adopting it. The Howard Stern show in New York
went national, and was presumably counted as an AM "talk" format
covered in the fairness doctrine study.337 Another problem is that
the study could not measure the impact of programming genres that
were never adopted at all, only the relative contributions of those
that were.3 38 Moreover, the study did not assess the economic and
social externalities inflicted by false advertising, one-sided political
speech, or biased coverage of issues.3 39
The second phase of empirical research into media regulation
has been more empirically-grounded and content-based. The Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press conducted opinion
polls finding that the percentage of the American people
complaining of biased news media coverage of political issues
increased from about fifty percent in 1985, before the fairness
doctrine's repeal, to about seventy percent in 2005.340 The Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations documented this trend issue by issue,
concluding that militarism, advocacy of free trade, and criticism of
335. See Hazlett & Sosa, supra note 334, at 295, 301.
336. See id. at 292 ("[We aggregate formats into five broad categories: music,
information, religious, foreign language/ethnic, and mixed.").
337. See Diana Atchison, Big Bucks and Blue Radio: South Florida's Shock
Jocks Titillate Listeners with Bawdy Songs and Ribald Jokes in an Anything-
Goes Ratings Battle, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 1989, at 7; Ted
Cox, Addition of Dahl, Stern Help Boost Ratings at WCKG, DAILY HERALD
(CHICAGO), Oct. 9, 1996, at 2; Dan Kening, NY Shock Jock Stern Storms onto
Local Scene, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 1992, at 22; Jeff Lyon, Drive Time
Slime Time, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar 17, 1996, at Magazine-10; Brian McTavish,
Is This Mancow Town? Homeboy Erich 'Mancow' Muller Sees Himself as Kansas
City's Next Radio Colossus, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 20, 1997, at El; see also
BILL JAKER, FRANK SULEK, & PETER KANZE, THE AIRWAVES OF NEW YORK:
ILLUSTRATED HISTORIES OF 156 AM STATIONS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA,
1921-1996, at 18, 133 (1998); MICHAEL C. KEITH, TALKING RADIO: AN ORAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADIO IN THE TELEVISION AGE 78 (2000).
338. See Hazlett & Sosa, supra note 334, at 291-95.
339. See id. at 292-301.
340. See Press Release, The Pew Research Center for People and the Press,
Online Newspaper Readership Countering Print Losses: Public More Critical Of
Press, But Goodwill Persists 24 (June 26, 2005), available at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdfl248.pdf.
496 [Vol:51
20111 THE FCC'S NEW THEORY 497
foreign humanitarian or economic development assistance were far
more likely among pundits with access to the mass media, than
among the general public. 34 1 The Program on International Policy
Attitudes and Knowledge discovered that in the lead-up to the 2004
elections, a majority of Americans falsely believed that Iraq, rather
than Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,3 42 was behind al Qaeda and 9/11,
and fifty-seven percent of Bush voters in 2004 falsely believed that
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction had been discovered after the
invasion.34 3 A Roper poll in 2006 revealed that eighty-five percent
of U.S. troops in Iraq believed that al Qaeda was some form of
branch, agency, or ally of the Iraqi government toppled in the 2003
war.344 In the lead-up to the 2008 election, most Americans once
again accepted false claims of possession of weapons of mass
341. See The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, WORLDVIEWS (2002),
http://worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport.pdf; The Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, Americans on Promoting Democracy, PROGRAM ON
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ArITUDES (Sept. 29, 2005), http://65.109.167.118/pipa/;
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Development Challenge, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar 1, 2005),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60623/jeffrey-d-sachs/the-development-
challenge.
342. See Josh Meyer, 2 Allies Aided Bin Laden, Say Panel
Members, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2004 at Al, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/20/world/fg-alqaeda20; Ken Silverstein, Two
Panelists Detail Allies' Al Qaeda Ties, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at A12,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/21/nation/na-talkshows 2l.
343. See Program on International Policy Attitudes & Knowledge
Networks, Americans and Iraq on the Eve of the Presidential Election, PROGRAM
ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES, at 7 (Oct. 28, 2004),
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/lraqPresElectOct4/IraqPresElect_- Oct
04_rpt.pdf ("Respondents were told, 'As you may know, Charles Duelfer, the
chief weapons inspector selected by the Bush administration to investigate
whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, has just presented his final
report to Congress' and were asked what he concluded . . . ."); id. (noting that
thirty-nine percent of respondents wrongly believed that the Duelfer and
the Iraq Survey Group found actual weapons of mass destruction or a
major program to make them); id. (noting that fifty-seven percent of Bush
supporters wrongly believed that Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group found
weapons of mass destruction or a major program to make them);
PIPA/Knowledge Networks, Three in Four Say If Iraq Did Not Have
WMD or Support al Qaeda, US Should Not Have Gone to War,
PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES (Oct. 28, 2004),
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqPresElectOctO4/IraqPresElectOct
04.pr.pdf ("Despite the widely-publicized conclusions of the Duelfer report, 49%
of Americans continue to believe Iraq had actual WMD (27%) or a major WMD
program (22%), and 52% believe that Iraq was providing substantial support to
al Qaeda.").
344. See CHARLES SAM COURTNEY, IGNORANT ARMIES: TALES AND MORALS
OF AN ALIEN EMPIRE 133 (2007).
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destruction by a rival of the American government, in this case
"Iran's nukes," a constant theme in the broadcast media and
common title of broadcast and cable news segments.3 4 5 This may be
due to the disproportionate media access by a handful of
interventionist and militarist pundits at think tanks funded by oil
companies or foreign regimes, who inevitably call for war.346
Similarly, a tiny minority of scientists who deny the existence of
global warming trends, and the melting of the polar ice caps, enjoy
dramatically greater access to the media than other scholars.34 7 A
study in the Columbia Journalism Review in 1997 documented a
movement towards privileging strategists and pundits over foreign
correspondents with real experience interviewing witnesses to
history being made.3 48
One mechanism by which uniformity of content is imposed is
by vertical integration of content and distribution within broadcast
networks. The economic concentration in the production of prime
time television programming nearly tripled from 1989 to 2002
according to one measure used by the Justice Department in
antitrust cases. 34 9 During the debate over the CBS-Viacom merger,
a "widely expressed public concern about [the merger] is that
inevitable self-dealing between the CBS network and Viacom's
production studios will tend to foreclose independent television
345. See Two-Thirds of Americans Think Iran Seeks
Nukes, ANGUS-REID (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/two thirds-of americansthinkiran.seeks nukes/.
346. See supra notes 72 and 114.
347. See Maxwell T. Boykoff, Lost in Translation? United States Television
News Coverage of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 1995-2004, 86 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 1 (2008). The mass media portray global warming as a minority view
or as evenly balanced in terms of the evidence with the absence of global
warming, whereas few scientists would agree. See Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the
Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686
(2004) (reporting that among peer-reviewed scientific papers, 928 seemed to
accept that global warming existed and was linked to greenhouse gas emissions,
either explicitly or implicitly); see also Jules Boykoff & Maxwell Boykoff,
Journalistic Balance as Global Warming Bias, EXTRA! (Nov./Dec. 2004),
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1978 (fifty-three percent of mass media
articles express doubt about scientific consensus).
348. See James F. Hoge, Jr., Foreign News: Who Gives a Damn?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Nov.IDec. 1997, at 48, 49-51; see also Neil Hickey,
Unshackling Big Media, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July/Aug. 2001, at 30, 31;
Rachel Smolkin, A Source of Encouragement, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Aug./Sept.
2005, at 31, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3909.
349. See Marc Cooper, Domination of the Video Product Space, in THE CASE
AGAINST MEDIA CONSOLIDATION: EVIDENCE ON CONCENTRATION, LOCALISM
AND DIVERSITY 361, 363 (Marc Cooper ed., 2007).
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producers from access to what remains one of the few most viable
distribution networks for television programming."350
Independently-produced television declined from eighty-five percent
of network programs in the mid-1990s to less than twenty-five
percent in the mid-2000s.35 1
Thus, empirical research in the decade since Hazlett's and
Sosa's 1997 study has found that regulation of broadcast licensees is
necessary to prevent distortion of the marketplace of ideas in the
direction of artificial uniformity. This more recent research
provides a better answer to the question of whether the fairness
doctrine "chills" or encourages the development of a healthy
marketplace of ideas. It does so by discriminating between different
types of content, between mindless "shock jock" drivel and accurate
information needed by voters to select candidates; for example, it
studies content by asking the public whether the coverage they are
being provided is balanced or biased, or whether they believe
obvious lies. Due to the rise of more advanced polling, it is no
longer credible to equate all news- or talk-related formats with
more vigorous democratic dialogue, regardless of the amount of
inane chatter or deceptive claims. Thus, the Hazlett and Sosa study
is, at best, evidence of more "talk," rather than more freedom, equal
access to regulated airwaves, or informed voters.
Second, neutrality regulation may safeguard the freedom to
innovate in a dynamic economy. The FCC argued in the Comcast
order that disfavoring specific Internet protocols or practices
"'damages the Internet as a whole,' including the ability of
entrepreneurs to enter the market with new Internet services."352
The agency cited testimony from one of the architects of the
Internet that "[t]he Internet's open, neutral architecture has proven
to be an enormous engine for market innovation, economic growth,
social discourse, and the free flow of ideas."353 Analogously, one of
350. David Waterman, CBS-Viacom and the Effects of Media Mergers: An
Economic Perspective, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 531, 536 (2000).
351. See Independent Production Companies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELEVISION 1168, 1168 (Horace Newcomb ed., 2004).
352. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Red. 13028, 13040 (2008).
353. Id. at 13040 n.94 (citing Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf,
Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc.), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&docid=f:30115.pdf [hereinafter
Cerf Statement]).
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the objectives of the fairness doctrine was to compel the opening up
of the broadcast airwaves to persons and organizations desiring to
develop formats and content relating to "coverage of public issues,"
and "broadcast news and commentary."3 54
Two schools of thought are currently at loggerheads over
whether net neutrality regulation in particular will accelerate or
impair innovation and economic growth. America's leading
technology and Internet companies, such as Amazon, eBay, Google,
Intel, Microsoft, Vonage, and Yahoo! have argued that net
neutrality is needed to protect innovation from the power of
infrastructure companies to favor their own Internet services, and
to pick winners and losers by charging higher fees or providing
degraded service to the "losers."55 Telephone and cable companies
that currently run most of residential broadband networks disagree.
They argue that it is forced sharing of networks and mandatory
neutrality schemes that threaten to disrupt new business models
relating to super-high-speed access lanes, reduced spam and
congestion, and the recoupment of the costs of installing fiber-optic
and wireless networks.35 6
354. In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 48
F.C.C. 2d 1, 1-7 (1974).
355. See id.; Cerf Statement, supra note 353; H.R. Rep. No. 109-541 (2006);
Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
109th Cong. 17-19 (2006) (statement of Jeffrey Citron, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Vonage Holdings Corp.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/citron-020706.pdf; Net Neutrality: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong. 17-19 (2006)
(statement of Earl W. Comstock , President/CEO, CompTel), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/comstock-020706.pdf; Robert McChesney and
John Podesta, Let There Be Wi-Fi, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (2006),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2006/0601.podesta.html.
356. See, e.g., The Telecom Marketplace Nine Years After the Telecom Act,
109th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (2005) (statement of Michael Kellogg on behalf of U.S.
Telecom Association); Robert Litan and Hal Singer, Unintended Consequences
of Net Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533, 558-70
(2007); The Future . . . Faster, U.S. TELECOM Ass'N (2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20061231032736/thefuturefaster.com/myth-everyone
.aspx; James L. Gattuso, Broadband Regulation: Will Congress Neuter the Net?
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/
2006/06/Broadband-Regulation-Will-Congress-Neuter-the-Net; BellSouth,
Overview of Net Neutrality, THE POLICY COUNCIL (2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060511152533/http://policycouncil.nationaljournal.
com/EN/Forums/BellSouth/ee777047-550f-41cc-9fa5-e6737dd5cdc3.htm;
Adam Theirer, "Net Neutrality": Digital Discrimination or Regulatory
Gamesmanship in Cyberspace?, 507 POLICY ANALYSIS (2004), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa507.pdf; Christopher S. Yoo and Tim
Wu, Keeping the Net Neutral?, LEGAL AFFAIRS (2006),
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In antitrust terms, non-neutrality represents a bundling of
content or applications/formats with access to the underlying
network, whether it is a television station, residential cable, or
telephone network. The danger of such bundling is that it will force
consumers to accept a bundled product they do not want or that
does not satisfy their needs with a bundling product that they
cannot cheaply or easily do without, like a scarce broadcast
frequency or high-speed internet connection.35 7  Most advanced
economies have governments that compel the unbundling of local
telephone networks from broadband access service because of the
danger of monopoly leveraging, reduced output, and unnecessarily
high prices.5
Empirical research to date has revealed substantial evidence in
favor of the technology and Internet companies' position that
neutrality regulation may enhance innovation. This research
indicates that the exploitation of local broadband monopolies and
duopolies in the United States is reducing the output of broadband
access and related services, and increasing the prices of such
services. 359 The average speed of a broadband connection in Japan,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-net-neutrality0506.msp;
see also In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13028, 13087 (2008) (Statement of Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate) ("If
we are truly looking to improve the consumer online experience, avoid network
congestion and protect privacy, it does not seem prudent to block internet
service providers' ability to purge their platforms of these technological
plagues."); id. at 13093 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert M.
McDowell) ("While we at the FCC are trying to spur more competitive build-out
of vital last-mile facilities, especially fiber and wireless platforms, this
congestion problem will not be resolved merely by building fatter and faster
pipes."); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006).
357. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953);
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); Conwood Co. v. United States
Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d
34, 34-35, 70-97 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Dentsply Int'l, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14139, *191 (D. Del. AUG. 8, 2003); IN RE BELTONE ELECS. CORP.,
100 F.T.C. 68, 204 (1982); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 51-52 11 1703g2 (1991).
358. See, e.g., Rob Friedan, Network Neutrality or Bias?-Handicapping
the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS
COMM. AND ENT. L. J. 171 (2006); Report on Commerce Commission's
Local Loop and Fixed PDN Unbundling Investigation, NEW ZEALAND
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (May 5, 2004),
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC 2042.aspx.
359. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-541, at 7 (2006) (citing FCC, High Speed Services
for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2005 (2006), available at
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which adopted neutrality regulation, is over ninety megabits per
second, compared to only nine in the United States. 36 0 Broadband
access by households is around a third higher in Japan. 361  The
average price of broadband service is two to three times as high in
the United States as in France or Japan, with a fifty megabit per
second line costing less than $25 per month in Japan.3 62 By 2005, a
http://www.internetworldstats.com/anLUS_.HighSpeedInternet2008.pdf);
John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America 27-31
(FCC OBI Working Paper Series No. 1, 2010), available at,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Commentary/2010/February/FCC-Broadband-
Adoption-and-Use-in-America.aspx [hereinafter Horrigan, Broadband Adoption]
(noting that "[fifty-one] percent of all non-adopters [of the Internet] said
monthly cost was a barrier, although fewer said it was the primary reason they
lack service," and that about eight percent of Americans are priced out of
broadband service at prices of over $10 or $20 per month); John Horrigan, Home
Broadband Adoption 2009, PEW INTERNET, at 22-23, 26-27 (June 17, 2009),
http://pewinternet.org/-/medial/Files/Reports/2009/Home-Broadband-Adoption-
2009.pdf [hereinafter Horrigan, Home Broadband] (reporting that thirty
percent of American broadband subscribers surveyed either had only one
provider in their area or was not aware of the other provider(s), and that those
with only one provider pay over fifteen percent more for it monthly than those
with two or more choices, with nearly everyone paying over $32 per month);
Hearing on Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet Before the House of
Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Task Force on Competition Policy
and Antitrust Laws, 110th Cong. 7 (2008) (statement of Susan S. Crawford,
Visiting Associate Professor, Yale Law School), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdflCrawford080311.pdf ("[Wie have
regional duopolies (usually one cable provider and one telco) providing Internet
access to 98% of the country.").
360. See, e.g., Average Advertised Download Speeds, By Country,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 2008),
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en 2649_34225_3869010 2 _1_1_1_1,00.
html; see also Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access
as Antitrust and Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1697, 1787-94
(2006); Robert McChesney and John Podesta, Let There Be Wi-Fi, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY (2006), http://tinyurl.com/qnqfct.
361. See, e.g., Households with Broadband Access, ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2004-2007),
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_34225_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.
html; New America Paper Calls for 100 Mbps Broadband Goal, TR DAILY, Sept.
17, 2009; see also Florida Groups Need to Act Fast for Broadband Money, PALM
BEACH POST (FL), July 25, 2009, at 18A; Wash., U.S. Internet Speeds Drag
Behind Rest of World, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 2009; Global
Data on Caps, Speeds & Prices, BROADBAND DSLREPORTS.COM (Nov 6, 2007),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Global-Data-on-Caps-Speeds-Prices-
89161.
362. See Andy Vuong, Comcast Answers the Need for Speed, DENVER POST
(CO), Sept. 20, 2009, at K01; Srisamorn Phoosuphanusorn, Slow Lane on the
Superhighway, BANGKOK POST (Thailand), Sept. 4, 2009; DSL Subscription Fees
Fall in 2008, According to Point Topic, LATIN AMERICA TELECOM, Dec. 1, 2008;
OECD, Average Broadband Monthly Subscription Price, By Country, USD PPP,
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French Internet company was offering a package of high-speech
Internet access, telephone service, and multi-channel television for
an astounding $32.50.363 Most Americans pay $38 to $44 per month
just for broadband Internet access.36 4 While the issue of net
neutrality is separable from the encouragement of competition by
allowing broadband companies to enjoy forced access to the
telephone networks, the trend of broadband accessibility, speeds,
and prices in France and Japan confirms other evidence that
neutrality laws improve broadband service.
Third and lastly, neutrality regulation has a vital role to play
in ensuring that all relevant information relating to important
economic and political transactions is widely disseminated. Within
the technology and Internet industries, it is widely believed that
enforceable provisions banning discrimination by broadband
providers against Internet companies are needed to prevent them
from squashing potential competition in video programming
(YouTube or NetFlix), text and images (Google, bloggers, or Flickr),
online investing (AmeriTrade), or telephony (Skype).365 Although
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 2009),
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_34225_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
363. See Multiple Play: Pricing and Policy Trends, ORG. FOR
EcON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (Apr. 7, 2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060806213936/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/32/36546
318.pdf ("French ADSL operator 'Free' has the lowest priced offer in both
nominal terms and using purchasing power parities, one of the highest
download speeds (20 Mbit/s) and a comparatively large number of video
channels (93) for a flat monthly rate (see Table 1). Interestingly, subscribers do
not have the option to buy just broadband or voice from Free. They must take
the entire package of video, voice and data for USD 36.72 (PPP) per month.").
364. See Horrigan, Home Broadband, supra note 359, at 22-27. Dr. Horrigan
reports that fourteen percent of Americans believe they have only one
broadband provider in their area, and these Americans pay an average of $44.70
per month. Id. Another fourteen percent of Americans believe they have two
providers; these Americans pay an average of $42.80 per month. Id. Then
there are the nineteen percent who believe they have three providers; they pay
about $38.10 per month on average. See id. About a third of Americans do not
subscribe to broadband; many of them live in rural areas that are likely to be
served by one or two providers at most. See Horrigan, Broadband Adoption,
supra note 359, at 5, 7, 21, 39.
365. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 110-95, at 2 (2008) ("We never would have had a
Google search engine or YouTube videos or Daily Kos blogs if pa[y] to play had
been our national policy."); H.R. Rep. No. 109-541, at 10-11 (2006) (describing
SBC' s declared intention not to allow Google to access AT&T's Internet
subscribers "for free"; SBC later merged with AT&T); Financial Services
Roundtable, Statement in Support of Net Neutrality, in H.R. Rep. No. 110-95, at
51 (2008); Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5353
Before the U.S. H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomms.
504 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:51
Internet discrimination might be profitable for infrastructure
companies, it would threaten the existence of the upstart and
initially undercapitalized firms that make new options like these
possible.366 The antitrust and telecommunications laws aim to
accelerate the pace of technological advances by stamping out
market power over essential infrastructure such as oil pipelines, gas
lines, electrical wires, telephone networks, or computer operating
systems.36 7  Permitting Internet discrimination frustrates these
objectives. As the House Judiciary Committee declared in a report
on proposed legislation, broadband infrastructure companies have
and the Internet, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Ben Scott, Policy Director,
Free Press) (describing Skype as a peer-to-peer voice conversation program at
risk from Comcast's policy of blocking peer-to-peer applications); Cerf
Statement, supra note 353 (describing Google's concerns about Internet
discrimination); Erika Morphy, House Committee Shoots Down Net
Neutrality Clause, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Apr. 27, 2006),
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/50219.html?wlc=1253664286 (according
to a consultant to Flickr, the photo sharing service, called it "a high-bandwidth
offering-just the sort of Internet service that could be impacted by a lack of
net neutrality.").
366. See Brett M. Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, Network
Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to
Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 383 (2007).
367. See, e.g., 15. U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (condemning unreasonable restraints of
trade affecting any part of interstate commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)
(condemning attempts or conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate
commerce); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)
(condemning monopolization of electrical infrastructure to detriment of smaller
providers and their customers under same section); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (condemning monopolization of oil infrastructure of
the United States under antitrust laws, especially 15 U.S.C. § 2); United States
v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 34-35, 70-97 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (condemning
monopolization of PC-compatible operating system market); United States v
AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (condemning monopolization of
telephone network), further proceedings at 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), vacated sub nom.
United States v. W. Elec. Co., No. 82-5192 (HHG), 1996 WL 255904 (D.D.C. Apr.
11, 1996); In re Public Utility Commission of Texas, 13 FCC Rcd. 3460, 1
(1997) (Telecommunications Act of 1996 intended to accelerate rapidly the
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies);
Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. 169
(Ill. 1887) (condemning monopoly in gas lines of Chicago); U.S. Telephone v
Central Union, 171 F. 130 (C.C. Ohio 1909) (condemning anticompetitive
restrictions against local telephone companies); Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of the Alliance for Competition in Telecommunications
for Amicus Curiae and Intervenor Status, United States v. Verizon, No. 1:05-
CV-02103 (D.D.C. brief filed May 4, 2006) ("When the software monopolist
Microsoft stated its intention to charge a 'vigorish'-the slang term for a
bookie's or loan shark's cut-on every transaction over the Internet, the
Antitrust Division initiated a lawsuit to break up the company.").
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market power that they have used to undermine competition,
restrain trade, and impair consumers' access to various forms of
content or services delivered over the Internet.
D. Political Theory
The bodies of philosophical theory that are most relevant to
media neutrality debates are theories of justice, in particular
corrective and distributive justice, and civic republicanism as a
variant of virtue ethics. Only corrective justice provides arguable
grounds for opposing neutrality regulation, which tends to advance
distributive justice, equality, and civic engagement.
Theories of corrective justice are familiar from contract law as
well as other areas. Aristotle states the fundamental premise of
corrective justice as providing remedies or rectification for injuries
or wrongs.3 69 Immanuel Kant argued that right and justice demand
the recognition of private property and the prohibition of theft,
while to reorder society on empirical grounds designed to maximize
happiness would be to subordinate free beings to objects and
thereby degrade them.370 He argued that corrective justice must be
done at any cost, saying for example that if a society was to flee a
city or dissolve, its last murderer lying in prison should still be
executed before migrating to satisfy justice, despite the useless folly
of such an act. 7
Corrective justice is relevant to media neutrality debates
because it provides several potential ways of balancing the interests
of the owners and the consumers of media. For one thing, all
current holders of broadcast licenses agreed to broadcast in the
public interest, so if the public interest supports regulation, they
may not be heard to complain of injustice.372 As noted above,
several major broadband providers and the relevant trade
associations have invited FCC oversight over their industry in
seeking to fend off suits under antitrust or other laws.373 Moreover,
368. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-541, at 7, 11-13 (2006).
369. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 73 (1983).
370. See WOLFGANG KERSTING, POLITICS, FREEDOM, AND ORDER: KANT'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT 342, 249
(Paul Guyer ed., 1992).
371. See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 156 (Hans Siegbert
Reiss ed., 1991).
372. See, e.g., "This Is the National Broadcasting Company" (Advertisement),
LIFE, July 16, 1945, at 56.
373. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, No. 02-682 (2003), 2003 WL 22068099 (arguing against
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societies have recognized that an injustice may occur if unlimited
freedom of contract is allowed to allocate benefits and burdens in
dealings when one party to the deal enjoys special access to state
power, strategic choke points in the economy, or informational
advantages (as in fraud or nondisclosure of material facts).374
Corrective justice does not endorse fraud or taking advantage of
others on the basis of an unlimited obligation to contract freely.3 75
Individual entrepreneurs such as lawyers and even hairdressers,
application of federal antitrust law to broadband DSL service because
regulations "can be developed by legislative branches and administrative
agencies with superior factfinding ability, greater industry expertise, existing
capacity for ongoing oversight and refinement, and the public accountability
that is an important companion to such economic policy"); Comcast Corp. v.
FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 647-48 (2010) ("In language the [FCC] now emphasizes,
Comcast [argued in a prior civil action that]: 'Any inquiry into whether
Comcast's [peer-to-peer] management is unlawful falls squarely within the
FCC's subject matter jurisdiction.'").
374. See STEPHEN CALKINS, AUGUST HORVATH, & JOHN VILLAFRANCO,
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 728-41 (2009) (describing
restrictions on misleading advertising in U.S., Europe, and Japan); THOMAS
EGER, MICHAEL G. FAURE, NAIGEN ZHANG, & ZHANG NAIGEN, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW IN CHINA 90-109 (2007) (describing competition laws in
China); DORIS HILDEBRAND, THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE EC
COMPETITION RULES 8-10, 236-39, 286, 375 (2008) (describing European law
restricting large companies from distorting European markets with their
excessive power); OECD, CHINA: DEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
MARKET AND THE STATE 146-47 (2009) (similar).
375. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (providing that contracts that
unreasonably restrain trade or create a combination that will do so are
unlawful); Cal. Civ. Code § 1689(b) (2005) ("A party to a contract may rescind
the contract in the following cases: (1) If the consent of the party rescinding, or
of any party jointly contracting with him, was given by mistake, or
obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, exercised
by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds, or of any
other party to the contract jointly interested with such party."); Consumer
Protection Act, 1987, S.I. 1987/43 (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl987/pdflukpga_19870043_en.pdf (restricting
sellers from misleadingly advertising prices, among other things); Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999, SI 1999/2083 (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/sil999/19992083.htm (restricting a variety of
misleading or unfair contracting practices); Behrend v. Comcast Corp., No. Civ.
A. 03-6604, 2007 WL 1300725, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2007), later proceedings
at 532 F.Supp.2d 735 and 245 F.R.D. 195 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (contracts between
broadband providers to split up monopoly territories were potentially unlawful
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2); Aval v. Earthlink, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 544, 557
(2005) (noting that contract terms extracted due to unequal bargaining power or
lack of disclosure may be void); KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW
1-29 (2003) (similar).
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with far less power than large-scale broadband networks, have to
contend with detailed regulations ensuring a high level of service. 37 6
Theories of distributive justice are often broken down into
several schools of thought, including libertarianism, egalitarianism,
and conservatism. The legislative history of the principal edifices of
American antitrust and telecommunications law reflects a theory of
modernist, egalitarian progressivism. 3 77  The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 expressly declared a federal policy of universal access to
telecommunication services without discrimination on account of
race or location.3 78 Although their view of regulation is more mixed,
even libertarian and conservative theories of distributive justice do
not necessarily countenance unlimited discrimination and
control.379 Media neutrality regulation promotes such equal access
by guaranteeing consumers minimum access when corporations
wish to deny it. Thus, it provided African-Americans, suffering
from one-sided coverage of disputes over the legality of anti-
miscegenation and segregation laws, with their only chance of
securing compelled access to pro-segregation media outlets in local
markets.380
376. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 7316-20.5 (2010) (regulating
hairdressing); id. § 6068 (2010) (regulating law practice); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§
400-17, 430-47 (1996) (regulating barbers and hairdressers); id. §§ 460-74-B
(1996) (regulating law practice); Whitcomb v. Emerson, 46 Cal. App. 2d 263
(1941); New York State Hairdressers & Cosmetologists Ass'n v. Cuomo, 369
N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
377. See LESLIE J. COOKENBOO, CRUDE OIL PIPE LINES AND COMPETITION IN
THE OIL INDUSTRY 1 (1955); ROBERT BRIT HORWITZ, THE IRONY
OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 69-72 (1991).
378. See Allen S. Hammond, IV, Universal Service in the Digital Age: The
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide, 50 FED. COMM.
L.J. 179, 206 (1997).
379. See, e.g., ROBERT DEVIGNE, RECASTING CONSERVATISM: OAKESHOTT,
STRAUSS, AND THE RESPONSE TO POSTMODERNISM 95-102 (1996) (describing
efforts by conservative scholars to theorize promotion of the public good, and
limitation on exploitation, luxury, and great fortunes); Robert Ehman, Natural
Property Rights: Where They Fall, in 15 PROBLEMS OF MARKET LIBERALISM 290
(Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1998) (describing
theorization by libertarian scholar Robert Nozick of limits on property rights in
interest of public access).
380. See, e.g., TV9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(noting that "Blacks did not participate in the ownership or management of any
mass communications media in the Orlando [Florida] area," and that the United
States Commission on Civil Rights found in 1971 that "fewer than one percent
of FCC-licensed radio stations in the U.S. were owned by minorities," and that
out of "[m]ore than 1,000 television stations, none is owned by minorities");
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519, 521
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Net neutrality has helped companies like Rowdy Orbit IPTV
and others overcome barriers to minority-produced media
content. 38 1 Tiered pricing based on speed or data caps should be
able to address the concern held by African-American organizations
that net neutrality will cause poor users to have to cross-subsidize
wealthy downloaders. 382  Other reasonable network management
policies that may prevent music lovers or high-definition television
viewers from demanding all the bandwidth on a "neutral" network
would also be tools to reduce spam, spyware, viruses, and denial of
service attacks. 38 3
Finally, civic republicanism, as a theory of maximizing
individual or collective virtue by promoting reflective, stable
identities, provides further support for regulating communications.
The relevance of unbiased information to individual development is
clear from a maxim of Epictetus: "Only the educated are free."384
The vision of an engaged American public that underlies the
Constitution and Bill of Rights likewise depends upon access to all
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing petition to deny renewal of FCC television license
on grounds that station ignored perspectives of African-Americans); Office of
Commc'n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (noting that FCC-licensed broadcaster "deliberately cut off a network
program about race relations problems on which the General Counsel of the
NAACP [appeared] ... [and] had presented a program urging the maintenance
of racial segregation and had refused requests for time to present the opposing
viewpoint," but that FCC renewed its license anyway); see also Brief Amicus
Curiae of National Black Media Coalition et al., CBS Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367
(1982) (Nos. 80-207, 80-213, 80-214), 1981 WL 390294, *4, 26 (U.S. Jan. 22,
1981) (arguing that "the public benefits from access to diverse viewpoints, not
just those supplied by concentrated media interests," and that "[h]owever well
intentioned and nonpartisan the networks (and other broadcasters) might be,
their power to determine what candidates may speak to the American public
and when cannot be insulated from review.").
381. See, e.g., Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn, Prepared Remarks to the
MMTC Broadband and Social Justice Summit, John H. Johnson School of
Communications, Howard University (Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http:/hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edoes-publictattachmatch/DOC-295888A1.pdf.
382. See Comments of Google Inc., at 68-74, Preserving the Open Internet
Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52
(Jan. 14, 2010), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020378767;
Marguerite Reardon, Vint Cerf Calls for Internet Speed Limits, CNET DIGITAL
MEDIA BLOG (Aug. 5, 2008 10:08 AM PDT), http:/news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-
10007079-93.html; Bandwidth Limits Make a Comeback, ABC NEWS (July 14,
2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/PCWorld/story?id=5373654.
383. See Comments of Google Inc., supra note 382, at 70-72.
384. KEVIN GOLDSTEIN-JACKSON, THE DICTIONARY OF ESSENTIAL
QUOTATIONS 57 (1983).
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relevant information and sources of opinion as necessary guidance
in operating the levers of the Republic.
Other scholars have described at length the relevance of this
civic republican emphasis on informed, active citizenship to the
problem of how to regulate television and/or the Internet.ss
International human rights law also implements this vision in
binding legal provisions.386
Ignorance and deliberate deception propagated by the
broadcast media in particular frustrate the informed exercise of
citizenship. While most mainstream legal scholarship erects a
bugbear of political minorities utilizing the Internet to barricade
themselves with virtual walls into "extremist enclaves,"387 a far
greater problem is the inculcation by telecommunications media of
false beliefs in the majority. Regulators reading the nation's
leading financial newspapers, magazines, and academic journals
385. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 270; Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 9, at
1171-1207; Pasquale, supra note 9.
386. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19,
2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice."); American Convention on Human Rights art. 13,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) ("Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any
other medium. . . ."); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and Nine Protocols art. 10, 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) ("Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.");
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A) (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to freedom
of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers."); GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN,
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-96 (2008) (discussing this right).
387. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 3-54, 192-210, 238 (paperback
ed., Princeton Univ. Press, 2002) (discussing the notion that new technology
allows users to seek out only the information that they wish to view and noting
that this may only reinforce and strengthen existing viewpoints); Mark S.
Nadel, Customized News Services and Extremist Enclaves in Republic.com, 54
STAN. L. REv. 831 (2002) (discussing Sunstein's idea that technology allows
extremists to find enclaves that support and encourage their radical
viewpoints).
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could hardly help but read paeans and hagiographies of CEOs and
private equity fund managers later exposed as reckless, deceptive,
and, more often, both.88 A renowned expert about how financial
deregulation led to the present banking crisis declared "that in the
bubble years, everyone becomes a cheerleader, including the
media," which failed to ask "tough questions."3 89 Instead, media
outlets plastered the "Masters of the Universe" on the covers of
newspapers, magazines, and television news clips, without
inquiring whether these CEOs, hedge-fund managers, or equity
firms were earning unnatural returns by "taking so much risk
they'[d] be bankrupt two years down the line."390 Such media
reports frequently ignored basic facts about Goldman Sachs and
Citigroup grossly misleading investors and the public,39 1 housing
price inflation far exceeding historical averages, 392  often
unregulated derivatives ballooning into an unstable multi-trillion-
dollar market,9  consumers going bankrupt at record rates, 9  and
wages and benefits stagnating or decreasing for many Americans.3 95
388. See, e.g., Sean Alfano, Workers Find The Gold at
Goldman Sachs, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/13/business/main2253330.shtml; Jeff
Greenfield, Did Network Drink Wall Street Kool-Aid, CBS NEWS (Mar. 13,
2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/13/eveningnews/main4864877.shtml.
389. Tunku Varadarajan, Interview with Nouriel Roubini, 'Nationalize' the
Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2009, at A9, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123517380343437079.html?mod=most-viewed_d
ay.
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., Associated Press, E-mail Trail Details
Wall Street Conflicts, USA TODAY (Apr. 28, 2003),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2003-04-28-settlement-
emails-x.htm (discussing the existence of conflicts of interest among employees
at firms); Thomas A. Fogarty and Edward Iwata, Links Between Reports,
Banking Fees Cited, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2003-04-28-banks3_x.htm
(discussing the various financial institutions' settlements with the regulators as
it relates to their stock analyses).
392. See The Danger of a Global House-Price Collapse,
THE EcONOMIST, June 16, 2005, available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfn?storyid=4079458.
393. See Too Much Derivatives Risk in too few Hands, THE PRUDENT
INVESTOR (Nov. 19, 2005), http://prudentinvestor.blogspot.com/2005/11/too-
much-derivatives-risk-in-too-few.html.
394. See generally Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An
Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AMER.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 415-16 (1999) (discussing the debate surrounding the
increase in consumer bankruptcies).
395. See Sue Kirchhoff, Increase to Minimum Wage Fails in Senate, USA
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Meanwhile, the broadcast media subjected the public to such
misleading mantras as "fundamentals of our economy are strong"396
or "house prices never go down."397  Such misperceptions
contributed to millions of Americans, most lacking a basic
familiarity with financial documents,398 entering into mortgages
that they could not repay, triggering a financial crisis that
bankrupted Wall Street and potentially several entire countries.399
The result will be an estimated thirteen million foreclosures of
home mortgages,4 0 0 and the diversion of $12 trillion of federal funds
TODAY (June 21, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-21-
minimum-wage.x.htm; One Million Join Ranks of US Poor, BBC NEWS.COM
(Aug. 26, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/3602874.stm (discussing the
increase in the level of poverty in the U.S. including statistics with regards to
different ethnicities).
396. See, e.g., NBC Today Show: Profile: President Bush to Give Speech
Today Outlining Ideas to Spur the Economy; Henry Paulson, Treasury
Secretary, and CNBC's Maria Bartiromo Discuss the Economy (NBC television
broadcast Jan. 18, 2008) (Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson stated: "The long-
term fundamentals of our economy are strong.. . . Well, our economy-the long-
term fundamentals are very strong in our economy, so we've got strong long-
term fundamentals."); NBC Today Show: Interview: Maria Bartiromo, CNBC,
Says Wall Street Doing Well because Asia and Europe's Economies Booming
(NBC television broadcast July 18, 2007) (attributing "rapid growth" in share
prices to "is the fundamentals. I mean, the economy is doing well in the US, but
even more important, the global economy is doing very well.").
397. See, e.g., Face The Nation (CBS television broadcast Aug. 21, 2005) ("I
don't think we're likely to see a large nominal price collapse, that is largely
falling house prices, but I think we'll see much lower rates of growth in house
prices after 2005.").
398. In a 2006 poll about half of homeowners "said they didn't know
much about the mortgage options that were available when they bought
their homes." Holden Lewis, Mortgage Borrowers Know That They
Don't Know Much, BANKRATE (Jan. 19, 2006),
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20060119al.asp. A third of
homeowners polled in 2007 didn't know what kind of mortgage (fixed rate,
adjustable rate, etc.) they had. See Press Release, Bankrate, 34% of
Homeowners Don't Know the Type of Mortgage They Have (Mar 26, 2007),
available at http://investor.bankrate.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=236049.
Two-thirds of Americans may not have been able to calculate how much interest
they paid monthly on their credit cards. See SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF
AMERICAN UNREASON 309 (2008).
399. See Simon Evans et al., Which Country Will Slither Down the Slippery
Slope Next?, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Oct. 19, 2008, at 80 (discussing the effect
of the U.S. banking crisis on a host of countries, including Estonia, Ukraine,
Argentina, Hungary, Russia, Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, India, Spain, and
China).
400. See Hubble Smith, Housing Market: Prime Loan Borrowers May Be
Poised to Face Home Foreclosures, LAS VEGAS REv. J. (Aug 9, 2009),
http://www.lvrj.com/business/52828477.html (noting expert predictions that an
increase in number of foreclosures was looming).
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from health care, education, and other human needs into corporate
bailouts and the extension of low-interest credit to U.S. banks. 401
There is likely a link between public ignorance or
misconceptions on the one hand and biased or selective media
coverage on the other. Many regulators, ordinary investors, and
captains of industry were caught off-guard by the global financial
crisis of 2008. Alan Greenspan expressed "shocked disbelief' when
"the self-interest of lending institutions [failed] to protect
shareholder's equity" from bad loans and losses from undue
financial speculation.40 2 Former Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Christopher Cox similarly complained that
the "global financial crisis has exposed many of the weaknesses and
holes in our regulatory system that are far greater and more
consequential than was previously understood," including "the $55
trillion national market in credit default swaps, which lacks
oversight and transparency."403  Over the past decade, various
reports have stated that between two-thirds and nine-tenths of
Americans get their news, or in other words, receive most of the
information they have about their government and the various
officials who control it, from television. Television's one-sided
programming has produced a toxic cocktail of false perceptions on
the part of the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Empirical research into the denial of public access and open
debate within the broadcast media has exposed the failure of the
FCC's deregulatory moves, including the repeal of the fairness
401. See Sharyl Attkinsson, Bailout Worst Case Tally:
$23.7 Trillion, CBS NEWS (July 21, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/20/cbsnewsinvestigates/main5175781.
shtml (federal obligations due to bailouts may exceed $23 trillion); David
Goldman, The $8 Trillion Bailout, CNNMONEY, Jan. 6, 2009, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/06/news/economy/where-stimulusfitsin/index.h
tm (discussing various distributions of federal loans and funding to banks as
part of federal bailouts); Lynn Thomasson, U.S. Stocks Advance as S&P 500
Index Erases Decline for Year, BLOOMBERG (May 4, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aMHNZIkTTfAs&ref
er=us ("The US government and the Federal Reserve have spent, lent or
committed at least $12.8 trillion to help end the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression, according to Bloomberg data.").
402. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 11-14 (2008)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve).
403. Christopher Cox, Op-Ed., Reinventing a Markets Watchdog, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 2008, at A17.
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doctrine. Anecdotal evidence and comparative research concerning
the willingness of broadband Internet corporations to distort the
availability of Internet connectivity and applications present an
even more foreboding prospect. Public and industry pressure to
avert discrimination and the degradation of applications resulted in
the FCC beating Congress to the punch in re-regulating Internet
infrastructure providers. The FCC's activist stance prompted it to
articulate a theory of the First Amendment that it had all but
abandoned in deregulating the broadcast space, namely that
unlimited corporate control over a mechanism for mass
communication is incompatible with equal access to speech and
debate. This theory has support in the purposes and original
context of the First Amendment, as well as in the economics of
communications infrastructure and the political theory of
democracies.
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